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Explosive NYT Story Lays Blame For Max

Old 01-04-2020, 09:13 PM
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Default Explosive NYT Story Lays Blame For Max

The new worldwide concern that younger, less experienced pilots do not have the experience to fly commercial airliners, when there is a malfunction outside the norm, is accelerating the need to keep pilots in the cockpit longer to obtain increased aviation safety.

As Japan's CAA told ICAO, "To address the world-wide shortage of pilots and to achieve further aviation safety, it is important that
experienced pilots fly in good health for a long period. While JCAB of Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) used to set age limits for commercial pilots to 65 (by the day before his
65th birthday), it decided to raise the age limit to 68 (by the day before his 68th birthday)."

Explosive New York Times Story Lays Blame For Boeing 737 Max Crashes

This week, the New York Times published a remarkable story by aviation writer William Langewiesche that details the horrific crash of Lion Air 610, a crash that killed all 189 aboard the Boeing 737 Max. After the similar crash of Ethiopian Airlines 302 that killed 157, regulators worldwide grounded the 737 Max amid concerns that a new system called MCAS had failed, resulting in uncontrollable runaway trim that doomed the two airliners and all 346 souls aboard the two.
From the start, the discussion of what caused the crashes has been a polarized one. On one hand, the design of MCAS was poorly thought out and rushed through both design and certification. Boeing and the FAA are being grilled by a Congressional committee about this process, though at this point what will come of the probe remains to be seen.

On the other hand, many pilots disagree that MCAS is ultimately to blame, regardless of what the investigations determine. That system, which automatically trims the airplane nose-down to overcome what the angle-of-attack sensors are saying is an aerodynamic stall, will trim at regular intervals and high-speed until the trim is fully nose down and impossible for pilots to out muscle.

The problem that these pilots have with the “blame MCAS” mentality is that the automated stability system is easy to overcome, if you know what you’re doing, that is, and if you’re a competent pilot, the claim goes.

This lack of competence is, in fact, exactly what Langewiesche focuses on in his cutting analysis of the Lion Air crash, blaming that lack of airmanship (a term he describes as “anachronistic”) on a culture of poor training that has arisen in countries like Indonesia and has been tolerated by aircraft manufacturers who were eager “to sell their airplanes to any airline without restraint.” Indonesia deregulated its airline industry in the late 1990s, the author writes, “..in the hope of providing for the sort of fast, low-cost travel that might help bind its islands together.” The problem, Langewiesche continues, is that, “The free-for-all soon raised questions about how to manage safety. That is a polite way of putting it. A race to the bottom comes to mind.”

This approach, the Times article says, “reduces pilots to journeymen and ignores the role of airmanship in safety.”

Langewiesche contends that that lack of airmanship was exposed because Lion Air flies Boeing aircraft, and Boeing planes, he writes, rely on pilot skill as a last line of defense against mechanical and electronic failures.

And Lion Air’s safety record is abysmal. “From 2003 to 2007,” according to the article, “the Indonesian accident rate as measured by fatal flights per million departures had grown to be 15 times as high as the global average.”

I’ll let you read Langewiesche’s brilliantly crafted narrative of the Lion Air accident, one that he details step by step, describing the malfunctions the crew encountered and the steps they took in attempting to overcome them, measures that were ultimately, as the world now knows, were insufficient to save the lives of those onboard.

Again and again Langewiesche returns to the question of airmanship, or, rather, the lack thereof. It is, indeed, hard if not impossible to explain the failure of the pilots in the Lion Air crash to reduce power—extremely high airspeeds greatly exacerbated the aerodynamic forces they were battling against to regain control of the 737 Max. Langewiesche says of the Lion Air captain, that even though “he did not know about the MCAS … he had just experienced a violent runaway trim after flap retraction, and you might think he would have had the wherewithal to leave the flaps alone and throttle back to slow or, alternatively, pull into a climb to achieve the same result while also buying time. But no, he stuck obediently to 5,000 feet, left the throttles forward and retracted the flaps.”

