That's not the Radar, that's the Mr. Coffee machine.

 

Late 1990's or early 2000's our quarterly pilot magazine came out with a letter by C.E (AA CP at the time). "If you're IMC, or at night with no lights visible (ie Amazon, ocean), or at any time you can't see the horizon, turn the darn radar on. We had 6 flights go blasting through thunderstorms last quarter."

AF447 CEO press conference the day after the accident (paraphrased but pretty darn close) - "we had a previous flight 15 minutes ahead deviating for weather. The had some turbulence that was greater than expected, they changed their radar settings, and decided to deviate to the other side of the planned route. We need to talk to them." Okay, anyone think they hit harder than expected turbulence from buildups and decreased the sensitivity? They intially deviated to the same side that AF447 did, hit some turbulence in buildups, changed their radar settings, and switched to the other side of the magenta line.

Next up is looking at the flight control inputs after the initial turbulence. Warren Vandenberg 'Children of the Magenta line' videos and presentation said the majority of upset injuries don't occur in the initial event but occur when the pilots intervene manually. How many pilots have never hand flown at the mid or upper 30's? When they have the a/p on before 1000', or 5000', does anyone think they have much knowledge or awareness, if any, of the pitch sensitivity at higher mach? The post analysis FDR readouts say it's often a short coming that results in a greater number of injuries. The data trace seems to show a positive G climb followed by two large descents (less than 1 G to perhaps negative G transitions). There's a good chance that's when the injuries occurred.