Snapchatting prior to crash
10-08-2023 | 04:52 PM
#21
Line Holder
Joined: Mar 2018
Posts: 661
Likes: 88
What has that got to do with the price of tea in China?
Neither pilot required an ATP.
Neither pilot was flying for an airline.
It was a general aviation mishap.
The number of hours either one had, is irrelevant.
Neither was qualified to hold an ATP certificate.
There was no "ATP rule in action."
Neither pilot required an ATP.
Neither pilot was flying for an airline.
It was a general aviation mishap.
The number of hours either one had, is irrelevant.
Neither was qualified to hold an ATP certificate.
There was no "ATP rule in action."
10-08-2023 | 05:42 PM
#22
Thread Starter
Disinterested Third Party
Joined: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,758
Likes: 74
There's no "1500 hour rule," and the ATP has been around for a long, long time. It's quite irrelevant to this mishap, but thanks for injecting irrelevant political diatribe into the thread.
Let me spell it out for you. Neither one of them had an ATP, and neither one of them was required to have one. The subject of the thread is snapchatting and the use of personal electronic devices in lieu of paying attention to flying the airplane, not ATP certification.
Your straw man assertion might apply to every aviator who dies short of obtaining the ATP, or if you prefer, 1,500 hours. Saved from another airline mishap? Bull ****.
I've flown with plenty of ATPs who weren't worth their weight in wet salt, in large, widebody, transport category airplanes. The natural extension of your macabre rationale is that we'd have all been better off if they'd been killed early on. Again, what an idiotic thing to assert.
In the case of the instructor who was snap-chatting, an assertion that somehow ATP minimums played into his mishap, or that he was saved from reaching them, is at best a god damn idiotic suggestion, and you assume on hell of a lot. What this kid did when in his early instructing hours is not necessarily what he would have done at 1,500 hours, or in a type training program, or beyond. When I was his age, I was spraying crops and flying formation under powerlines while doing it, but having flown and worked around airplanes since I was a kid, I made a lot of stupid mistakes, like. many of us, and my understanding, attitude, and judgement evolved (and continues to evolve). What I knew yesterday, I know differently today, and will know another way tomorrow. Are you asserting that. the snapshot of this kid in the Warrior is exactly how he'd remain a year from now? Five years? Ten years? What makes you think he'd have passed a checkride? Wouldn't it be up to the judgement of the check airmen evaluating him? (why should they bother: you're taking care of the evaluation now). Better off dead, to save others in the future?
You really want to go there? Well, god damn.
10-12-2023 | 07:58 AM
#23
Line Holder
Joined: Jul 2017
Posts: 1,530
Likes: 24
Thanks for spelling it out. Maybe next time use a pop-up book and pictures.
There's no "1500 hour rule," and the ATP has been around for a long, long time. It's quite irrelevant to this mishap, but thanks for injecting irrelevant political diatribe into the thread.
Let me spell it out for you. Neither one of them had an ATP, and neither one of them was required to have one. The subject of the thread is snapchatting and the use of personal electronic devices in lieu of paying attention to flying the airplane, not ATP certification.
Your straw man assertion might apply to every aviator who dies short of obtaining the ATP, or if you prefer, 1,500 hours. Saved from another airline mishap? Bull ****.
I've flown with plenty of ATPs who weren't worth their weight in wet salt, in large, widebody, transport category airplanes. The natural extension of your macabre rationale is that we'd have all been better off if they'd been killed early on. Again, what an idiotic thing to assert.
In the case of the instructor who was snap-chatting, an assertion that somehow ATP minimums played into his mishap, or that he was saved from reaching them, is at best a god damn idiotic suggestion, and you assume on hell of a lot. What this kid did when in his early instructing hours is not necessarily what he would have done at 1,500 hours, or in a type training program, or beyond. When I was his age, I was spraying crops and flying formation under powerlines while doing it, but having flown and worked around airplanes since I was a kid, I made a lot of stupid mistakes, like. many of us, and my understanding, attitude, and judgement evolved (and continues to evolve). What I knew yesterday, I know differently today, and will know another way tomorrow. Are you asserting that. the snapshot of this kid in the Warrior is exactly how he'd remain a year from now? Five years? Ten years? What makes you think he'd have passed a checkride? Wouldn't it be up to the judgement of the check airmen evaluating him? (why should they bother: you're taking care of the evaluation now). Better off dead, to save others in the future?
You really want to go there? Well, god damn.
There's no "1500 hour rule," and the ATP has been around for a long, long time. It's quite irrelevant to this mishap, but thanks for injecting irrelevant political diatribe into the thread.