Langewiesche doesn’t defend the design of MCAS—why, for instance, does it trim to a fully nose-down configuration?—or the approval process that ended with the stability augmentation system being fielded on production 737 Max planes, but he ultimately lays the blame on the pilots who, he concedes, are the product of a flawed safety system driven by economic forces, corrupt political and corporate oversight, and maintenance organizations, and questionable recurrent training practices.

Still, the author suggests that were he in a position of authority to do so, he would return the airliner to service as it's currently configured. He writes in conclusion, “What we had in the two downed airplanes was a textbook failure of airmanship. In broad daylight, these pilots couldn’t decipher a variant of a simple runaway trim, and they ended up flying too fast at low altitude, neglecting to throttle back and leading their passengers over an aerodynamic edge into oblivion.

They (the pilots & their lack of experience) were the deciding factor here—not the MCAS, not the Max.”

It’s a tough conclusion for me to wrap my head around. The author admits that the economic model of low-cost airlines like Lion Air is antagonistic toward safety culture, that Boeing failed to reveal, or one might even say “hid” the existence of MCAS from its customers, that parts suppliers ship substandard replacement components to airlines, and that pilots in many parts of the world are overworked and under supported. Yet he still concludes that the fault of the two 737 Max catastrophes was on the pilots.

The pilots probably should have been able to overcome the baffling mechanical malfunction they faced, true. But Langewiesche fails to address the fact that in simulator reenactments many pilots here in the United States have been hard pressed or unable to overcome a sensor malfunction that drove the repeated automatic deployment of rapid and repeated nose down trim of MCAS, even though those same pilots entered the sim knowing in essence what they would be encountering. That foreknowledge was a hedge against disaster that the pilots of Lion Air 610, whatever other mistakes they made, did not have in their favor.

Ultimately, the author’s attitude about airmanship and the pilot’s role in safety is sadly outmoded. The view of the pilot as the hero, the one who stands as the last line of defense against disaster is the stuff of John Wayne movies. The truth, which Langewiesche admits, is that a very small percentage of pilots who think they would be up to the task when faced with a difficult challenge in a flight simulator actually succeed at the task.

The dream of every pilot being a hero, like Tammie Jo Shults or Sully Sullenberger, is wishful thinking. Even worse, it gives rise to accepting inadequate aviation infrastructure, systems and training.

As poorly as the pilots of Lion Air 610 performed, they had the deck stacked against them, and if studying accidents shows us anything, it is that when things start going south in a complicated cockpit, even good pilots can have a very bad day. We need to expend our energy on keeping those bad days from happening instead of hoping in vain to have a pair of heroes in every cockpit.

https://www.planeandpilotmag.com/exp.../#.XhFcmkdKjcs

Last edited by rickair7777; 01-07-2020 at 07:42 AM. Reason: Title Clarity
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Old 01-04-2020, 09:16 PM
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Most people reading this topic and the public information are not reading all the material. Here’s a truncated review with eleven public facts:

1. In 2016, during the ICAO General Assembly, Japan informed ICAO and the other States that they are considering an increase the CAT multi engine pilot retirement age limit to 68 under certain conditions. Japan requested ICAO’s other States do the same thing.

https://www.icao.int/Meetings/a39/Do.../wp_277_en.pdf

2. Taking into consideration the aspects mentioned above, the European Union’s European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) took the lead outsourced a research study commencing in late 2017 to evaluate if and how the increase of life expectancy is linked with the morbidity rates, and consequently the incidence and effect of age related medical conditions for pilots.

https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-...imits-workshop

3. The research study was presented by the key stakeholders on March 18-19, 2019 in Cologne, Germany to more than 60 State participants. Stakeholders who cosponsored the workshop to led the worldwide effort to simultaneously increase the mandatory pilot retirement age included:

ICAO
International Air Transport Association (IATA)
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Transport Canada
Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia (CASA)
Civil Aviation Authority New Zealand (CAA)
Civil Aviation Authority Japan (CAA)
European Society of Aviation Medicine (ESAM)
U.S. Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA)
European Cockpit Association (ECA)
European HEMS & Air Ambulance Committee (EHAC)
European Helicopter Association (EHA)

Click here to read the list of sponsors with the FAA one of the the event's stakeholders:

https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/def...workshop_0.pdf

4. Section 3.2.2 Commercial Air Transport (CAT) pilots flying multi-pilot operations

Based on the outcome of Task 1 and 2, it was concluded that allowing pilots older than 65 years in multi- pilot CAT operations would require additional risk-mitigation measures such as specific tests to support the aeromedical decision on the applicant’s fitness on an individual basis. We recommend keeping the age limit at 65 years as it is currently set by EASA (FCL.065; EASA, 2016). It is currently not recommended to further relax or completely abolish the 65-year.

