TA???
#111
On Reserve
Joined: Feb 2015
Posts: 73
Likes: 31
From: FO
You're mixing things up. Sled said Fedex has a block override, and international override (two different things), and that he is not aware that DL/UA/AA have any similar provisions. To which I pointed out all 3 have an international override. I am not comparing block override to international override. I am comparing international override to international override, something Sled said he wasn't aware of anyone having.
The language is different as Fedex pays the override for the entire trip and legacies pay based on legs, but apart from that, I would say that is definitely "similar". Especially because the WB trips at legacies often are one leg out, one leg back so in effect the override pays for the entire trip there too.
The language is different as Fedex pays the override for the entire trip and legacies pay based on legs, but apart from that, I would say that is definitely "similar". Especially because the WB trips at legacies often are one leg out, one leg back so in effect the override pays for the entire trip there too.
Sled
#112
Line Holder
Joined: Mar 2020
Posts: 444
Likes: 100
You’d vote no to a million dollar recovery payment and Delta +10. Why? The SCOPE!!! FURLOUGH!!!
So they walk all over scope everyday and everywhere from belly frieght to trucking from the HUB during Peak and they’ll do it forever to make $1. They threatened to furlough at least 5 times in the last 2 years. Didn’t do it.
Also, GOT SCOPE? It’s improved from TA23. So keep being ur HARD NO. Ur a LEGO cartoon.
-Bubs
So they walk all over scope everyday and everywhere from belly frieght to trucking from the HUB during Peak and they’ll do it forever to make $1. They threatened to furlough at least 5 times in the last 2 years. Didn’t do it.
Also, GOT SCOPE? It’s improved from TA23. So keep being ur HARD NO. Ur a LEGO cartoon.
-Bubs
#113
The scope does still suck. All of the use of the word "feasible" should be of GREAT concern as the company has proven beyond any shadow of a doubt that they cannot be trusted, should never receive the benefit of the doubt, and are consistent in their intent to abuse language.
#114
Line Holder
Joined: Oct 2015
Posts: 833
Likes: 69
Your missing a critical point in our current scope:
”Should, at the end of the calendar year, the Company actually bring into service fewer trunk aircraft than were scheduled and based on the schedule, the Company wet leased more aircraft than would have been permitted if the scheduled additions were the same as the actual deliveries, then the Company shall pay to the Association the same monies it would have paid the Association as calculated under Section 1.B.6.a.”
There are no hard caps or limits in our current scope. Anything can be exceeded as long as the company pays the penalty. This hasn’t worsened in TA2026, the formula has just changed to make it simpler to calculate and understand.
”Should, at the end of the calendar year, the Company actually bring into service fewer trunk aircraft than were scheduled and based on the schedule, the Company wet leased more aircraft than would have been permitted if the scheduled additions were the same as the actual deliveries, then the Company shall pay to the Association the same monies it would have paid the Association as calculated under Section 1.B.6.a.”
There are no hard caps or limits in our current scope. Anything can be exceeded as long as the company pays the penalty. This hasn’t worsened in TA2026, the formula has just changed to make it simpler to calculate and understand.
I have a philosophical difference regarding the scope section. I do not place much value on financial penalties. To me, penalties do not protect pilot flying. I would rather trade away penalty language in exchange for tighter definitions, limitations, and restrictions tied to calendar dates and the trunk fleet.
I understand scope is never an absolute ban. UPS has the best scope in the business, and even they allow exceptions in specific situations. I am fine with wet leases in defined circumstances such as peak, cabotage restrictions, hull loss, and unusual shipment configuration. But I think the language should move in the direction of tightening, not loosening.
The last few years are a good example.
Trunk Fleet Aircraft
• 2022: 417
• 2023: 407
• 2024: 389
• 2025: 386
Under the old 1.B.6 structure, if scheduled net trunk-aircraft growth was zero, the company was effectively left with only the baseline two-aircraft / four-bid-period wet-lease provision under that paragraph, apart from the separate exceptions elsewhere in Section 1. Yes, there was still penalty language if scheduled additions later failed to materialize, but the old framework was still more directly tied to trunk-aircraft growth.