Let me spell it out for you. Neither one of them had an ATP, and neither one of them was required to have one. The subject of the thread is snapchatting and the use of personal electronic devices in lieu of paying attention to flying the airplane, not ATP certification.
Your straw man assertion might apply to every aviator who dies short of obtaining the ATP, or if you prefer, 1,500 hours. Saved from another airline mishap? Bull ****.
I've flown with plenty of ATPs who weren't worth their weight in wet salt, in large, widebody, transport category airplanes. The natural extension of your macabre rationale is that we'd have all been better off if they'd been killed early on. Again, what an idiotic thing to assert.
In the case of the instructor who was snap-chatting, an assertion that somehow ATP minimums played into his mishap, or that he was saved from reaching them, is at best a god damn idiotic suggestion, and you assume on hell of a lot. What this kid did when in his early instructing hours is not necessarily what he would have done at 1,500 hours, or in a type training program, or beyond. When I was his age, I was spraying crops and flying formation under powerlines while doing it, but having flown and worked around airplanes since I was a kid, I made a lot of stupid mistakes, like. many of us, and my understanding, attitude, and judgement evolved (and continues to evolve). What I knew yesterday, I know differently today, and will know another way tomorrow. Are you asserting that. the snapshot of this kid in the Warrior is exactly how he'd remain a year from now? Five years? Ten years? What makes you think he'd have passed a checkride? Wouldn't it be up to the judgement of the check airmen evaluating him? (why should they bother: you're taking care of the evaluation now). Better off dead, to save others in the future?
You really want to go there? Well, god damn.
What sort of oversight did this CFI have? What sort of mentoring? What happened at this FAR61 school/FBO?
The 1500hr rule allows some time for these quirks to work themselves out.
10-12-2023 | 09:04 AM
#24
Line Holder
Joined: Jul 2017
Posts: 1,530
Likes: 24
Who gave this guy his CFI initial? What were his motivations in snapchatting a crappy exchange with his student? Was there some rice-bowl issue with this student's usual instructor? The student's father is a pilot and they flew together a fair bit. Did he know about the accident CFI's lack of ability? So many questions for a real investigation to look into.
10-12-2023 | 09:07 AM
#25
Line Holder
Joined: Jul 2017
Posts: 1,530
Likes: 24
Who gave this guy his CFI initial? What were his motivations in snapchatting a crappy exchange with his student? Was there some rice-bowl issue with this student's usual instructor? The student's father is a pilot and they flew together a fair bit. Did he know about the accident CFI's lack of ability? So many questions for a real investigation to look into.
Since checking and standards are fallible (The accident instructor had his CFI with these deficiencies.) the 1500hr rule is a secondary safety net to catch/correct/educate. I don't think I made that point effectively in my earlier post.
Since checking and standards are fallible (The accident instructor had his CFI with these deficiencies.) the 1500hr rule is a secondary safety net to catch/correct/educate. I don't think I made that point effectively in my earlier post.
10-12-2023 | 03:48 PM
#26
Thread Starter
Disinterested Third Party
Joined: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,758
Likes: 74
There's no "1,500 hour rule." There never was. It does not exist.
There is only a requirement for an ATP, and then only for operations that require the ATP. The ATP may be granted with varying combinations of total flight time and education/experience. While the basic requirement is for 1,500 hours, the ATP may be had with less, with some restriction.
We don't know anything about the CFI's "lack of ability," or of his capability. Evidently he flew into convective weather and lost control of the aircraft. In a former life, one of my jobs was atmospheric research: thunderstorms, specifically; I flew back and forth through them with sensors and various equipment. My biggest takeaway from having done that is that while it was interesting and I saw and experienced things that 99.9% of us will rightfully never experience, or hope to experience; my one takeaway is that I don't want to every fly through a thunderstorm again. Regardless of one's capability, there are forces inside thunderstorms, as we're all at least academically aware, that exceed the capability of both man and machine (regardless of ability or capability). Greater skill or experience or the pool of both that makes up a given airman, the greater his or her opportunity to survive an encounter, but forces within separate man from machine, and machine from itself.
Did the CFI's use of snapchat have anything to do with his flying into convective weather? This, we don't know. Certainly judgement played a role. Many of us might have postponed the flight or gone a different direction, and made contingency plans to delay the return, divert, etc.
The application of skills as an airman or instructor on the day of the practical test do not necessarily equate to the product of decision making in the evolution of weather, flight, etc. It's very possible that the CFI said and did all the right things to be blessed with wet ink and the classic admonition that it's a license to learn. Some lessons don't end well, particularly for the student who doesn't pay adequate attention.