5. However, the study concluded that if pilots are permitted to fly past age 65 the medical study group recommended additional medical testing for pilots over age 65 to include:

A. A routine 12-lead resting ECG is recommended to identify abnormal conduction or other arrhythmogenic patterns that could increase the risk of cardiovascular incapacitation in aircrew.

B. Blood lipids and blood glucose tests to identify cardiovascular risks laboratory investigations should include total cholesterol.

C. Ophthalmologist examination.

D. Hearing examination as required in the context of the annual general aeromedical examination, a comprehensive otorhinolaryngological examination by a specialist will be required at reaching 60 years of age and once every two years thereafter.

E. A spirometry examination is required once to update the lung function.

F. Cognitive testing of flight performance in the regular mandatory License Proficiency Checks (LPC) or Operator Proficiency Checks (OPC). Attention should be focused on abilities to function under highly stressful demands, such as high time pressure.

https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-...imits-workshop

6. ICAO’s Medical Examiner Working Group (MEG) meet on May 7, 2019 in Las Vegas. The group agreed on the new Flight Time Duty Limits (FDL) and Flight Time Limits (FTL) for CAT pilots over age 65, which include:

An increase in the pilot age limit above 65 for multi pilot CAT operations; however, pilots flying over age 65 will require additional risk-mitigation measures (aeromedical testing). These measures will likely include testing to support an aeromedical decision on the applicant’s fitness on an individual basis, which must be imposed. These measures could include an ophthalmologist examination, auditory or hearing testing, cardiovascular/lipid testing (bloodwork), and cognitive testing (additional checkride) for those pilots who conduct CAT flying over age 65 (for U.S. pilots these tests will be conducted in addition to FAA Class I certificate requirements).

A reduction of the maximum monthly/yearly FTL to 80% of the maximum allowed for pilots over 65 performing CAT multi pilot operations (see presentation).

https://www.icao.int/Search/pages/re...tirement%20age

Then click on ASMA-ICAO meeting, from ICAO’s website.

7. EASA was designated to take over Stakeholder lead for increasing the worldwide mandatory retirement age. During the EASA discussions, the ICAO’s Dr. Olumuyiwa Benard Aliu expressed ICAO’s gratitude for the recent work the European Agency has carried out in areas such as the extension of the age limit for commercial pilots.

https://www.unitingaviation.com/stra...rt-priorities/

8. From ICAO’s website, the Stakeholders and Advisory Body decided at their May 7, 2019 meeting on the next steps forward, which include (see slide 30, 31, & 32):

Development of options based on the feedback from the Workshop and Medical Examiner Group (MEG), etc.

The parties will work closely with ICAO and the International Authorities on the future steps to (simultaneously) coordinate (worldwide) actions.

EASA high-level decision - Impact assessment will be consulted with EASA Advisory Bodies.

Further feedback from the advisory bodies on the way forward.

Regulatory activities in congruence with the decision.

https://www.icao.int/safety/aviation...%20Study_c.pdf

9. The parties agreed to develop a Best Intervention Strategy (BIS) by October 2019 in order to be consulted with our Advisory Bodies finalized by the end of 2019 or the beginning of 2020.

10. The new FAR and ICAO Annex to raise the mandatory commercial retirement age has been marked and is earmarked for approval. They will be:

14 CFR Part 121.383, Amendment HR 4343, FAA INFO 08001.

ICAO regulation will be ICAO Annex 1, Para 2.11.10.1 and ICAO Annex 1, Amendment 167.