There are separate exceptions:
• 1.B.5: one-for-one wet lease after severe hull damage or destruction, until replacement or one year
• 1.B.6: baseline two-aircraft / four-bid-period wet-lease provision
• 1.B.7: no-penalty wet lease / other agreements for authority, foreign restriction, emergency, or operational/economic infeasibility situations
• 1.B.8: subcontracting when the shipment configuration prevents use of company aircraft
The current MD-11 situation is a good example of the kind of thing 1.B.7 is meant to address. That is part of normal business reality, just like hull loss, cabotage, peak excess volume, or freight that does not fit the aircraft.
My issue is with the broader structural change in 1.B.6. Under the new language, the onus moves away from fleet totals and toward trunk block hours. Using 2023 and 2024 as an example, 2023 trunk block hours were about 1.5 million, and 2024 was about 1.45 million. If 2024 PCYNAD is negative, then the company gets up to 1.00% of prior-year trunk block hours penalty free, which is roughly 15,000 hours. If PCYNAD is non-negative, the company gets up to 1.25% penalty free, which is roughly 18,750 hours. That is before any SPR penalty begins.
Separately, once a wet lease is anticipated to exceed 26 weeks, there is only a consultation requirement. If it actually goes beyond 26 aggregate weeks, then the additional 2 SPR penalty applies. That is not a prohibition. Compare that with the old four-bid-period framework, which is roughly 16 to 18 weeks.
Also compare the scale. In 2024, if the company were effectively limited to the baseline two-aircraft wet-lease provision, and those two aircraft averaged 12.5 block hours per day with no downtime, they would produce about 3,000 block hours over four bid periods. At a more reasonable 9 hours per day, the number is about 2,200 hours.
So put yourself back in 2024:
• block hours are down
• trunk fleet is declining year over year
• the postal contract is going away
• there is furlough talk
• we are told the company is overstaffed
In that environment, would you rather have a framework that effectively leaves the company with roughly 2 aircraft and around 2,200 to 3,000 hours over 16 to 18 weeks under old 1.B.6, or a framework that allows roughly 15,000 penalty-free hours over as much as 26 weeks before the more severe time-based penalty kicks in?
That is why I view the old language as more limiting and the new language as less limiting.
#115
On Reserve
Joined: Feb 2015
Posts: 73
Likes: 31
From: FO
I have a philosophical difference regarding the scope section. I do not place much value on financial penalties. To me, penalties do not protect pilot flying. I would rather trade away penalty language in exchange for tighter definitions, limitations, and restrictions tied to calendar dates and the trunk fleet.
I understand scope is never an absolute ban. UPS has the best scope in the business, and even they allow exceptions in specific situations. I am fine with wet leases in defined circumstances such as peak, cabotage restrictions, hull loss, and unusual shipment configuration. But I think the language should move in the direction of tightening, not loosening.
The last few years are a good example.
Trunk Fleet Aircraft
• 2022: 417
• 2023: 407
• 2024: 389
• 2025: 386
Under the old 1.B.6 structure, if scheduled net trunk-aircraft growth was zero, the company was effectively left with only the baseline two-aircraft / four-bid-period wet-lease provision under that paragraph, apart from the separate exceptions elsewhere in Section 1. Yes, there was still penalty language if scheduled additions later failed to materialize, but the old framework was still more directly tied to trunk-aircraft growth.
There are separate exceptions:
• 1.B.5: one-for-one wet lease after severe hull damage or destruction, until replacement or one year
• 1.B.6: baseline two-aircraft / four-bid-period wet-lease provision
• 1.B.7: no-penalty wet lease / other agreements for authority, foreign restriction, emergency, or operational/economic infeasibility situations
• 1.B.8: subcontracting when the shipment configuration prevents use of company aircraft
The current MD-11 situation is a good example of the kind of thing 1.B.7 is meant to address. That is part of normal business reality, just like hull loss, cabotage, peak excess volume, or freight that does not fit the aircraft.
