Good post, but this sentence summarizes nicely. This could just as easily have been Emirates or Etihad.

Someone asked, "Why didn't the LCA intervene?"

I have been an LCA on multiple airplanes and there is a built in issue with OEing a Captain, who's in charge.

The issue is even more acute with a new captain upgrade because he or she is used to the other person being captain and will often defer to the LCA instead of making the decision. At UAL we had an OE fly through a thunderstorm and destroy the front windshields and nose cone. The issue was each thought the other would either make the right decision or was OK with what was happening.

So the moral of the story is the only thing more dangerous than two captains at the controls is when a management pilot and a flight instructor are at the controls.

Regardless of the psych/human factor issues there is no excuse for the fact two people are dead, many more physically injured for the rest of their lives and not to mention the entire pax count is scarred mentally as well.

Quite an interesting dilemma (bold/italics emphasis added by me). I wonder if you all discuss these issues in your CRM training and general crew dialogue?

Having dealt with Asiana crews before in a maintenance capacity, I know how they are (or were back in the late 90's when i worked the flights) with the hierarchy.

Do you feel that you can bring up an issue like this before flying with a Management pilot (assuming you are a US Carrier based pilot) to put that issue aside before beginning your general crew duties Pre-flight?

NTSB presser this morning had the aircraft traveling at approximately 106 knots upon impact and at about 118 knots 16 seconds before impact at an altitude of about 200 feet. Apparently a go around was called for 1.5 seconds before impact.

103 knots !

Just heard that figure in an NPR report. They got down to 103 knots prior to hitting the seawall.

That is absolutely appalling. There were 4 pilots in that cockpit and nobody said anything until it was way too late to recover. How does that happen?

When your that far behind the power curve with that high of an AOA there is nothing in the world that could save you. Question to ask is why they allowed the airplane to get that slow, was the F/O and RO asleep? Basic Airmanship left that cockpit long before they packed a perfectly good airplane in!

I guess we have to remember how Asian airlines operate. I know in the US we try to place CRM as the most important tool in the flight deck. Do you think anyone was afraid to speak up to the CA when things started to go downhill and then wait until the last minute before nothing could be done? If it was an OE trip with a LCA (not sure, still catching up on the details) what if the green CA was senior to the LCA? Just putting in the perspective that maybe the rest of the crew was afraid to undermine the CA.

I've been an LCA also and I remember the one thing that was preached to me was to never allow the aircraft to be put in a position where safety was compromised. I agree that when doing IOE with captains you want them to be the ones doing the PIC decision making. It's expected that they will make mistakes during training, that's how we all learn. But once things started making me uncomfortable it was my job to bring the aircraft back into a safe flight regime. My first priority was to get the passengers to their destination safely, teaching comes second.

That being said we still don't know the full story. I have no experience in dealing with Asian crews, but I have friends who have and have heard plenty of stories similar to those posted here. If this does turn out to be caused by pilot error and a lack of CRM hopefully this is the wake-up call some of these carriers need to turn things around.

While I agree with all the above, there are even more negative issues in play. Additionally I, for one, will not hesitate to intervene as necessary in any such situation in which I feel lives are at stake. I do not care, at all, who the person is I feel the need to question, take an aircraft away from or otherwise intervene. I learned this lesson during my early flying. I was in the jumpseat of a Lear (on the board...) merely as an observer. A new captain was transitioning to the left seat of the Lear without any significant turbine experience or even as an FO on type. He became fixated and overloaded during an approach. The approach was never stabilized. He got slow with a very high sink rate. I sat and watched this situation unfold to the point of being genuinely scared. The high time Lear instructor in the right seat let this deteriorate way too far; although he had told the IOE/PF about five times to check his descent rate. After the second warning the PF added power, though the amount was inadequate. All further warnings resulted in insufficient to no action; the guy was locking up. I had enough of this as we were now about a hundred feet above touchdown, at night. I had decided the heck with these guys I was going to reach up and slam both throttles to the stops. Just as my hand got halfway to the throttles, the FO's left hand came in front of mine and did exactly what I was going to do, slammed them to the stops. It was still a carrier landing but we survived and somehow without damaging the airframe. It did get an over power and hard landing inspection. One more second and we could have all been dead. In most cases there is no good reason to let things progress that far. Our entire training system needs a revamp from bottom to top. Additionally, while recognizing an aircraft needs a captain, all this negative hierarcy/culture stuff needs to stay out of the cockpit as well. Personally, I always tell other pilots flying with me to please speak up if you see anything that causes you concern...

