If we could train people properly, airplanes would never crash.

 

You look over. It's not really difficult, regardless of the situation. Can you not turn your head while you're adrenaline is spiked? If you can not, you really shouldn't be flying airplanes. There is also a button available to override the other sidestick. The airplane did exactly what the pilot told it to do.

 

So what you're saying, is that the FAA approved training programs that put people in the flight deck are lacking?

 

And pilot training, and maintenance training, and quality training, and product design, and....

It was your comment after all. Looking at many of the recent notable crashes, human error is usually involved at some point. Your comment seemed to indicate we can remove it with training.

 

So your answer is yes, the root of the problems are the FAA?

 

My training is in human factors and ergo, look at human machine interfaces, designing for the population, realistic expectations, what humans are capable of, what colors to use, what frequencies can be heard, how we reach switches and controls, how those systems are designed to maximize human performance and minimize errors.

As such a safety professional, I realize that in the heat of the moment, with all sorts of things going wrong, one more thing that is "wrong" is not going to help at all. You say it's "easy" to look over and see that, but in the heat of the moment and with all those critical things, it may not run by the pilots to look at each other's "sticks", they may be concerned about something else that seems more important or further confused by the positions. What if the crew doesn't agree and each one thinks his actions are correct? There are many things that seem obvious when we are analyzing from the ground, but in real life in the situation they aren't so easy to sort through.

 

From Day 1 of training we are taught something extremely simple. FLY THE PLANE. That is priority number 1. There isn't anything that's more important. The only exception I may consider is a fire that can be extinguished. If there is a fire warning, I want someone on that ASAP. If the fire is on the wing, the only thing I care about is getting on the ground so we can evacuate. Flying the aircraft is always number one.

Now if we are to apply your logic of being so distracted by other things, that it prevents us from checking sidestick inputs, how will a yoke make a difference? If I'm so distracted by something that I can't turn my head and check the sidestick, then a yoke isn't going to make a difference.

 

I haven't flown the A-320 in almost 10 years, but from what I remember, I could always tell (roughly) where the Capt had the controls in my peripheral vision. The stick is forward of one's torso; it's pretty easy to see.

The reason for not connecting the two sticks on the Bus: mechanics. It would take lots of pulleys, cables, and levers to physically connect two things that (electrically) don't need to.

While the tactile/visual feedback Rick is talking about would be nice, and might have made a difference in the AF 447 accident, it is (to my knowledge) the ONLY Airbus accident caused by aerodynamic misapplication of the controls. The famous (infamous) 'tree-cutting' incident was pilot error.....not knowing the auto-thrust wouldn't kick in when the jet was in flare-mode.

On the other hand, many yoke-based aircraft have been made to crash while the other column was clearly visible to the PNF. I remember doing Microburst/Windshear training in the sim in the 727, 747, and 747-400....while the Capt was moving the wheel mightily, I couldn't tell if he was doing the right thing....I just thought it looked like we would crash (and we often did).

Stall training in airliners is CRAP, so I will agree with James in that regard. In the Air Force, as in light aircraft, I was taught---and teach---that you recover with the minimum of lost altitude, but if necessary, YOU LOSE ALTITUDE. That's because the FAA perspective of a stall being about a "speed" is false...it's about AOA, and how much energy you have to try and effect the recovery with.

I will never forget my first exposure to this in airline training where, on the one hand, they said "Roll out, reduce AOA, and apply maximum power."

But when I did that, (and lost 250 feet of altitude), they said "Whoah!!! You can't lose (or gain) more than 100 feet of altitude!!" (Me): "Then how do I reduce AOA?!?!"

The answer was ambiguous. "By reducing back-pressure." ???? Somewhere, the requirements became confused. So, airline 'stall' training became a precision-maneuver about how to recover from slow-flight, and not how to recover when in a full-blown stall 30-40 knots below where you should be, where firewall power couldn't fix it if you were still pulling 1.5 gs.

That's what happened in Colgan 3407.

I don't know if airline stall training has been fixed yet, as I haven't been back since 2003. But I don't think having a moving-stick is necessary to make it happen correctly. A fundamental shift in FAA philosophy for stall-training is.

 

It seems that way. Are we all flying aircraft that can't be recovered from stalls? (its a rhetorical question)

 

No.

There is mechanical failure that is uncontrollable/recoverable regardless of pilot acumen and training. There is sabotage and acts of God.

But there is also a fighter-pilot axiom that states "turning-room required exceeds turning-room available." I started as a civilian pilot (PPL-only) before going to Air Force pilot training. I was never taught anything about the turn-radius of my aircraft...it was expected I would just somehow "figure it out."

But once I got in fighter flying, it was painfully drummed into me that I had to know---or at least, estimate---my turn-radius at any given moment. I also had to be able to estimate my adversary's radius. It was the only way to win, draw, or lose a fight.

In an airliner stall/upset situation, one might regain control aerodynamically....but not have sufficient room to effect the physical recovery.

So no, to answer your question...it isn't just about stalls. Colgan 3407 could have been recovered from the stall at just about any point by relaxing the g.

But once that aerodynamic control had been restored, if they were more than about 20 degrees nose-down, there just wasn't enough room (turn-radius) to make it. The fact that he tried to pull-through on a Split-S (which would take 8-10k feet in my estimate in an ATR starting at 150 kts and 2-g) wasn't going to happen at 1500 AGL and only made it worse.