My issue is with the broader structural change in 1.B.6. Under the new language, the onus moves away from fleet totals and toward trunk block hours. Using 2023 and 2024 as an example, 2023 trunk block hours were about 1.5 million, and 2024 was about 1.45 million. If 2024 PCYNAD is negative, then the company gets up to 1.00% of prior-year trunk block hours penalty free, which is roughly 15,000 hours. If PCYNAD is non-negative, the company gets up to 1.25% penalty free, which is roughly 18,750 hours. That is before any SPR penalty begins.
Separately, once a wet lease is anticipated to exceed 26 weeks, there is only a consultation requirement. If it actually goes beyond 26 aggregate weeks, then the additional 2 SPR penalty applies. That is not a prohibition. Compare that with the old four-bid-period framework, which is roughly 16 to 18 weeks.
Also compare the scale. In 2024, if the company were effectively limited to the baseline two-aircraft wet-lease provision, and those two aircraft averaged 12.5 block hours per day with no downtime, they would produce about 3,000 block hours over four bid periods. At a more reasonable 9 hours per day, the number is about 2,200 hours.
So put yourself back in 2024:
• block hours are down
• trunk fleet is declining year over year
• the postal contract is going away
• there is furlough talk
• we are told the company is overstaffed
In that environment, would you rather have a framework that effectively leaves the company with roughly 2 aircraft and around 2,200 to 3,000 hours over 16 to 18 weeks under old 1.B.6, or a framework that allows roughly 15,000 penalty-free hours over as much as 26 weeks before the more severe time-based penalty kicks in?
That is why I view the old language as more limiting and the new language as less limiting.
I understand scope is never an absolute ban. UPS has the best scope in the business, and even they allow exceptions in specific situations. I am fine with wet leases in defined circumstances such as peak, cabotage restrictions, hull loss, and unusual shipment configuration. But I think the language should move in the direction of tightening, not loosening.
The last few years are a good example.
Trunk Fleet Aircraft
• 2022: 417
• 2023: 407
• 2024: 389
• 2025: 386
Under the old 1.B.6 structure, if scheduled net trunk-aircraft growth was zero, the company was effectively left with only the baseline two-aircraft / four-bid-period wet-lease provision under that paragraph, apart from the separate exceptions elsewhere in Section 1. Yes, there was still penalty language if scheduled additions later failed to materialize, but the old framework was still more directly tied to trunk-aircraft growth.
There are separate exceptions:
• 1.B.5: one-for-one wet lease after severe hull damage or destruction, until replacement or one year
• 1.B.6: baseline two-aircraft / four-bid-period wet-lease provision
• 1.B.7: no-penalty wet lease / other agreements for authority, foreign restriction, emergency, or operational/economic infeasibility situations
• 1.B.8: subcontracting when the shipment configuration prevents use of company aircraft
The current MD-11 situation is a good example of the kind of thing 1.B.7 is meant to address. That is part of normal business reality, just like hull loss, cabotage, peak excess volume, or freight that does not fit the aircraft.
My issue is with the broader structural change in 1.B.6. Under the new language, the onus moves away from fleet totals and toward trunk block hours. Using 2023 and 2024 as an example, 2023 trunk block hours were about 1.5 million, and 2024 was about 1.45 million. If 2024 PCYNAD is negative, then the company gets up to 1.00% of prior-year trunk block hours penalty free, which is roughly 15,000 hours. If PCYNAD is non-negative, the company gets up to 1.25% penalty free, which is roughly 18,750 hours. That is before any SPR penalty begins.
Separately, once a wet lease is anticipated to exceed 26 weeks, there is only a consultation requirement. If it actually goes beyond 26 aggregate weeks, then the additional 2 SPR penalty applies. That is not a prohibition. Compare that with the old four-bid-period framework, which is roughly 16 to 18 weeks.