There is only a requirement for an ATP, and then only for operations that require the ATP. The ATP may be granted with varying combinations of total flight time and education/experience. While the basic requirement is for 1,500 hours, the ATP may be had with less, with some restriction.
We don't know anything about the CFI's "lack of ability," or of his capability. Evidently he flew into convective weather and lost control of the aircraft. In a former life, one of my jobs was atmospheric research: thunderstorms, specifically; I flew back and forth through them with sensors and various equipment. My biggest takeaway from having done that is that while it was interesting and I saw and experienced things that 99.9% of us will rightfully never experience, or hope to experience; my one takeaway is that I don't want to every fly through a thunderstorm again. Regardless of one's capability, there are forces inside thunderstorms, as we're all at least academically aware, that exceed the capability of both man and machine (regardless of ability or capability). Greater skill or experience or the pool of both that makes up a given airman, the greater his or her opportunity to survive an encounter, but forces within separate man from machine, and machine from itself.
Did the CFI's use of snapchat have anything to do with his flying into convective weather? This, we don't know. Certainly judgement played a role. Many of us might have postponed the flight or gone a different direction, and made contingency plans to delay the return, divert, etc.
The application of skills as an airman or instructor on the day of the practical test do not necessarily equate to the product of decision making in the evolution of weather, flight, etc. It's very possible that the CFI said and did all the right things to be blessed with wet ink and the classic admonition that it's a license to learn. Some lessons don't end well, particularly for the student who doesn't pay adequate attention.
10-19-2023 | 02:29 PM
#27
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Apr 2016
Posts: 138
Likes: 0
From: 767
Prelim is out
On September 27, 2023, about 2249 central daylight time, a Piper PA-28-161, N3079M, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Whitesville, Kentucky. The flight instructor and student pilot were fatally injured. The airplane was operated by Eagle Flight Academy as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight.
According to the operator and the student pilot’s regular flight instructor, the accident instructor and student pilot were on the return portion of a night cross-country flight, and it was their first time flying together. Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) data indicated that the airplane departed Bowling Green-Woodhurst Airport (BWG), Bowling Green, Kentucky, around 2155. The airplane climbed to 4,500 ft msl and proceeded on a northwesterly course toward Owensboro/Daviess County Regional Airport (OWB), Owensboro, Kentucky, on a visual flight rules flight plan.
According to preliminary air traffic control (ATC) voice communications, the pilot contacted ATC at 2244 and the controller advised the pilot of heavy to extreme precipitation at the airplane’s nine o’clock position. ADS-B data showed that the airplane continued its northwesterly course and about two minutes later, the flight instructor requested an instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance. The controller issued the clearance and provided an easterly vector to assist the flight in getting out of the weather. The flight instructor stated to the controller that the airplane was “getting blown around like crazy,” and the airplane’s flight track showed a turn to the northwest followed by a right circling turn. The controller reiterated the heading of 090o, and the flight instructor responded that they were in “pretty extreme turbulence.” The flight track showed a continuing right descending turn, and no further communications were received from the flight instructor. The airplane's last ADS-B position, at 2249, was at an altitude of 2,200 ft and about 1,000 ft northwest of the wreckage debris field, which spanned 25 acres in a hilly, densely wooded area.
Page 2 of 4 ERA23FA380 This information is preliminary and subject to change.
All major components of the airplane, except for the left portion of the stabilator, were located in the debris field. The fuselage was separated aft of the rear seat, and the forward fuselage, including the cockpit, engine, and right wing, were located together in the most westerly portion of the debris field. The left wing, with aileron attached, was separated from the fuselage, and was located about 800 ft east of the forward fuselage. The flap was separated from the wing and located in the debris field. The right wing remained attached to the forward fuselage and was upside down with aileron and flap attached. The empennage with vertical stabilizer intact was located over a ridge about 200 ft north of the forward fuselage. The rudder was torn diagonally from top to bottom, with the lower portion remaining attached to the vertical stabilizer and the upper portion separated and located near the empennage in the debris field. The stabilator was torn chordwise just outboard of the hinges. The right side of the stabilator was located about 1,500 ft away from the forward fuselage in the most eastern edge of the debris field.
The wreckage was recovered to a salvage facility for further examination. The left wing’s interior ribs exhibited signatures consistent with the aileron bellcrank having been pulled from its mount and drawn through the wing to the inboard end. The aileron bellcrank was broken with the balance cable arm remaining attached to the balance cable. The balance cable was continuous to the right wing. The remainder of the bellcrank was not located. The right wing aileron cables remained attached to the bellcrank and the bellcrank remained attached to the wing.
