chazbird

Staying with the thread drift...my friend and his girl friend had just opened their front door to go out that morning when that 727 came down about 300 feet directly in front of them. They were not physically injured (!!) but neither were never the same. I had started flying around then in the same general area and it was a very sobering introduction.

LowSlowT2

The 'recommend' ride (ride before check) should be one of the hardest rides the student ever takes and I could see re-tuning a navaid just to make a learning point. The checkride should be about the basic standards and proficiently demonstrating them and trickery to prove a point is just not cricket.

Yoda2

A couple other radio scenarios come to mind. Years ago Cessna (ARC) changed the functions of two knobs (the only two knobs) on a very common radio. These radios were prevelant especially in the 150 & 172 models. At first glance, the two different radios appeared very similar. A pilot manipulated one of the knobs by habit, muscle memory, Etc. thinking they were performing another function. This led to an accident, in a C150!
Another radio scenario occurs with two pilots performing pilot functions in an aircraft that only requires a single pilot. This commonly occurs when "helping out" your buddy... This is also potentially dangerous situation. It is usually best to just let your buddy do the flying. If you want to help you can always make suggestions or monitor. This scenario has also led to an accident(s) In fact a court judgement ruled against a defense due to the simple finding that the particular aircraft in that instance required a single pilot and therefore no assistance was needed in changing radio frequencies.

CallmeJB

Evaluating piloting ability involves checking the pilot's situational awareness. Flying an NDB approach without the NDB monitored is the first link in the chain. By changing the ADF frequency, Martha effectively evaluated if the applicant would continue through the swiss-cheese to an accident, or catch the error and break off the approach.

If the applicant had noticed that the needle wasn't moving at all, even if they had never noticed the changed freq or the lack of ID, in my eyes that would have been enough to evaluate them as 'lesson learned, no harm, let's try another one'. As it was, the applicant in the story turned a full 90 degrees off course while descending to and leveling at MDA, then looked up at the appropriate time and was shocked that the runway was not in sight. That demonstrates a lack of heading awareness, and situational awareness, and deserves a pink slip.

That is an effective scenario to evaluate overall piloting ability... the simple things, as stated above: engines need air, fuel, and cooling, instrument approaches cross a FAF, fly towards the airport, and descend to minimums. This pilot stopped flying towards the airport; didn't see the forest for the trees.

The only way to check if the pilot 'just forgot to ID' vs. 'has no clue what they're actually doing and are just going through the rote motions of an NDB approach' is to change the freq and see what happens.

Reservist

Strongly disagree. Not only is she prohibited from "checking" in this manner by the PTS. She timed her frequency change to coincide with station passage, and specifically trick the applicant into believing that the sudden needle swing was due to "zone of confusion" over station indications, A dirty trick. When else can an examiner change your nav frequencies, on a parrell ILS is it fair game to switch the frequency to the adjacent runway?

CallmeJB

The applicant turned 90 degrees to the inbound course inside of the FAF. They descended to a low alititude relying solely on a piece of equipment that they weren't monitoring (nor is it self-monitoring, like an ILS receiver). Most importantly, they couldnt figure out that something was wrong even after they looked up.

Do you think this applicant deserves to pass?

They had several minutes flying inbound to diagnose that something was wrong... many chances along there to catch their error and prevent from flying into that antenna in my backyard. But they didn't, and they failed, rightfully so.

Reservist

I don't think anyone should be put into that position, I'd call the ride invalid the minute the nav radio was tampered with. The 90 degree heading change you keep referencing you just made that up, it is nowhere in the article. It says something like "cranked in a pretty big heading correction followed by multiple heading gyrations" (not a direct quote). Perhaps we should call you ML.

CallmeJB

You're right, I guess I did make that up. I really thought that's what the article said (I did read it). Sorry about that.

You can call me whatever you want... either way it looks like we're going to agree to disagree.

web500sjc

The article narrates that the examiner distracted the pilot before the NDB, the pilot then watched the ADF start turning and ASSUMED she had reached the station.

from the PTS, applicants are to be evaluated on the below items during a non-precision approach...

Selects, tunes, identifies, and confirms the operational status of navigation equipment to be used for the approach procedure.
section VI, Task A, Number 4


Recognizes if any flight instrumentation is inaccurate or inoperative, and takes appropriate action.
section VI, Task A, Number 6



Now I am not saying that I agree with the methods used, but the job of an examiner is to determine weather a person is proficient in the areas of operation being examined. At a Part 135 operation i would expect a pilot to properly fly the approach while properly monitoring the operational status of the Navaid.

jSig

This kind of mentality is the norm in the FAA. "He is doing everything right so lets trick him into failing". Common sense does not prevail and this behavior is applauded in the FAA. This is the type of garbage that gives them (inspectors) such a bad name.

As for the GII story, all I can say is wow.