Also compare the scale. In 2024, if the company were effectively limited to the baseline two-aircraft wet-lease provision, and those two aircraft averaged 12.5 block hours per day with no downtime, they would produce about 3,000 block hours over four bid periods. At a more reasonable 9 hours per day, the number is about 2,200 hours.
So put yourself back in 2024:
• block hours are down
• trunk fleet is declining year over year
• the postal contract is going away
• there is furlough talk
• we are told the company is overstaffed
In that environment, would you rather have a framework that effectively leaves the company with roughly 2 aircraft and around 2,200 to 3,000 hours over 16 to 18 weeks under old 1.B.6, or a framework that allows roughly 15,000 penalty-free hours over as much as 26 weeks before the more severe time-based penalty kicks in?
That is why I view the old language as more limiting and the new language as less limiting.
Moreover, the TA has several provisions which address what was happening in 2024.
Specifically 1.B.10: "No pilot shall be involuntarily furloughed while the Company wet leases ANY aircraft pursuant to section 1.B.6." (emphasis mine)
And 1.B.11, which is long but contains additional language stating "...In addition, in the event the company enters into a Section 1.B.6 wet lease while a Pilot is on a non-voluntary furlough...the company shall recall a number of pilots equivalent to the staffing needs for the flight schedules operated by the wet leased aircraft."
In short, under the TA the company can't start a furlough while wet leasing any aircraft (including the 2 usually allowed), and if a furlough has occurred and is ongoing then if the company starts wet leasing they are obligated to bring back from furlough however many pilots it would take to operate the wet lease. None of this language is present in the current book. Under current book, the company could absolutely have wet leases ongoing, and furlough as many pilots as they want while signing yet more wet leases with no protection for the pilots. With that context, please describe to me how the current book is more limiting.
Cheers,
Sled
Last edited by Sled; 04-12-2026 at 02:59 PM. Reason: added more wet lease and furlough discussion
#116
On Reserve
Joined: Jan 2020
Posts: 37
Likes: 13
Thank you to everyone who has attempted to explain scope and furlough. This definitely helps us all gain a better understanding. I’m guilty of not understanding the depth and comparison to the degree that some have demonstrated here. It’s easy to bite off on what’s been published without diving deep enough to compare properly.
#117
Line Holder
Joined: Jul 2017
Posts: 1,530
Likes: 24
Hi All! I don't work at FedEx, but I was looking at language around acquisition of other carriers. That was a big issue when JD was at our place. If you were going to acquire, say, Amerijet how does the new language affect the pilots?
If this question is going to make people all enraged, feel free to ignore me.
If this question is going to make people all enraged, feel free to ignore me.
#118
I’m going to get “GOT MONEY” stickers printed. Got scope torpedoed the last TA. This TA has money in it but the “got scopers” are still trolling.
Temocil is right. The company does what it wants and more to the point that Justin makes is there are improvements to scope protections in this TA. Cargo companies have way more flexibility in finding grey area loopholes in trucking and shipping compared to pax carriers.
PM told me to vote yes or I’d get furloughed in TA23. And then the company said “yeah that’s right” and then nothing happened. Just like Temocil iterated it’s not easy to furlough. FedSux prob needs to hire right now too. So, then that stirs the argument “oh this is our leverage!” No. That leverage went out the door with the Covid volumes.
Tanking this TA cause “we can do better with scope” #1- Isn’t going to happen. #2- Could take 3 years to get back at the table. It’s absurd. Same for the guys who want a shorter duration TA. Hmm, it’s been 5 years since we started negotiating. Maybe another 5 we can get a 3 year deal? “GOT DURATION?”
-Bubs
Temocil is right. The company does what it wants and more to the point that Justin makes is there are improvements to scope protections in this TA. Cargo companies have way more flexibility in finding grey area loopholes in trucking and shipping compared to pax carriers.
PM told me to vote yes or I’d get furloughed in TA23. And then the company said “yeah that’s right” and then nothing happened. Just like Temocil iterated it’s not easy to furlough. FedSux prob needs to hire right now too. So, then that stirs the argument “oh this is our leverage!” No. That leverage went out the door with the Covid volumes.