Examination of the engine revealed that the fixed-pitch propeller remained attached to the crankshaft propeller flange, and both propeller blades appeared straight. The engine displayed impact damage. The starter ring gear was impact fractured into several pieces, and the alternator was attached to the front of the engine by one bolt. The carburetor was impact separated at the bowl. Suction and compression were observed on all cylinders when the propellor was rotated by hand. Valvetrain continuity was confirmed throughout the engine and all rocker arms moved when the crankshaft was rotated. No anomalies were noted during examination of the engine cylinders with a lighted borescope. Both magnetos were tightly installed, and once removed and rotated using an electric drill, spark was produced at each ignition lead point. Liquid consistent in odor and color with 100LL aviation fuel drained from the boost pump when the filter cover was removed. Examination of the engine did not reveal any preaccident anomalies or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation.
According to the operator and the student pilot’s regular flight instructor, the accident instructor and student pilot were on the return portion of a night cross-country flight, and it was their first time flying together. Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) data indicated that the airplane departed Bowling Green-Woodhurst Airport (BWG), Bowling Green, Kentucky, around 2155. The airplane climbed to 4,500 ft msl and proceeded on a northwesterly course toward Owensboro/Daviess County Regional Airport (OWB), Owensboro, Kentucky, on a visual flight rules flight plan.
According to preliminary air traffic control (ATC) voice communications, the pilot contacted ATC at 2244 and the controller advised the pilot of heavy to extreme precipitation at the airplane’s nine o’clock position. ADS-B data showed that the airplane continued its northwesterly course and about two minutes later, the flight instructor requested an instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance. The controller issued the clearance and provided an easterly vector to assist the flight in getting out of the weather. The flight instructor stated to the controller that the airplane was “getting blown around like crazy,” and the airplane’s flight track showed a turn to the northwest followed by a right circling turn. The controller reiterated the heading of 090o, and the flight instructor responded that they were in “pretty extreme turbulence.” The flight track showed a continuing right descending turn, and no further communications were received from the flight instructor. The airplane's last ADS-B position, at 2249, was at an altitude of 2,200 ft and about 1,000 ft northwest of the wreckage debris field, which spanned 25 acres in a hilly, densely wooded area.
Page 2 of 4 ERA23FA380 This information is preliminary and subject to change.
All major components of the airplane, except for the left portion of the stabilator, were located in the debris field. The fuselage was separated aft of the rear seat, and the forward fuselage, including the cockpit, engine, and right wing, were located together in the most westerly portion of the debris field. The left wing, with aileron attached, was separated from the fuselage, and was located about 800 ft east of the forward fuselage. The flap was separated from the wing and located in the debris field. The right wing remained attached to the forward fuselage and was upside down with aileron and flap attached. The empennage with vertical stabilizer intact was located over a ridge about 200 ft north of the forward fuselage. The rudder was torn diagonally from top to bottom, with the lower portion remaining attached to the vertical stabilizer and the upper portion separated and located near the empennage in the debris field. The stabilator was torn chordwise just outboard of the hinges. The right side of the stabilator was located about 1,500 ft away from the forward fuselage in the most eastern edge of the debris field.
The wreckage was recovered to a salvage facility for further examination. The left wing’s interior ribs exhibited signatures consistent with the aileron bellcrank having been pulled from its mount and drawn through the wing to the inboard end. The aileron bellcrank was broken with the balance cable arm remaining attached to the balance cable. The balance cable was continuous to the right wing. The remainder of the bellcrank was not located. The right wing aileron cables remained attached to the bellcrank and the bellcrank remained attached to the wing.
Examination of the engine revealed that the fixed-pitch propeller remained attached to the crankshaft propeller flange, and both propeller blades appeared straight. The engine displayed impact damage. The starter ring gear was impact fractured into several pieces, and the alternator was attached to the front of the engine by one bolt. The carburetor was impact separated at the bowl. Suction and compression were observed on all cylinders when the propellor was rotated by hand. Valvetrain continuity was confirmed throughout the engine and all rocker arms moved when the crankshaft was rotated. No anomalies were noted during examination of the engine cylinders with a lighted borescope. Both magnetos were tightly installed, and once removed and rotated using an electric drill, spark was produced at each ignition lead point. Liquid consistent in odor and color with 100LL aviation fuel drained from the boost pump when the filter cover was removed. Examination of the engine did not reveal any preaccident anomalies or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation.
Thread
Thread Starter
Forum
Replies
Last Post
