The A-10 Video
02-07-2007, 09:01 PM
#21
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Aug 2006
Position: 737 Right
Posts: 1,385
Not trying to pad my post count on this one thread but after listening to the tape you really can't tell much.
Because the tape starts so late in the mission, you don't know what type of control has been declared by the JTAC or was demanded by the current ACO (airspace coordination order). The JTAC/FAC is acting like he has hi-SA on the fighter's position, but there's no where on the tape where he confirms their position with them so I'd assume there's a lot that happens prior to what we see on the tape. The SA passed in the initial FAC to Ftr brief is critical to assessing blame (if any) and it's not included on the tape.
It's clear from the tape that the A-10's had been attacking targets earlier in the mission so they had something going right with the JTAC/FAC prior to this attack.
Summary; you just can't tell who's to blame from what's on the tapes.
Because the tape starts so late in the mission, you don't know what type of control has been declared by the JTAC or was demanded by the current ACO (airspace coordination order). The JTAC/FAC is acting like he has hi-SA on the fighter's position, but there's no where on the tape where he confirms their position with them so I'd assume there's a lot that happens prior to what we see on the tape. The SA passed in the initial FAC to Ftr brief is critical to assessing blame (if any) and it's not included on the tape.
It's clear from the tape that the A-10's had been attacking targets earlier in the mission so they had something going right with the JTAC/FAC prior to this attack.
Summary; you just can't tell who's to blame from what's on the tapes.
02-08-2007, 08:32 AM
#23
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2006
Position: Work
Posts: 506
Originally Posted by 1Seat 1Engine
The JTAC/FAC is acting like he has hi-SA on the fighter's position, but there's no where on the tape where he confirms their position with them so I'd assume there's a lot that happens prior to what we see on the tape. The SA passed in the initial FAC to Ftr brief is critical to assessing blame (if any) and it's not included on the tape.
they had something going right with the JTAC/FAC prior to this attack.
Summary; you just can't tell who's to blame from what's on the tapes.
they had something going right with the JTAC/FAC prior to this attack.
Summary; you just can't tell who's to blame from what's on the tapes.
Anyway....the FAC never confirmed their position but..the two pilots never specifically asked the FAC about the target. They just asked about friendlies in the area.
Tough call - folks say don't shoot if there is a shred of doubt..but you are in a war and NOT shooting could get someone killed. I am sure we will see more of this.
02-09-2007, 01:54 PM
#24
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2006
Position: MD
Posts: 237
Good points by 1S1E. Albie's points about the differences between a good FAC and a clock-watcher are also well made.
One additional note. Everyone who has done this job knows how badly the FAC/CAS mission is undervalued/underfunded in the AF and, by the way, undertrained/underutilized during peacetime by the vast majority of Army maneuver units. Battle tracking is and always has been a serious issue, especially with mech units in a fluid battle environment. All other factors aside (and there are many), having to rely, in the 21st century, on VS-17 panels as a last-ditch measure to avoid frat is criminal. (Ever try to spot one of those F*&^ers from 18,000 feet slant range?)
I am not a fan of over-technologizing, is that is a word, the FAC/CAS mission, but if ever there was a situation in which a ground IFF system could have saved the day, this was it. Ditto on the ('03?) F-16/Canadian frat in Afghanistan, and ditto on the other A-10/Brit frat during GWI. I did several Air Warrior I excercises (from the air and from the ground) back in the mid '90's with SADL equipped airplanes and the targeting confidence it provided was phenomenal. Where is that technology today and why was it not funded force-wide a decade ago? I have my own ideas, but that is a separate discussion. Someone needs a good ass kicking for allowing this incident to happen, but that person(s) is/are much farther up the food chain than any of the operators who were directly involved.
Just my $.02. Sorry for the rant.
P.S. Albie - It was TTFACORB in my day.
http://www.raytheon.com/products/ste...s01_052820.pdf
One additional note. Everyone who has done this job knows how badly the FAC/CAS mission is undervalued/underfunded in the AF and, by the way, undertrained/underutilized during peacetime by the vast majority of Army maneuver units. Battle tracking is and always has been a serious issue, especially with mech units in a fluid battle environment. All other factors aside (and there are many), having to rely, in the 21st century, on VS-17 panels as a last-ditch measure to avoid frat is criminal. (Ever try to spot one of those F*&^ers from 18,000 feet slant range?)
I am not a fan of over-technologizing, is that is a word, the FAC/CAS mission, but if ever there was a situation in which a ground IFF system could have saved the day, this was it. Ditto on the ('03?) F-16/Canadian frat in Afghanistan, and ditto on the other A-10/Brit frat during GWI. I did several Air Warrior I excercises (from the air and from the ground) back in the mid '90's with SADL equipped airplanes and the targeting confidence it provided was phenomenal. Where is that technology today and why was it not funded force-wide a decade ago? I have my own ideas, but that is a separate discussion. Someone needs a good ass kicking for allowing this incident to happen, but that person(s) is/are much farther up the food chain than any of the operators who were directly involved.
Just my $.02. Sorry for the rant.
P.S. Albie - It was TTFACORB in my day.
http://www.raytheon.com/products/ste...s01_052820.pdf
Last edited by SC-7; 02-09-2007 at 09:10 PM. Reason: Added SADL link.
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