Being a check airman doesn't make you a good pilot or good leader (CRM). I despise the ones who cannot fly the plane.

Agree. The point of my post was simply that having an LCA/instructor at the cockpit does not a safe flight make.

Whether there's enough time to intervene/stop a bad situation or not.

Remember that sim scenario I mentioned where we did all the visual pattern stuff? One of the things in that module was an extremely high deck angle recovery at low altitude. I specifically remember being at full thrust with a deck angle of near or over 30 degrees aircraft nose up and an indicated speed of near 90 knots. The airplane was still flying and was able to both climb and recover to a more normal attitude. Intermittent stick shaker activation and kissing the whiskers of the pitch limit indicator was part of the profile.

Extreme? No doubt and who knows how accurate the sim replicates, but with exposure to those extremes in the training environment, at the very least there's more encouragement to not let it happen in the first place.

Ua855
 

The people on UA855 were so lucky not to be involved. Any news from the crew on what they saw? I saw the video on CNN.

I saw them getting towed back. Must of been horrific for the passengers to watch and then be helpless to act and help out.

This could have been so much worse. Sorry for 2 deaths and those critically injured.

Yea, I understand what you're saying about rusty but...not impressed.:rolleyes: For a ferry flt sure. But a revenue flt no! I've watched guys shut-off the automation. "Look what a good pilot I am." What do you think the media's and the company's reaction will be when they learn you have the automation off and you were, God forbid, involved in a mishap. Especially those with safety redundancies like auto throttles. You'd be hung out to dry. Just wait until we learn Asiana had AT off. The pilots will be even more roasted. IMO once you're in the big leagues flying heavy metal those "look at me" days are over!! For your passengers sake!! Sorry, I'll get off my soap box. Just my safety training. :cool:

Your mentality is a bit bizarre in my opinion, as a pilot should be expected and trained to use the level of automation that is appropriate to the situation.

Stubbornly refusing to ever turn the automation off earlier than usual is not appropriate and there are plenty of scenarios where no automation is called for.

I will never fly the LGA Expressway Visual 31 or DCA River Visual 19 with the autopilot.

Do you think I am reckless?

It's not about "look at me I can fly." I'm not sure where you get that, but it's not from any of the pilots I've ever sat next to in 121 so far.

It's about maintaing some semblance of stick and rudder skills because not matter what your airplane's automation can do, you need to be able to do the same -- because some computer chip may have other plans for you on the arrival some day and you're gonna be back to the basics until the wheels are on the ground.

training help
 

Speaking only in the USA/ FAA structured airlines, some more specific SIM training could help us all. Unless your company has a custom SIM training program approved by the FAA you get the "canned" training wherein the FAA dictates exactly what has to be covered for each PC/PT event. Usually making the SIM time rushed and without the luxury of trying anything ourside of the FAA training curriculum.

I'll just say that from the outside it's easy to sit here and say, how could this happen? But having been flown a brain dead approach after a pacific crossing and having seen some of the stupid stuff that guys do when they are dead tired I have to say that yeah I can see how you could get started down that road.
The major cultural difference being that you'd have one or two or three others guys forcefully pointing out your error before it became dangerous. Or so we'd hope any way.

Costs $$$.

Every airline is trying to cut costs on 'additional' training above required minimums.

Sorry I turn off the automation not to say look what a good pilot I am but to keep skill levels for times when the automation might not be available. I guess do it how you like but there are many in the training areas that are concerned with pilots being to reliant on automation, but hey to each their own I guess.

