Actually, the rough edges with AMR go back before that to Roselawn and the ATR. It's not just "Airbus" or "Aerospatiale" when dealing with French manufacturers (in whole or part), but the French government known for blaming everyone but themselves for shortcomings with their products, support for those products and/or their operation.

 

the problem with that is that it was ENTIRELY the FO's fault... even Boeing came out and said his actions would have lead to a similar outcome on a Boeing product...

 

Ooo, careful. Wasn't he in compliance with AAs training procedure at the time for that scenario? Didn't AA recommend rudder usage?

Not to thread-hijack, just ironing the kinks...

 

I Don't know... I'd have to defer to an AA pilot for that.

 

It was called the Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program. You can find information on this program starting on page 46 of the PDF document found on this site: American Airlines Flight 587 Submission which is a lengthy submission from AA to the NTSB for their investigation regarding Flight 587.

 

You have a source for that?

Rudder travel for full deflection on the Bus at their airspeed, IIRC, was less than 2 inches. NOT something known or taught at AA at the time of the accident. Give 2 inches a look the next time you fly. It's nothing, and in my view, a serious design flaw in the A300.

 

so you're trying to tell me the A300/310 has a total of 2" rudder peddle travel between 0 and full deflection? Seriously? Either you're dead wrong (my guess), or it is a very bad design indeed... I doubt it would pass FAA certification with a 2" travel.... I can tell you for sure the A320 is a LOT more than 2"..

BTW... NTSB faulted the FO and the training.

 

Listen up: *at the airspeed they were flying*. As the speed increases, rudder travel for full deflection lessens, and (on the A300) less than 2 inches of rudder travel was required for FULL rudder deflection. So not only am I trying to tell you that, I am telling you that.

BTW, I know what the NTSB ruled. You do understand that that ruling is/was controversial?

FO Molin reacted to the turbulence in a way that I feel any AA A300 pilot could have done, given the training we received and the information we had to go on. To denigrate FO Molin in the off-handed manner you did seems rude at best. Perhaps that was not your intention.

 

Up front, I meant no disrespect to FO Molin.

My intention is to remind people that official finding is that the airplane didn't fail... the same would have happened had this been a 757, 767, or 777 according to Boeings own reports on the issue, and rudder travel ratio's aren't an Airbus idea... Boeings do the same, as do Douglas (at least the MD11)..... those loads were outside of any of any of their limits. The 2" issue would imply that they were likely going fast, however I don't have the report or the facts handy, my memory is that this happened very shortly after take off while cleaning up and climbing thru V2+factor, so therefore, not in the high speed climb.

As to why he opted to use rudder in his recovery and why AA taught it... that's not for me to get into here, and I don't intend any disrespect to the deceased pilot... I don't know him, and I wish well for his family. Sorry if you took it as an attack on him... I was simply re-stating the public record on the accident; I was more defending the design.. After all, in millions of flight hours, this had never before happened.

 

Thank you for the clarification.

As far as the scheme Airbus used to limit rudder travel with increasing speed, suffice it to say that for the A300 it was NOT the way Boeing did it or even Airbus (apparently) did it on other models. They didn't use a so-called ratio limiter; what they did was mechanically limit the pedal throw at higher speeds.

For example, a 2 inch throw on the ground in a Boeing might move the rudder 30 degrees, but in flight only 2. But in the A300, a 2 inch throw on the ground might equal 30 degrees, but in the air you were mechanically prevented from moving the pedals that far. IOW, if you are used to the Boeing way of doing things, that 2 inch pedal throw at high speed results in a minuscule movement of the rudder, whereas the 2 inch throw (it's actually a little less, btw) will give you FULL deflection in the A300, something that is clearly radically different in philosophy and needed to be addressed completely, the pros and cons of each system notwithstanding.

As it was, Airbus poorly informed training of the difference, it wasn't emphasized in any way, and therefore completely misunderstood in application. I personally think it would've taken a miracle for Sten to operate the machine the way it needed to be operated at that time to insure survival.

There but for the grace of God go several of us