Quote:
There is a Compliance Program outlined in FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 14, Chapter 1.
There is a directive to use the CP, which includes addressing compliance issues in an ASAP-like manner, to fix the problem, rather than punishment. Under this, a pilot that had a non-compliance issue would likely be able to proceed if it wasn't a repeat issue for that pilot and they were willing and able to address it. There are still exclusions though and whether it is accepted into that program depends on these and the facts surrounding the issue. Enforcement cases (things that result in suspension, revocations, etc.) are very rare these days. They still happen, but usually for intentionally reckless actions, egregious lapses of judgement, generally situations where multiple 14 CFR regulations were violated due to the conduct of the flight.
The FAA inspectors that provide oversight are bound to use the 8900.1 Order.
The big difference between CP and ASAP is ASAP information is not FOIA-able. In both cases, they are looking for the company to fix the issue with the pilot and any surrounding issues with their systems. It also might invite more FAA investigation into the company, since the ASAP committee is not doing the investigation and the FAA may "dig" until they root out the issue, vs. the consensus of an ASAP ERC. Consensus doesn't mean each member gets what they want, it's always a compromise, so there could be a tendency towards less compromise if it's investigated separately.
You could also stall an aircraft unintentionally and at the same not not demonstrate the degree of care and judgement that is expected of the holder of that certificate. There's a lot of scenarios that could present. ATC could direct you to climb to an altitude that you can't maintain or is not safe. There could even be a problem with the aircraft, or how it's dispatched, but ultimately the responsibility comes down to the PIC for the flight conduct, unless it can be shown that there was something outside their control. Blindly following an instruction that is contrary to an aircraft limitation that should be known because all of that information was given to you is not something outside your control.
Originally Posted by JamesNoBrakes
Excluding events is within compliance of the MOU, if falls under the criteria for which something can be excluded. I'm not sure where you are seeing a conflict. Again, it's rare, but one of the situations where this could happen is repeated non-compliance of a specific nature. There is a Compliance Program outlined in FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 14, Chapter 1.
There is a directive to use the CP, which includes addressing compliance issues in an ASAP-like manner, to fix the problem, rather than punishment. Under this, a pilot that had a non-compliance issue would likely be able to proceed if it wasn't a repeat issue for that pilot and they were willing and able to address it. There are still exclusions though and whether it is accepted into that program depends on these and the facts surrounding the issue. Enforcement cases (things that result in suspension, revocations, etc.) are very rare these days. They still happen, but usually for intentionally reckless actions, egregious lapses of judgement, generally situations where multiple 14 CFR regulations were violated due to the conduct of the flight.
The FAA inspectors that provide oversight are bound to use the 8900.1 Order.
The big difference between CP and ASAP is ASAP information is not FOIA-able. In both cases, they are looking for the company to fix the issue with the pilot and any surrounding issues with their systems. It also might invite more FAA investigation into the company, since the ASAP committee is not doing the investigation and the FAA may "dig" until they root out the issue, vs. the consensus of an ASAP ERC. Consensus doesn't mean each member gets what they want, it's always a compromise, so there could be a tendency towards less compromise if it's investigated separately.
You could also stall an aircraft unintentionally and at the same not not demonstrate the degree of care and judgement that is expected of the holder of that certificate. There's a lot of scenarios that could present. ATC could direct you to climb to an altitude that you can't maintain or is not safe. There could even be a problem with the aircraft, or how it's dispatched, but ultimately the responsibility comes down to the PIC for the flight conduct, unless it can be shown that there was something outside their control. Blindly following an instruction that is contrary to an aircraft limitation that should be known because all of that information was given to you is not something outside your control.
Are inspector not also bound by the administrator’s Just Culture directive? My whole point here is how does not allowing a crew who has a specific type of UAS unintentionally and for the first time, to be allowed into the ASAP program not be punitive to the one entity that is ultimately responsible for the safety of the flight, the crew in question? This is where a pilot group representative could’ve, I say should’ve, stood up had a conversation with the FAA inspector, maybe even work back channels within the FAA that are above the inspector with the ultimate threat of pulling out of the ASAP MOU entirely. Like it’s been done before with eventual success. So maybe, it’s all kosher and legal what the FAA did, but it doesn’t mean it’s the best way at solving the issue from the pilot groups point of view. And keep in mind that that is where I’m coming from on this discussion. I started it by saying the pilot group should’ve pulled out of the MOU entirely when that happened.