At 7s prior to impact, the reported airspeed call was a completely inappropriate call. It should have been "unstable, go around" instead.

Because I have sat next to one or two.
Valid point, of course you shut-off AP when required. I'm just thinking about the AT I guess.

Sent: Mon, Jul 8, 2013 2:19 am
Subject: FSAP from bunkie on UAL 885
On July 6, 2013 at approximately 1827Z I was the 747-400 relief F/O on flt 885, ID326/06 SFO-KIX. I was a witness to the Asiana Flt 214 accident. We had taxied to hold short of runway 28L at SFO on taxiway F, and were waiting to rectify a HAZMAT cargo issue as well as our final weights before we could run our before takeoff checklist and depart. As we waited on taxiway F heading East, just prior to the perpendicular holding area, all three pilots took notice of the Asiana 777 on short final. I noticed the aircraft looked low on glidepath and had a very high deck angle compared to what seemed “normal”. I then noticed at the apparent descent rate and closure to the runway environment the aircraft looked as though it was going to impact the approach lights mounted on piers in the SF Bay. The aircraft made a fairly drastic looking pull up in the last few feet and it appeared and sounded as if they had applied maximum thrust. However the descent path they were on continued and the thrust applied didn't appear to come soon enough to prevent impact. The tail cone and empennage of the 777 impacted the bulkhead seawall and departed the airplane and the main landing gear sheared off instantly. This created a long debris field along the arrival end of 28L, mostly along the right side of 28L. We saw the fuselage, largely intact, slide down the runway and out of view of our cockpit. We heard much confusion and quick instructions from SFO Tower and a few moments later heard an aircraft go around over the runway 28 complex. We realized within a few moments that we were apparently unharmed so I got on the PA and instructed everyone to remain seated and that we were safe.

We all acknowledged if we had been located between Runways 28R and 28L on taxiway F we would have likely suffered damage to the right side aft section of our aircraft from the 777.

Approximately two minutes later I was looking out the left side cockpit windows and noticed movement on the right side of Runway 28L. Two survivors were stumbling but moving abeam the Runway “28L” marking on the North side of the runway. I saw one survivor stand up, walk a few feet, then appear to squat down. The other appeared to be a woman and was walking, then fell off to her side and remained on the ground until rescue personnel arrived. The Captain was on the radio and I told him to tell tower what I had seen, but I ended up taking the microphone instead of relaying through him. I told SFO tower that there appeared to be survivors on the right side of the runway and they needed to send assistance immediately. It seemed to take a very long time for vehicles and assistance to arrive for these victims. The survivors I saw were approximately 1000-1500' away from the fuselage and had apparently been ejected from the fuselage.

We made numerous PAs to the passengers telling them any information we had, which we acknowledged was going to change rapidly, and I left the cockpit to check on the flight attendants and the overall mood of the passengers, as I was the third pilot and not in a control seat. A couple of our flight attendants were shaken up but ALL were doing an outstanding and extremely professional job of handling the passenger's needs and providing calm comfort to them. One of the flight attendants contacted unaccompanied minors' parents to ensure them their children were safe and would be taken care of by our crew. Their demeanor and professionalism during this horrific event was noteworthy. I went to each cabin and spoke to the passengers asking if everyone was OK and if they needed any assistance, and gave them information personally, to include telling them what I saw from the cockpit. I also provided encouragement that we would be OK, we'd tell them everything we learn and to please relax and be patient and expect this is going to be a long wait. The passenger mood was concerned but generally calm. A few individuals were emotional as nearly every passenger on the left side of the aircraft saw the fuselage and debris field going over 100 knots past our aircraft only 300' away. By this point everyone had looked out the windows and could see the smoke plume from the 777. A number of passengers also noticed what I had seen with the survivors out near the end of 28L expressing concern that the rescue effort appeared slow for those individuals that had been separated from the airplane wreckage.

We ultimately had a tug come out and tow us back to the gate, doing a 3 point turn in the hold short area of 28L. We were towed to gate 101 where the passengers deplaned. Captain XXXXX met us at the aircraft and gave us information he had and asked if we needed any assistance or hotel rooms for the evening. Captain XXXXX and F/O XXXXX went to hotels and I went to my home an hour away in the East Bay.

