Preliminary FDR report.
Lightning strike, and Direct Law. Good until the flare; Capt overcontrolled.
First bounce 2.5+ g. Second was 5.8g on the nose gear. Last was 5+.
I’m shocked that only the gear failed.
Quote:
On May 17th 2019 the MAK reported that the read out and analysis of the data off the flight data recorder has been completed.
On May 18th 2019 Rosaviatsia reported the captain (43, ATPL, 6,844 hours total, 1,570 hours on type) was assisted by a first officer (36, CPL, 773 hours total, 623 hours on type). About 30-40km (16-21nm) west of Sheremetyevo Airport there was rain in clouds, the clouds extended to a height of 8000 to 9000 meters (FL262-295) and contained a thunderstorm. The aircraft was climbing through 7900 feet at 15:08Z when an electrical failure occurred, the flight control system (FCS) degraded to "DIRECT MODE", the autopilot automaticaly disconnected, the aircraft was in the middle of thunderstorm activity. The captain assumed manual control of the aircraft until the end of the flight. Radio communication, that had taken place on VHF #1 radio so far, became unavailable, the crew was able to partially restore communication via VHF #2 on the emergency frequency only. The crew set the squawk for loss of communication. The crew decided to return to Sheremetyevo and performed a manual ILS approach to runway 24L. At the time the aircraft intercepted the glideslope the aircraft's mass was 42,600kg, which was 1600kg above the maximum landing weight. The crew deployed the flaps to 25 degrees in accordance with the flight crew operating manual for flight with minimum mode (DIRECT MODE) of the FCS as well as landing above MLW. At 15:26Z the crew set the emergency transponder code. Vapp was determined to be 155 KIAS, the descent on the glideslope was stabilized and without any deviation from Vapp. Winds during the approach came from 190 degrees at 30 knots, descending between 1100 and 900 feet the crew received 5 cycles of predictive windshear warnings "Wind Shear ahead, go around!". Descending through 260 feet AGL the aircraft began to deviate below the glide slope, a "GLIDESLOPE" warning occurred, descending between 180 to 40 feet the engine thrust was increased causing the aircraft to accelerate to 164 knots, at 16 feet AGL the speed was 170 KIAS. A Terrain Awareness Warning System aural signal "Retard" occurred, the engine thrust was reduced to idle. At that point the captain began to apply oscillating pitch inputs with increasing amplitude which changed the pitch angle up to +6 and -2 degrees. The aircraft made a "three point" touchdown 900 meters past the runway threshold at 158 KIAS and a vertical load of +2.55G and bounced up to 6 feet AGL. The spoilers did not deploy, in DIRECT MODE they are not permitted to operate automatically and need to be extended manually, however, the spoilers were not manually extended by the crew. 2 seconds after the first touch down the aircraft touched down a second time with the nose gear first at 155 KIAS and +5.85G, the aircraft bounced off again to 18 feet AGL. A third touchdown occurred at 140 KIAS in excess of +5G resulting in the destruction of the construction, a fuel spill and fire. While the aircraft was skidding along the runway at 100 KIAS a first fire alarm triggered in the aft cargo compartment, 16 seconds later in the tail section of the aircraft, the aircraft came to a stop 20 seconds after the first fire alarm. 40 seconds after the first fire alarm the fire extinguisher in the tail section was activated. The engines continued to run until end (at 15:31:04Z) of the FDR recording 47 seconds after the first fire alarm. The MAK is conducting the investigation which focusses also on the predicitive wind shear alerts and the reaction to them.
05-01-2020
AIRLINE