Tanking this TA cause “we can do better with scope” #1- Isn’t going to happen. #2- Could take 3 years to get back at the table. It’s absurd. Same for the guys who want a shorter duration TA. Hmm, it’s been 5 years since we started negotiating. Maybe another 5 we can get a 3 year deal? “GOT DURATION?”
-Bubs
#119
Line Holder
Joined: Aug 2023
Posts: 695
Likes: 54
I have a philosophical difference regarding the scope section. I do not place much value on financial penalties. To me, penalties do not protect pilot flying. I would rather trade away penalty language in exchange for tighter definitions, limitations, and restrictions tied to calendar dates and the trunk fleet.
I understand scope is never an absolute ban. UPS has the best scope in the business, and even they allow exceptions in specific situations. I am fine with wet leases in defined circumstances such as peak, cabotage restrictions, hull loss, and unusual shipment configuration. But I think the language should move in the direction of tightening, not loosening.
The last few years are a good example.
Trunk Fleet Aircraft
• 2022: 417
• 2023: 407
• 2024: 389
• 2025: 386
Under the old 1.B.6 structure, if scheduled net trunk-aircraft growth was zero, the company was effectively left with only the baseline two-aircraft / four-bid-period wet-lease provision under that paragraph, apart from the separate exceptions elsewhere in Section 1. Yes, there was still penalty language if scheduled additions later failed to materialize, but the old framework was still more directly tied to trunk-aircraft growth.
There are separate exceptions:
• 1.B.5: one-for-one wet lease after severe hull damage or destruction, until replacement or one year
• 1.B.6: baseline two-aircraft / four-bid-period wet-lease provision
• 1.B.7: no-penalty wet lease / other agreements for authority, foreign restriction, emergency, or operational/economic infeasibility situations
• 1.B.8: subcontracting when the shipment configuration prevents use of company aircraft
The current MD-11 situation is a good example of the kind of thing 1.B.7 is meant to address. That is part of normal business reality, just like hull loss, cabotage, peak excess volume, or freight that does not fit the aircraft.
My issue is with the broader structural change in 1.B.6. Under the new language, the onus moves away from fleet totals and toward trunk block hours. Using 2023 and 2024 as an example, 2023 trunk block hours were about 1.5 million, and 2024 was about 1.45 million. If 2024 PCYNAD is negative, then the company gets up to 1.00% of prior-year trunk block hours penalty free, which is roughly 15,000 hours. If PCYNAD is non-negative, the company gets up to 1.25% penalty free, which is roughly 18,750 hours. That is before any SPR penalty begins.
Separately, once a wet lease is anticipated to exceed 26 weeks, there is only a consultation requirement. If it actually goes beyond 26 aggregate weeks, then the additional 2 SPR penalty applies. That is not a prohibition. Compare that with the old four-bid-period framework, which is roughly 16 to 18 weeks.
Also compare the scale. In 2024, if the company were effectively limited to the baseline two-aircraft wet-lease provision, and those two aircraft averaged 12.5 block hours per day with no downtime, they would produce about 3,000 block hours over four bid periods. At a more reasonable 9 hours per day, the number is about 2,200 hours.
So put yourself back in 2024:
• block hours are down
• trunk fleet is declining year over year
• the postal contract is going away
• there is furlough talk
• we are told the company is overstaffed
In that environment, would you rather have a framework that effectively leaves the company with roughly 2 aircraft and around 2,200 to 3,000 hours over 16 to 18 weeks under old 1.B.6, or a framework that allows roughly 15,000 penalty-free hours over as much as 26 weeks before the more severe time-based penalty kicks in?
That is why I view the old language as more limiting and the new language as less limiting.
I understand scope is never an absolute ban. UPS has the best scope in the business, and even they allow exceptions in specific situations. I am fine with wet leases in defined circumstances such as peak, cabotage restrictions, hull loss, and unusual shipment configuration. But I think the language should move in the direction of tightening, not loosening.
The last few years are a good example.