Control Tower
 

As an outsider looking in (I'm an Electrical Engineer), I wonder what role and responsibility, if any, the control tower plays relative to monitoring aircraft trajectory?

Please excuse my ignorance on this.

Thanks.

Dude. You are truly a professional and I can't wait to have the opportunity to fly with you after SLI.

On a visual approach, absolutely no responsibility. They don't have the SA or expertise, and they have other things to do (manage aircraft separation). And frankly getting that low and slow on a visual is ludicrously bad piloting (for an airline), almost stretching credibility...I wouldn't have believed it if I hadn't seen it. Even then I wouldn't have believed it if it wasn't for the long history of "Power Distance" CRM issues in Asian cockpits.

On an instrument approach, if the tower has a radar feed from approach, they may get automated altitude alerts if you descend below published mins on an approach segment, and they would then alert you. But it's still not their primary responsibility.

Thanks for posting that Fr8Dog.

I was wondering how the crew and pax of 885 were coping. That had to have been an agonizing experience watching that unfold.

Tossing this in here for the 'hand flying' discussion.

Children of Magenta - YouTube

Hilariously completing my inditement of the media's denial of cultural accident causes, WSJ had removed this 5 year old article as people were beginning to comment on it and it's relevance to Asiana 214. Wow. We really do live in the information age.

Really? I know you personally have got thousands of hours in jets with no auto-throttles and now they're a safety issue? Come on. Why not auto-land out of every approach if it's safer? Every airline out there probably has an MEL available for auto-throttles. Should the pilots still refuse the jet?

I always scoff the pilots that don't disconnect the automation and manually fly the jet (when it's appropriate). They owe that to their fellow crewmembers and passengers, IMO. It's their responsibility to be proficient flying their aircraft to include basics like airspeed control via manual manipulation of the throttles. I honestly can't remember the last time I landed with auto-throttles on. I've also flown two jets from ANC-OAK in the last year with the A/T MELed - and it really didn't matter to me because I do it all the time. If your airspeed isn't in your crosscheck exactly the same amount no matter the status of your auto-throttles, then you need to stop using them until it is, IMO. Off my soapbox now.

I'm not UAL. This had been making the rounds and I posted after someone asked the question!

Time compression.
IF the reports are correct - ARFF was on station in 3 MINUTES.
Now I don't fly into KSFO, so I am not sure when the emergency responders are stationed on the airfield and if they have some prepositioned (like the military often does out on the field) on the airfield or if they come from one of the 3 stations (number 3 looking like the closest from the airfield diagram); but considering the location of the mishap - it would seem to have been a pretty quick response time from dead calm to catastrophe :(

Thanks to the FO for the insightful write up and MD11Fr8Dog for reposting.

otari - I see that rickair7777 noted that they have no responsibility in the visual approach arena and don't have the SA; but I'll disagree - at least with the SA part from my own experience. I'll let some ATC types answer the question as to whether there is responsibility within the terminal area of the runway(s), but I often fly approaches well below the normal glidepath and have been cautioned before on low/shallow approaches. Some times the controllers forget what we are doing and we certainly try and let them know - sometimes pre-briefed and again real time just to erase some of the worry they express. I'll agree that I bet the tower controllers were probably not aware of the last part of the approach and had their attention elsewhere, but I'll bet a dollar that some controller didn't look at that approach and say to himself [they look extremely low, but it isn't my job]

F15andMD11 -
Exactly what metric of *usual* airline flying does a pilot have the opportunity to portray the above line? The last 200' of a stabilized ILS approach? I truly don't know. If these boards are to be believed, a very large majority of heavy international flying is done on the AP. :confused:

