But didn't the ATSB determine that fatigue was not a factor in this mishap? I remember it being mentioned that the pilot had not had much sleep the night before - though he had a 24 hour rest before that. The other two pilots had no fatigue factors. I would think that this was a failure of procedures; not necessarily fatigue. Who can **really** say in the end I guess.

USMCFLYR

 

To tell you the truth, I'd have to go back a reread it. You're probably correct, I thought I remember it being in there though.

I wouldn't doubt it. But how many times have we seen an investigating agency discount it, but we all knew better?

True, and maybe it's happened to you, don't know. But just because somebody has had a 24 hour rest period doesn't ensure they are well rested to fly. Especially if there were multiple body clock swaps in a relatively short amount of time. As well as the sleep pattern never being able to be synced to comply with the duty period. I know it's happened to me, one just recently.

Edited, made a typing mistake;

Again, I'd have to go back and reread the report. But to repeat what I said, we've all heard of cases where fatigue wasn't listed as factor by the investigative body.

True, glad that a failure to verify/cross check number didn't have a fatal result.

 

I wouldn't let an article be the source I use to quote what the ATSB determined. With that being said, we have no idea what the procedures in place were at that time and if they were followed. We also don't know if fatigue was a casual factor. Perhaps the pilot said so in order to provide him some cover. As I mentioned earlier, does Emirates have any procedural checks to ensure the thrust set for takeoff is adequate? Of course, this probably wouldn't have changed anything because they would have just ensured the wrong N1 setting was set for takeoff. The problem seems to have come setting the wrong N1 because the weight was incorrect.

 

[

This is a good point. I'm sure there are specific circumstances. Question for those flying the heavies - especially in the circumstances above - if on takeoff and let's say 500' - would the first procedure not be to go to full power on the remaining engines?

USMCFLYR

[/quote]

No, you do not go to full power on the remaining engines. The reduced power settings factor in the loss of an engine when calculating obstacle clearance.

 

Interesting...thanks for the clarification.
Definitely different from my community.

USMCFLYR

 

Does anybody know what the maximum reduction normally allowed for takeoff is? I have seen 15% reductions allowed (note: not 15% N1, 15% of actual thrust). Are other aircraft allowed a greater reduction?

Joe

 

Boeing goes TO, TO1, TO2- representing full, -5%, and -15%, in addition each of these ratings may be assumed off for temp up to 53 degrees C giving no more than a 25% reduction at most. The FMS will limit thrust reduction.

A rated thrust( TO, TO1, TO2) implies that you will not increase thrust in event of an engine failure, whereas an assumed thrust gives you that option.

Bottom line is the crew is responsible for input of the correct weight and other takeoff data, a critical step that all crewmembers must verify.

 

Here is a good primer on derates and reduced thrust.
Assumed Temperature Thrust Reduction

On one of the airbus sites a PPT says the -320 can do a reduction of up to 25% of available thrust.

 

III Corps -

Thanks for the reference. Very informative.

USMCFLYR

 

We do Reduced thrust (Flex) TO anytime we can. The lowest N1 setting we can use is 85%