Trunk Fleet Aircraft
• 2022: 417
• 2023: 407
• 2024: 389
• 2025: 386
Under the old 1.B.6 structure, if scheduled net trunk-aircraft growth was zero, the company was effectively left with only the baseline two-aircraft / four-bid-period wet-lease provision under that paragraph, apart from the separate exceptions elsewhere in Section 1. Yes, there was still penalty language if scheduled additions later failed to materialize, but the old framework was still more directly tied to trunk-aircraft growth.
There are separate exceptions:
• 1.B.5: one-for-one wet lease after severe hull damage or destruction, until replacement or one year
• 1.B.6: baseline two-aircraft / four-bid-period wet-lease provision
• 1.B.7: no-penalty wet lease / other agreements for authority, foreign restriction, emergency, or operational/economic infeasibility situations
• 1.B.8: subcontracting when the shipment configuration prevents use of company aircraft
The current MD-11 situation is a good example of the kind of thing 1.B.7 is meant to address. That is part of normal business reality, just like hull loss, cabotage, peak excess volume, or freight that does not fit the aircraft.
My issue is with the broader structural change in 1.B.6. Under the new language, the onus moves away from fleet totals and toward trunk block hours. Using 2023 and 2024 as an example, 2023 trunk block hours were about 1.5 million, and 2024 was about 1.45 million. If 2024 PCYNAD is negative, then the company gets up to 1.00% of prior-year trunk block hours penalty free, which is roughly 15,000 hours. If PCYNAD is non-negative, the company gets up to 1.25% penalty free, which is roughly 18,750 hours. That is before any SPR penalty begins.
Separately, once a wet lease is anticipated to exceed 26 weeks, there is only a consultation requirement. If it actually goes beyond 26 aggregate weeks, then the additional 2 SPR penalty applies. That is not a prohibition. Compare that with the old four-bid-period framework, which is roughly 16 to 18 weeks.
Also compare the scale. In 2024, if the company were effectively limited to the baseline two-aircraft wet-lease provision, and those two aircraft averaged 12.5 block hours per day with no downtime, they would produce about 3,000 block hours over four bid periods. At a more reasonable 9 hours per day, the number is about 2,200 hours.
So put yourself back in 2024:
• block hours are down
• trunk fleet is declining year over year
• the postal contract is going away
• there is furlough talk
• we are told the company is overstaffed
In that environment, would you rather have a framework that effectively leaves the company with roughly 2 aircraft and around 2,200 to 3,000 hours over 16 to 18 weeks under old 1.B.6, or a framework that allows roughly 15,000 penalty-free hours over as much as 26 weeks before the more severe time-based penalty kicks in?
That is why I view the old language as more limiting and the new language as less limiting.
I don't know where you got the trunk aircraft numbers from, so they may be correct, but looking at the past postings showed that we actually gained aircraft in 2024. You also state that the number of weeks is between 16 and 18, yet in 2024, from Oct-Dec there were 14 weeks in those 3 bid months. So, 2024 would have had a minimum of 18 weeks and a maximum of 19 weeks. You also say that with the 2 aircraft minimum and 16-18 weeks the company would only block 2200-3000 hours during that time. Why? If you look at the South America flying, those aircraft block about 20 hours in a day. Do you really think that the company is going to let those wet lease aircraft just sit if they are trying to take our flying for cheaper? That doesn't make sense. Based on what the South America flying does, which is probably more in line with how they use the 777, those 2 aircraft in 2024, 2025, and 2026 would block at least 5000 hours. Based on what the postings showed for 2024, the amount the company could have blocked was closer to 13,000 hours.
You are also neglecting that the fewer hours that Fedex pilots fly, the less hours the company can wet lease without penalty. Under current book, that isn't the case.
I tend to look at wet lease the same as code sharing. When I book a ticket on Delta and the aircraft is painted in AirFrance livery with an AirFrance crew, what is the difference between that and a wet lease or belly freight? I paid Delta, yet I am on a different plane not operated by Delta pilots.


