C-17 Gear Up

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Quote: "I'm gonna have to go ahead and disagree with you there." ---Bill Lumberg

The Wheels Up Landing checklist step 11: GPWS Tactical 50'

Without having a -1 available, and after doing this in the sim, I have to assume the reason for this step is specifically to eliminate that pesky "Too Low Gear" warning. The thing won't bark until 50' below what is set in Tactical mode, 0' in this case.

Someone else asked why we would use this Tactical mode thingy: -1 says to do so for low level flights. Set it 100' below the planned route (daytime) altitude to inhibit nuisance wanings. No, we usually don't do that for this airfield.

Added for Sputnik:
"can't over ride it, will sound when below 250' w/ flaps greater than 1/2 and gear up."
I don't have a good -1 available with our great new policies. But if this is true, I'm guessing it is with the handle down (vice gear down). I definitely need a -1 and a brief...
Look up GPWS in the Dash 2 and read the warning... If flaps are 1/2 or less....
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Quote: Also note the GPWS will not go into runway mode until the gear handle is down, so terrain warnings will take precedence.

"Terrain Terrain" Acknowledged crew, we're visual, terrain no factor...

And, yes, I think we all need a GPWS brief, including myself!
Had a sim tonite so tried different configs of GPWS and TAWS...when it didnt go into runway mode the TAWS went crazy, nonstop ..we quickly turned that off but tomorrow will try letting it go and see if the "gear warning" can get a word in. Also when we turned the TAWS and GPWS off didnt hear a peep all the way down. Will experiment more with your 50ft theory.
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Quote: Yeah, but that was in the OPORD for double shuttles from GE (EDDF/ETAR) to OEF. It happened every now and then, but it wasn't too often.
Often for some and not-so-often for others, I guess. I did 3 in a row on a 14-day SRT and timed out on 56(?) in 7. I would say that from Spring '03 to Winter '04 I averaged one every SRT, or about one every 3 weeks.
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Ding Ding... It's not just going to be the gear handle in the final issue, but also the flap lever position. The photos online are several hours after the landing and the flaps can droop, so no armchair guessing. The handle drives the warnings, not the actual flaps position, hence the function of the disagreement systems/monitors. Then there is the whole GPWS/TAWS (psuedo EGPWS for other airframe drivers, but not exactly the same system by comparison) myriad of settings, hierarchy and database possibilities.

Of course, it could all be a human being issue too- CRM/ORM/SA/combo- but reviewing systems never hurts... Love the N/W/Cs in the -2... Guess that's why we break out the expanded -2 during IFEs along w/ the -1......

Again, this should move the briefing topics from taxi incidents and near-incidents to actual flying issues quickly!

Will be quite the read, when the FACTS are aired for the rest of us from which to learn.

PS- I wouldn't use the sim for opinions on systems until given the confirmation from on high that the simulation is accurate. I sure hope it's spot on accurate. I also wouldn't try the 250' or 50' AGL go around w/ the gear up in the jet even if I owned it. That's one for the test pilots and all their extra coverage.... Remember this is different w/ or w/o TAWS, so just trying out the gpws won't give you the whole story. Definitely for the briefings when it's all said and done.

Any of this in the NEW MQF???!

Not even paid 2 rupies for this opinion....
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Quote: I've been to this location twice in a KC-10 (day and night). We don't have all the bells and whistles or any defensive systems. I don't understand why they wouldn't be stabilized at a mile / 300 feet. I don't understand why in this situation you would set the RA to tactical and only have an alert at 50' AGL.

The enemy is out there; however, the ground has higher probability of kill.

-Fatty
Flew in and out of there numerous times and I'm not saying aircraft never took fire, but the instances I heard of were during daylight ops and I could count those on one hand with a finger or two missing. IMHO, there's no need to make the approach any more intense or difficult than it has to be. Granted, there can always be a first time, but while we're still waiting for that event we've seen enough C-17s need hours/days to get to final parking that you'd think someone up the chain would say, "How about we concentrate a bit more on the threat that's been taking us out instead of the one that we've been more concerned about?"

Totally from the hip here, so shoot it down and I'll take my hits for throwing it out there, but could part of the blame be placed on a possible C-17 mentality of trying to make the flying more intense than is really required? Granted, the skill set of tactical approaches is needed, and the crews have to stay proficient, but in cases where there's a history of difficulties can't the crews put the "we're going into the $h!+ now guys" mentality aside for an approach every so often? Maybe you do that already; like I said shooting from the hip here.
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crickets. Yes, that's from the hip w/ the standard expected for accuracy and precision and repeatability. Demonstrating proper tactics is not always equal in anyway to max or near-max performing the aircraft, unless you have the crew up w/ you and your SA actually matches reality. Training doesn't always allow a 100% warm-up either. That's why you get paid the big bucks. I won't judge outside my MWS and very personal experience otherwise.
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Well, part of the hip shot was inquiring if the C-17 crews routinely go in full bore on the tac approaches instead of nice and steady straight in final, and it seems from your answer that is the case. My point is that with so many C-17 landing incidents a Bagram that perhaps the tactics should be revisited to avoid more unnecessary accidents that weren't enemy related. It's not like I'm the first one to suggest such an idea either. Standard AF response to similar trends in other MAJCOMs has been to increase rate of no-notice checkrides, reduce the time length between annual checks, raise altitude minimums for CDS/equipment drops, etc, etc.
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Quote: ] Standard AF response to similar trends in other MAJCOMs has been to increase rate of no-notice checkrides, reduce the time length between annual checks, raise altitude minimums for CDS/equipment drops, etc, etc.
So, are you essentially saying that if someone craps in bed, everyone has to wear a diaper?

The C-17 and KC-10 have 2 very different cultures. As far as we know, they did not go into this approach "full bore" and were straight and level. Maybe they just plain forgot to put the gear down.

C17D
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Quote: My point is that with so many C-17 landing incidents a Bagram that perhaps the tactics should be revisited to avoid more unnecessary accidents that weren't enemy related.
How many is so many??? I can think of 3 off the top of my head since 2002 and none resulting in the loss of an aircraft. I do believe tactics need to be revisited though.
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Quote: Flew in and out of there numerous times and I'm not saying aircraft never took fire, but the instances I heard of were during daylight ops and I could count those on one hand with a finger or two missing. IMHO, there's no need to make the approach any more intense or difficult than it has to be. