​​The possibility of post-Putin chaos in Russia is one key factor many countries — from adversaries such as the United States to Russia partners such as China — considered as they calibrated their reactions to mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion against Moscow.
It’s a tricky calculation, especially for the United States.

The Biden administration has taken many steps, including imposing economic sanctions, that arguably are weakening Putin in the wake of his war on Ukraine. But Washington has repeatedly insisted it does not back regime change in Russia, a fellow nuclear power.

At the moment, the lack of a clear successor, or the possibility of a violent warlord such as Prigozhin taking charge, leaves too many uncomfortable variables to openly root for a Putin overthrow, according to two current U.S. officials, two foreign officials and one former U.S. official.

“The United States has no interest in instability inside Russia that has the potential to spill over into Europe,” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a former U.S. intelligence official who specializes in Russia and autocracies. “Regime change that occurs through a chaotic and violent process is also the most likely to produce another authoritarian leader, which could possibly be worse than Putin.”

Two U.S. officials who deal with Russia policy said the Biden administration considered questions about the stability of the Russian state as it crafted its response to last weekend’s brief mutiny.

While it’s rare for the United States to call for regime change in another country, the Biden administration also wants to be extra careful not to feed Putin’s long-standing narrative that America is behind efforts to oust him or, for that matter, spur a disorderly downfall.
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Carl Von Clausewitz stated everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.

We'll win this war, but we'll win it only by fighting and showing the Germans that we've got more guts than they have; or ever will have. We're not just going to shoot the sons-of-*****es, we're going to rip out their living *******ed guts and use them to grease the treads of our tanks.Gen. George S. Patton

But how did we end up here?

We are currently facing the consequences of decades-long underinvestment into European defense. The EU’s combined defense expenditure as a share of GDP peaked at 1.6 percent in 2005, and it is still struggling to recover from the substantial cuts that followed, meaning that agreed defense spending targets remain just that — distant targets.

From a global perspective, EU defense spending is lagging well behind as well. From 1999 to 2021, the bloc’s combined defense spending increased by 19.7 percent against 65.7 percent for the United States, 292 percent for Russia and 592 percent for China, with disparities in purchasing power further adding to this imbalance in Russia’s and China’s favor.

Inflation and structural cost increases also bite deep into our limited nominal growth. Roughly 20 cents per each euro dedicated to defense make it into R&D and procurement — investments that meaningfully improve our ability to defend. And though it is a key readiness and deterrence asset, ammunition receives a mere fraction of investments. Thus, serious improvement of Europe’s defense remains dangerously elusive.Europe needs to match the security realities it is faced with today. Russia’s aggression, bringing war to NATO’s borders for the first time in history, has set significantly higher benchmarks for what is enough. And accordingly, our strategic capacity requires a serious increase, and our defense industry needs to adjust to a wartime footing.

We need a combat-effective Europe, able to provide for its own defense. This is the only way to build deterrence by denial that would be credible enough to avoid war and stop Russia’s cycle of aggression.

Since the invasion began, we have seen Russia fire Europe’s monthly artillery production in a single day in Ukraine. Capacity and sustainability will determine the outcome of this war. Deep precision strikes, air defense and anti-tank weaponry have all proved crucial for Ukraine, but to sustain it, ammunition is constantly and desperately needed.

Our defense planning for the future must take this into consideration. Instead of a few days’ supply, we should think about ammunition stocks in terms of months of supply. Ten days of land-war capacity for 100 brigades of European allies comes at the price of €100 billion — and this is only for mechanized infantry needs. Europe needs to replenish stocks of all categories of battle-decisive munitions, which translates to several trillions of euros in cost.