11. On December 10, 2007, "The Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act" created new legislation to permit pilots fly until they reach 65 was attached to a bill in the House of Representatives. It took less than 48 hours for the National Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) and the bill to be approved in conference committee by both the House and Senate. The retirement age provision was originally included in a Federal Aviation Administration spending bill, but it was pulled out when the money measure got bogged down on Capitol Hill. Then on December 13, 2007, unbeknown to pilot unions and their Political Action Committees (PACs), President Bush signed the bill to raise the mandatory retirement age for commercial pilots to 65, allowing pilots to fly an additional five years.
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Old 01-04-2020, 10:14 PM
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The Boeing 737 MAX 8 Crashes: The Case for Pilot Error

The Boeing 737 MAX 8 Crashes: The Case for Pilot Error

A Detailed Review of the Ethiopian And Indonesian Preliminary Accident Reports By Vaughn Cordle, CFA and Don McGregor, USAF Maj Gen (Ret.)

Pilot Errors in Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302

There are two critical and fatal pilot errors that were not properly identified and discussed in the Ethiopian preliminary report’s Initial Findings and Safety Recommendations. The report falls short in terms of properly identifying or prioritizing the primary causes and their relationship to the ultimate effect—the crash. We believe that our analysis of the report’s findings and “ET302 Preliminary FDR [Flight Data Recorder] (DFDR) Data” provides strong evidence that supports our view.

We divide our analysis of why ET 302 crashed into essential and critical arguments that identify the two fatal pilot errors.

Critical Arguments

1. The pilots (crew) mismanaged engine thrust and airspeed

2. Excessive airspeed rendered manual trim ineffective

3. The crew deviated from the emergency procedure

4. Crew experience and competency a major contributing factor

Pilot Errors

1. Mismanagement of engine thrust and airspeed

2. Deviation from company and Boeing procedures

What Ethiopian Airlines Already Knew—Lessons Learned from the Lion Air Flight 610 (LA 610) Accident

The Indonesian preliminary Aircraft Accident Investigation Report is a more thorough review of the accident and provides useful “Findings” and “Safety Actions”—critical information that can help any airline avoid an MCAS-related accident. However, this does not clear Lion Air of pilot or procedural culpability that led to the accident. Like our review of the Ethiopian report, we believe that our analysis of the report’s “Factual Information”, “Aircraft Flight and Maintenance Log” history, and “FDR [Flight Data Recorder] (DFDR) Data” provides strong evidence supporting the view that pilot error was the largest contributing factor.

Like the Ethiopian accident, we can divide our analysis of the LA 610 crash into critical arguments culminating into two fatal pilot errors. Even though the accidents of Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines have similarities with respect to MCAS issues, they are significantly different in the circumstances leading up to and during the emergency. Because of this, the format used to support these arguments and errors will be presented differently—yet reach the same conclusion: pilot error was the largest contributing factor.

Critical Arguments

1. Previous Lion Air Flight 43 did not pass on critical aircraft information

2. Previous Captains or Maintenance did not ground the aircraft

3. The pilots (crew) identified the wrong checklist

4. The pilots misdiagnosed the runaway trim problem

5. Inappropriate transfer of aircraft control during a critical phase of the emergency

Fatal Pilot Errors

1. Misdiagnosed runaway trim

2. Inappropriate transfer of aircraft control

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/boein...hn-cordle-cfa/
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Old 01-04-2020, 10:20 PM
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The Lions Air & Ethiopian Airlines accidents, and the worldwide regulator view that the commercial airline industry has an influx of inexperienced aviators, not capable of handling complex problems, has accelerated the plan to increase the mandatory CAT multi engine pilot retirement age.

"Pilot error was the largest contributing factor in both accidents—not the only one but the most consequential factor."

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/boein...hn-cordle-cfa/
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Old 01-05-2020, 12:40 AM
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Puff, puff...pass........you clearly have an agenda through previous posts. Move on little one under the bridge.
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Old 01-05-2020, 01:30 AM
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Originally Posted by Pogey Bait View Post
Puff, puff...pass........you clearly have an agenda through previous posts. Move on little one under the bridge.
I like how his reaction to talk about poor pilot training in certain countries isn't that pilot training should be improved, but the retirement age increased to try to push the pilot training impact back a marginal amount.
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Old 01-05-2020, 04:35 AM
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Perhaps Rickair or some other mod can figure out via IP address what this troll's original screenname is and banhammer them both?
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Old 01-05-2020, 05:38 AM
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If you read the summary at the end, the author makes the case that aircraft should be designed to be more easily flown a la the Airbus model (or even easier than that).

