Can I ask a question?


Why is everyone calling SFO a "tricky" runway? It is a long, flat piece of pavement. We aim for the same landing spot every flight, regardless of weight.

If you want to say ASE is a "tricky runway", you have an argument. Saying SFO is tricky is saying LGA, JFK, ATL, IAD, etc. are tricky because they are long, flat pieces of pavement.

It shouldn't matter that there is water around the end of the runways, we aim for the long, flat piece of pavement. Saying this was "his first landing in SFO" shouldn't even be a discussion, IMO.

SFO has its own threats... particularly the fact that I swear ATC is watching your FMA, waiting for altitude capture and for the engines to spool up before clearing you to your next altitude. It's a constant battle for energy management going into there.

bump......

Heading East on a ULR and your brain is mush.....gotta agree with the above poster on that

And I'm afraid this crash will further push the automation school -of-thoughts into their respective corners...of that I am certain

what I can say personally is that after a 12+ hr ulr, jumping 8+ time zones, the 20's yr old 1900 driver in me still itches to disconnect everything at 5000 ft but the 40's 777 Captain keeps the automation in until 1500 ft.

call me lazy? maybe....I dunno. I honestly see both sides of this issue without bias

I've got my money on that one... It's happened before and will happen again.

And in regard to the "HOLD" function of the AT on the 777. All HOLD does is the AT stays at its current postion, without reference to speed, you are free to move the thrust levers as much as you want. The servos do not fight you. For example, above 80 kts during the takeoff roll, after the FMA changes from THRUST REF to HOLD, you can, as well, choose to push the levers forward, or retard (say for a abort) the system is disregarding your speed and will not fight your input. We train to disconnect the autothrottles anyway during a +80 kt abort but if the system is in HOLD you really don't need to...its just for consistency

HOLD is just that....The plane is saying: I am "HOLDing" this last postion until you tell me otherwise, or you are too unaware and I will wakeup below 1.3Vso and increase thrust (assuming other systems are active, like pri flight computers)

Not Very Subtle
 

I would disagree that "KAL turned it around". The fact is that KAL had several, preventable fatal accidents and their accident and incident rate became a real concern to the worldwide aviation community. The FAA, Transport Canada and EU officials finally convinced KAL that if they didn't address training, CRM and safety issues they were facing action that would prevent them from operating in major Western airports. KAL finally capitulated and hired Boeing and Airbus and a ton of expat sim instructors from all over the world to train their crews. Has it been successful ? In my opinion, marginally but this crew apparently reflects the huge gulf in experience in operating heavy transport category aircraft by the Korean pilot group.

I won't even address the cultural differences of Korean society; however, there is a retired United Standards Captain who spent 6 years training KAL and Asiana Airlines crews in Korea that recently wrote an article on his experiences. It's an eye opener to be sure and I'll provide a link if anyone is interested.

Y'all be safe out there.

G'day Mates:)

I wouldn't go so far as to call you lazy because you're the professional that should be assessing his capabilities (and his crew's), the wx conditions, aircraft status, etc. and choose the appropriate level of automation for the task.

I would question the implication in your post that it's somehow ALWAYS better to keep the automation on until the last 5 miles and 2 minutes of the flight. Even if you're fresh, grabbing a handful of aircraft at 1500 feet and getting "in tune" with it can take a little while. Sometimes even if I'm a little tired, starting to hand fly sooner rather than later helps me wake up, get my scan going and get the feel of the aircraft. Clicking off the autopilot in last minute or two sometimes feels a little like getting zapped onto final in the sim when it's not quite trimmed and you play catch-up until you're over the numbers.

Keep in mind that wakeup (like A.FLOOR on the bus) is not available below 100 RA.

Pretty good brief today (Tues Jul 9) from the NTSB.

Briefing | C-SPAN

Left side (pilot flying) flight director was off.
Autothrottles were armed but she is still not sure if they were engaged and if so, in what mode.
Also seems to still be unsure what descent mode they were in. Last mentioned was vertical speed.
There were only 3 pilots in the cockpit. The relief capt was in the cabin.
Two flt attendants seated in rear were "ejected" at the initial impact. (YIKES!) They both survived.
One of the 16 yr old fatalities may have had her seat belt off and was moving around the cabin at impact.

Acknowledged she is aware that ALPA is not happy with release of information. Doesn't care. NTSB works for the flying public.

(IMHO ALPA is only making the pilots look worse by whining about the release of info)

From 777 FCOM:

"With the autothrottle armed, the autothrottle automatically activates if no autopilot
or F/D is active or an autopilot or F/D is in VNAV XXX, ALT, V/S, or G/S, and:
• speed less than an FMC calculated value for one second
• thrust below reference thrust
• airplane altitude above 100 feet RA on approach, or airplane barometric altitude 400 feet above airport on takeoff
The autothrottle can support stall protection when armed and not activated. If speed decreases to near stick shaker activation, the autothrottle automatically activates in the appropriate mode (SPD or THR REF) and advances thrust to maintain minimum maneuvering speed (approximately the top of the amber band)
or the speed set in the mode control speed window, whichever is greater. The EICAS message AIRSPEED LOW displays.
Note: When the pitch mode is FLCH or TOGA, or the airplane is below 400 feet above the airport on takeoff, or below 100 feet radio altitude on approach, the autothrottle will not automatically activate.
Refer to Chapter 10, Flight Instruments, Displays, for PFD indications.
Note: During a descent in VNAV SPD, the autothrottle may activate in HOLD mode and will not support stall protection."

