You flew the Max for years, prior to the crashes?

Interesting.


Correct. MCAS trims at the high speed “flaps down” rate, with the flaps up.

Even Boeings own test pilots lost control of the airplane during simulator testing, per their own documentation.

Apparently there are a lot of underpaid heros here that should be test pilots, not FMS managers.

 

So when did Boeing test pilots loose control?? Oh, that's right, when they sat there and did nothing for a while to see what happe s.

 

I wasn’t Boeing test pilots. They were FAA.

 

Well realistically, how long would it take you super pilots to think about flipping the stab trim cut out switches to off as you're climbing out and probably just hit birds, lost your one aoa, lost your airspeed indications, clacker and shaker both going off?? Oh and you don't even really know the true scope of MCAS at this point either because Boeing decided not to explain the system properly to the airlines operating the jets.

 

Let alone Boeing only hooked it up to one AOA probe although you could get it hooked up to a second AOA as an extra cost option.

https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/fi...TS_Summary.pdf

item 13.1

 

Honestly? Clacker and shaker both go off: 100% sure it is unreliable airspeed, so: AP OFF, AT OFF, FD OFF. Doesn't matter what aircraft you are on.
For plan B: POS keeps trimming, so trim cutout. Always. (type A: 2 ADIRS OFF). If we can't handle that we have no business making the money we do.

I 100% feel there are people at B that deserve jail time for getting the MAX certified. Even the NG should have been forced to include EICAS. But that does not absolve the crews in those crashes.

The Indonesian plane flew with that failure condition the day before. And before you call those pilots super heroes, they continued to their destination, flying more than an hour (AFAIK) with the overspeed and stick shaker going off, after they had to switch of the electric trim, and upon arrival only wrote up that the speed trim system seemed to trim in the opposite direction, with the "cannot reproduce on ground" write off.....

Ethiopian hit over 400 with the nose still pointing up, but nobody pulled back on the throttles.

We have had quite a few mishaps that could have gone seriously wrong here in the US. But I believe the way we talk about it, and train here makes this much less likely to happen here. Since 9/11 2 part 121 planes have crashed with less than 50 pax dead per crash. In that same time period over 1000 have died in Indonesia, and that is only looking at crashes with 50 dead or more.....
And about 50 million pax in Indonesia, vs close to a billion in the USA, per year.

They had a 737 crash because the AT clutch wasn't working very well (had been written up multiple times, 65 to be exact....so not just the pilots fault.) and one engine throttled back, the other one didn't during the climb. For minutes the ball was against the side, the throttles were staggered, the bank angle warning sounded. The AP disconnected and the captain made an input increasing the bank angle to over 90 followed by pulling worsening the problem. We have EET training. Sriwijaya Air Flight 182.

There is plenty of reason to assume we aren't super pilots, but would have done better.

 

AFAIK B copied MCAS from the Poseidon where it did use both AOAs. And it had a comparator warning if the 2 disagreed. To prevent the need for extra training on that warning for the MAX the decision was made to have MCAS use 1 AOA at a time, switching between left and right AOA with every power cycle. So it was connected to both AOAs, but would only use one per flight cycle.