Boeing and KAL believed it caused accidents, and look how KAL turned it around. When I lived in NW CO, by neighbor was a Boeing sim instructor. He worked mostly with KAL and Asiana and spent most of his time in Korea, in 2-3 month blocks (he was a former USAF, and Saudia before Boeing). He had some interesting stories about Capts that wouldn't think twice about reaching across the cockpit to backhand an FO. He worked specifically on CRM issues, and while he said it was often a tough row to hoe, they were making progress (this was 2002). He said that it was really tough to get FOs to assert themselves, but then once they got them speaking, they couldn't shut them up! ;)

I think the definition of "on station" is what might be in question here. The individuals ejected from the aircraft and observed by the UAL crew were thousands of feet from the wreckage. Is it not possible that they were without aid for much longer than those egressing the aircraft at the location it finally came to rest?

I wonder if one of the 2 mentioned by the UAL885 bunkie was the one that got run over! :(

They do in more than a few Asian cultures.

Failure is a better and more face saving outcome than quitting. Those who have taught Chinese students will tell you that generally, they would rather purposefully sabotage their training at the risk of hurting themselves or someone else than ask to quit.

Crashing an airplane IS better than going around. Seriously. That's the nasty combination of a lack of uncertainty avoidance (traditional religious values say that everything will be okay) and the desire to save face.

It's not a race thing, since there are plenty of pilots from other places of Asian descent that do just fine, it's a cultural thing.

3 minutes feels like eternity to a pilot. Have you ever timed yourself performing memory items? You can very reasonably have taken the appropriate action on a hung or hot start in like FIVE seconds. Waiting 30 seconds for a fire to be out or still going to blow secondary fire bottles feels like forever as well.

Pilots spend years mastering flows until you appear to be a wizard to a layman. A pilot watching fire trucks rolling a few minutes into a disaster seems like they were asleep, but it's standard. I've had fires put out and been inspecting damage from the exterior as firefighters showed up.

The radar system in the TRACON and Tower gives a Low Altitude Alert when an aircraft descends below (or is projected to descend below) pre-programmed parameters. The tower radar display shows altitudes in hundreds of feet based in the aircraft's mode C (which is considered accurate with a 200' variance between mode C reported altitude and field elevation or pilot reported altitude). In this case, electronically, it doesn't appear that the tower would have gotten any alarms. Visually, with the control tower being several stories above field elevation, it is unlikely a controller, assuming he had nothing to do except stare at the landing airplane, would have seen anything unusual from his vantage point until the last second.

As controllers, we give alerts and warnings, but leave the airplane flying to the pilots. None of us as controllers are qualified to make decisions based on how a 777 crew flies the last 7 seconds of their approach unless it involves a runway safety issue (another a/c crosses a hold short line, etc).

I have no idea. In middle of all of the confusion, and if survivors were scattered from the threshold to the wreckage - and laying down none the less - I'd still say that ARFF was not long in responding.
There is no doubt that during a stress filled situation that time compression doesn't set in - even in the cockpit right?

"a long time"...."appeared slow"?
Under what conditions and definitions do these descriptions fit?
I'm sure for an person who has stumbled away from the wreckage and is lying injured in the dirt - time seems an eternity. For first responders rushing towards a mishap I'm sure time flew by.

Not say you but I see many guys who have become autopilot addicts and in the sim now cannot fly the aircraft to even close to ATP tolerances without a flight director and AT. Aircraft can be distpatched with AT's inop and more than one failure can lead to no flight director, bad time to learn to fly again. I hand fly when the situation/workload allows and personally feel that is a good thing.

My point was that their job is not to continuously monitor every airplane from the marker to TD. That's what a Final Monitor is for, but they don't use those on visuals :rolleyes: Tower has work to do on handoff from approach and during rollout, but no real need to monitor an airplane's performance on short final...spacing is addressed further out. They were probably busy talking to other airplanes checking in, rolling out, or taxiing. The SFO tower controller handles landings on 28L/R as well as takeoffs on 1L/R.

Like I said before, if tower gets altitude alerts from approach radar they will pass that along...not all small towers have that. SFO does, but it was probably too late in this case.

I'm sure if they happened to be looking during the crucial last second they would have keyed the mike (but probably too late in this case).