Evidence seems to indicate the possibility of VNAV SPD/HOLD or FL CH SPD/HOLD.

I understand your point. Perhaps I could have phrased it better. Sometimes I awaken from the bunk feeling like fresh like a kid on xmas morning, sometimes I get very little sleep....I wish I knew beforehand which way I will feel when I slide back in the chair, but honestly, I don't. There seems to be no reason to it. Its the nature of the beast. There are times, I am saying, where leaving the automation in is best. If you would've asked me 20 yrs ago if I ever believed this to be true I probably would've said your crazy, but here I am. Maybe with seasoning comes the rationalization that I need to weigh all alternatives. Doesn't make me any less a pilot or professional.

Quote:
Originally Posted by the turtle http://www.airlinepilotforums.com/im...s/viewpost.gif
And in regard to the "HOLD" function of the AT on the 777. All HOLD does is the AT stays at its current postion, without reference to speed, you are free to move the thrust levers as much as you want. The servos do not fight you. For example, above 80 kts during the takeoff roll, after the FMA changes from THRUST REF to HOLD, you can, as well, choose to push the levers forward, or retard (say for a abort) the system is disregarding your speed and will not fight your input. We train to disconnect the autothrottles anyway during a +80 kt abort but if the system is in HOLD you really don't need to...its just for consistency

HOLD is just that....The plane is saying: I am "HOLDing" this last postion until you tell me otherwise, or you are too unaware and I will wakeup below 1.3Vso and increase thrust (assuming other systems are active, like pri flight computers)

Keep in mind that wakeup (like A.FLOOR on the bus) is not available below 100 RA.


Agreed. AT wakeup is there to protect a mismanaged mode selection or incapacitation, or other crazy scenario, in flight. By 100 RA the aircraft correctly assumes its landing, if in landing config, which by all accounts, it was. Its looking to fully retard the throttles by 20 RA.

off to bed for me

Certainly not. I apologize if my post gave you the impression I was implying this.

I agree with you, and I could say similar things about ATL, DFW, LAX, EGLL, etc.

But energy management, weather, a 'shuttle' approach, traffic; these are things we deal with in order to find that long, flat piece of pavement. SFO is just as/no more challenging than other airports. Why it gets deemed a 'tricky' runway is beyond me.

Interesting iussion from 2008 here:

777 FLCH in climb and a/t going into HOLD, no low speed prot - PPRuNe Forums

Asiana Pilot Training
 

Got this in my eMail this morning. It's not me.

After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the –400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.

One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.

We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.

This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “normal” standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.

Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then “Cleared for the approach” and he could have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to “Extend the FAF” and he couldn’t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.” Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).

This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141’s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!

The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture.

The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don’t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don’t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!

Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.

Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250’ after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800’ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks.

So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck.

That probably says more to what factors were behind the crash than anything I've seen to date.

Here is the thing...
You can talk about "FLCH trap" and the hold mode all you want. In the end, there are three primary things I am scanning on final...airspeed, aimpoint, and centerline. By engaging automation, you are supposed to be freeing up your spare brain cells to assist in scanning those three things. Unless something else distracted the pilots, I don't see how anyone can make an excuse for what appears to be a basic lack of airmanship and allowing a heavy aircraft with revenue passengers to get that slow. In my community (military heavy pilot) if we get more than 5 knots below computed threshold speed, someone is speaking up. If for nothing else but self preservation, I can't understand how this was allowed to happen.

E6B, I was not making any excuses for this Captain or LCA. The question was how could the power be at idle without someone physically holding the throttles back? In the B777 the AT mode "HOLD" can and will bite you if you don't include the FMA's in your scan. I am a product of " meatball, line-up, angle of attack" and stick to that scan 31 years later, but when I started flying EFIS/FMS commercial aircraft I had to expand my scan to include the FMA's. These engineers have designed these aircraft around the EFIS/FMS. In the B777 if you want to change the ILS you do it through the FMS, want to tune a VOR, you do it through the FMS. As for the AT system, as soon as you line up at the end of the runway and TOGA the AT system automatically engages. To me the FMA's tell you what the aircraft thinks it's doing whether you have the automation coupled up or not. And for the best results/ smoothest operation of the aircraft whether hand flying or coupled up FMA's must be added to your scan. Hopefully, we can all take something away from this tragic accident that will make us all better aviators. The ATM

Madman 1, thanks for the post, an excellent presentation of how and why this could possibly happen. Friend of mine was expat 777 Capt at Asiana and had identical experiences as you stated. Maybe this will foster real change.

Sorry, I wasn't specifically referring to your post. My apologies if it was taken that way.

