Right back at you. We are on the same team here.

Yes, regarding SEC info…I cannot find our total DTA value. That would clear up some inference with my guess at the tax scenario. Unfortunately, we pilots are often missing most of the information our company uses to make decisions. We agree that the cost cutting has a limit. Personally, I think they have just about or already found that limit and are as low as the CASM excluding fuel will allow. The goal was below 6 cents and they made it to 5.9. Time to focus on RASM.

As far as training. That’s a whole other subject. My glass half full thought and in talking with a CA lead was more along the lines of SL got the promotion and decided we need to retool our training to more appropriately bring cadets up to speed. More sim sessions, and better training devices. But this is all second hand info that could be easily skewed.

In the end only time will tell.

I agree F9 achieved unprecedented low CASM. Although I am most often very critical of BB, in this case he deserves kudos. Needless to say, managing expenses for any business is absolutely critical to it's longevity. Cutting costs with little or no revenue is meaningless. Of greater import is producing and managing revenue, which takes significantly more talent, inisght, and a certain degree of risk. This is where I see F9 falling far behind. It really doesn't take an MBA from Harvard to cut costs, negotiate more attractive lease terms, etc.. The cutting corners to profitability strategy historically does not propel a company from red to black for the long term. Whereas developing solid business practices, product diversification, managing market forces and competition more often propels a company to profitability. Prof. Michael Porter's book "Porter's Five Forces" should be a must-read for everyone in the C-Suite at F9. Trying to cut costs to profitability in a business model (ULCC) creates it's own problems and limits growth opportunity. The legacy carriers are responding to the ULCC model by offering a limited number of seats on certain routes at fares equal to or lower than F9's ULCC fare. At F9, that's all we offer, seemingly cheap fares. Operative word being "seemingly". Johnny buys the $25.00 ticked then gets soaked for a $100.00 bag fee at the airport then pay $5.00 for a Coke, $8.00 for a Griz Pack, etc.. To the average F9 customer demographically speaking it's a bait and switch leaving a very bad taste. Whereas the legacies offer a wide range of seats and services (service diversification) at a wide price point. F9 only offers one service (let's face it, F9's fare structure is like Taco Bell; same crap, different combinations). Google worst US airlines: see who's number one and see who's been last for the last seven years running. This is one reason we are, and will be bottom of the list until F9 changes the business plan. The ULCC model, ipso facto is self limiting on many levels. BB is desperately putting lipstick on a pig. Its ok if the ULCC model failed, Look at UAL's TED. Accept, learn, develop profitable strategy, execute plan. F9 is stuck in phase 1.

Back to cutting costs to profitability, I whole-heartedly agree we need to bring our cadets up to speed. I agree with adding more sim time and possibly more IOE than average for cadets. Unfortunately, given BL's tenor and history of prioritizing profits over people, his behavior is very predictable; I envision BL will attempt to substitute and/or significantly reduce level D sim training with more cost effective fixed training devices which do not (emphasis added) offer the same level of realsim and training efficacy. This situation only serves to the detriment of the cadet/new hire. Remember the Ford Pinto case? All BL's efforts point towards saving money at the expense of short-changing the pilot and travelling public.

You are correct my friend: "In the end only time will tell."

THREAD DRIFT ALERT



is this a financial discussion about F9 or a "screw up in training" discussion about the thread title ?

Por qué no los dos?

si porfavor, mucho queso