A Boeing VP pretty much eluded to the same thing in an interview a year or so ago.

Basically, make flying easier via computer software like Airbus (but even more automated) and you won't have to worry so much about how skilled pilots are anymore. The key phrase is "reducing the cognitive load".

DARPA has spent tens of millions of taxpayer dollars integrating software into commercial aircraft and helicopters to make them flyable with just a tablet and zero stick and rudder skills for example.

I realize this is a complete departure from how aircraft are designed and operated in the past and currently.
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Old 01-05-2020, 06:27 AM
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This guy isn’t just a troll. He seems to have a stake in seeing the retirement age changes. His titles and keywords are aimed at getting his posts high in search engine results. Time for a delete thread and ban user Mods.
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Old 01-05-2020, 08:27 AM
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Originally Posted by Qotsaautopilot View Post
This guy isn’t just a troll. He seems to have a stake in seeing the retirement age changes. His titles and keywords are aimed at getting his posts high in search engine results. Time for a delete thread and ban user Mods.
Qotsaautopilot,

No troll (whatever that slang term means), just bullet point facts with public information on a topic of interest. Can you point to one fact that I wrote that is not true?

The issue is there is a worldwide shortage of pilots. Pilots are no longer receiving high performance aircraft training at the rate in years past, companies are cutting costs by training with iPads (memos), paper trainers and other devices. Simulators are running 24/7 almost everyday per year and there is not enough to keep up with demand.

The box is tightening and governments will no longer let pilots fly who are not trained to fly complex aircraft, e.g. the problems discovered in the B737-800 Max. Both with the MCAS and pilot experience.

There appears to be three ways to address the problem: A Multi Pilot Crew Certificate, increasing the mandatory pilot retirement age, and drone operations.

Fact - The organizations leading the effort to increase the mandatory pilot retirement age and the signatories of Pilots' Age limits Workshop were ICAO, International Air Transport Association (IATA - the trade group representing EVERY major airline), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Canada, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia (CASA), the Civil Aviation Authority New Zealand (CAA), and the Civil Aviation Authority Japan (CAA).

Click on this link to read this fact:

https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/def...workshop_0.pdf

Fact - A few weeks after ICAO's meeting in LAS Vegas where the new Flight Duty Limit (FDL and Flight Duty Time (FDT) for the new reg were determined (80% of current FAR 117 limits for pilots operating under FAR 121) were established, for mer Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenberg spoke to NBC's Phil LeBeau at the Paris Air show.

Muilenburg told LeBeau he believes a growing pilot shortage represents "one of the biggest challenges" facing the airline industry.

Click the link below to read this fact and watch the interview:

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/17/boei...hallenges.html

Fact - Executives around the world now recognize the growing pilot shortage and the lack of qualified pilots, coupled with the thirst for air travel growth, with the stunning and remarkable story by aviation writer William Langewiesche on how inexperienced pilots cannot handle abnormal operation in current aircraft, has led the regulators to belief they must increase the pilot retirement age as a stop gap measure to prevent more loss of life and increase safety.

Click on the link below to read about Langewiesche's findings:

https://www.planeandpilotmag.com/exp.../#.XhIapUdKjct

Fact - The next step in the evolution of dealing with the inability of the world to train enough pilots is the rapidly move towards converting current airlines to single pilot ops and building new aircraft for single and no pilot operations.

The FAA has created an office a designated a Principle Operating Inspector (POI) for this evolution, which some would call

Click on the link below for the FAA's requirements to become a drone pilot as the industry moves to technology because of the pilot shortage.

https://www.faa.gov/uas/

Next, I will write more on the effect of drone pilots replacing cockpit pilots.

Furthermore, one way to slow down the thirst for drone pilots is to have more cockpit pilots available. What's the fastest solution to to reduce the need for drone pilots to back fill empty cockpits? Increasing the pilot mandatory retirement age and the lack of cockpit pilots.
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