Good info on how everything works in the 777. I agree that it is easy to fall into a trap with automation. I have flown right through an ILS course or departure radial many times because I wasn't scanning the FMA. The E-6 doesn't even approach the level of automation available in the 777 though. Luckily, I had a bro sitting next to me willing to back me up and save me from my laziness/lack of attention. It doesn't appear that happened in this case.

It just blows my mind that something as important and basic as airspeed on final was allowed to get that far out of hand. I have seen four reds before, but I acknowledged it and made an immediate correction.

The only thing I can think of is that maybe the mindset of "everything is ok, why is this damn stick shaker going off?" may have crept in because they assumed the autothrottles had it. When all your senses are telling you things are fine and then you get conflicting info, it is easy to try to figure out why that shaker/alarm/light is malfunctioning instead of reacting like you should, which in this case would be to initiate an immediate go-around.

The PIC (right seat captain) told the NTSB that he thought the auto throttles were maintaining speed and the first thing he noticed was that they were low. It appears that the airspeed had completely fallen out of his cross check. Why that would occur has everything to do with how he had used (and gotten used to) automation in the past, which may have been "select and forget" vs "select and verify, verify, verify" (once each for button position, FMA, raw data).

Agree. Getting past the that it was the CA's OE/new to the plane, the LCA was new to the job, a "cultural issue", it was a long haul flight, whatever etc.

It's astounding that at the end of the day, just like in MANY other accidents/incidents/mishaps, that simply being a pilot and flying an airplane got tossed out the window. In this case, Pitch+Power=Performance, or whatever other terminology one has for it.

Thank you for posting a CONFIDENTIAL FSAP Report on a public forum. :confused:

It appears as though the pilot who wrote it has his friends to thank. I've seen it on facebook and gotten it emailed to me.

Credit Where it's Due
 

The article was written and posted on the United pilot's forum by Captain Brown, a retired United Standards Captain. It is a public forum as is the report from the F/O of the United flight holding short of 28L.

As for change, I seriously doubt it. I worked with the Korean Marines during the Viet Nam war and saw the same cultural issues Captain Brown discusses. While there were a number of bright Korean individuals involved in flight operations, those ingrained cultural issues that have been characteristic of that society have been there for centuries and aren't likely to change any time soon.

G'Luck Mates :)

Public Document
 

There is NOTHING confidential about a posting on the retired United pilot's forum. This particular article has been posted in several public forums as has Captain Brown's article about his experiences as a simulator instructor for Altheon.

Boneman simply passed on a public document which is in no way confidential !

G'Luck Mate:)

Interesting point from a CNN article says the pilot set 1500 V/S at 4000ft because they were a little high and thought the A/T were armed. On a 3degree glide path they would have been 13-14 miles from the airfield. At 200kts that would require 1000vvi to maintain glide path and 137 = 700ft/ min. If slowing to 137 then the throttles would pull back to almost idle. But I wouldn't think the aircraft would slow very quickly with a 1500ft/min descent. Left unchecked V/S would fly you right into the ground on visual approach/no automation Approach. In the military we used V/S on PARs based on our ground speed, but had a minimum altitude set where as on a visual approach the would be no minimum set which would provide altitude warnings.

I did a little more hand flying today than usual because of this, funny how easy it is to become reliant on that crap. Buuutttt it all worked out ;)

Oh yeah. This is real sensitive and confidential stuff here.:rolleyes:

<yawn>

Clean Aircraft
 

One point to consider and I realize that none of us were in the cockpit of Asiana 214. The 777 is a very clean aircraft and it takes a considerable amount of "thinking ahead" to safely execute a visual approach to any runway. Not a big deal to those familiar with the aircraft's aerodynamic characteristics, but, in my opinion, this crew was behind the aircraft and may not have realized what the autoflight was doing, IF even engaged.

We'll wait until the NTSB finishes their work before passing judgement but I'd bet a case of good brew that a lack of situational awareness was a major factor in this unfortunate accident.

Y'all be careful out there.:)

By quoting it... you just re-posted it!

Its been out there long before I posted it!

I only meant turn around in regard to the fact that the accidents DID stop/decrease! Everything else I agree with.

Don't worry about it....

Check out this article...

A guide to crash speak - The Week

Trying to teach the general public the concept of an ILS and stabilized approach? That's a bold move consider John Q. Public couldn't pass a 9th grade math class.

I wouldn't think so either. I wonder if the speedbrake was extended/left extended during the approach. Avherald.com (8 July addendum) had a timeframe/altitude/KIAS breakdown. At 1400', aircraft was 170KIAS, and had descended at an average rate of 1333 FPM from 1600'. In the 36 seconds of the descent from 1400' - 500' (average 1500 FPM descent), aircraft lost 36 KIAS. ( 1 Kt./ sec.) No specific configuration was listed. Even so I'm doubtful that gear down and landing flaps would yield the altitude/airspeed loss in the time frame without some use of speed brakes.

Like others, I'd be interested to read the final report, these are just my thoughts with the limited information provided so far.

Does anybody have an issue with the NTSB releasing so much information. I thought the CVR was for crash investigation not news media sensationalism. I know they haven't published the transcripts but they are paraphrasing exchanges from the CVR. The public can read it in the final report, not now.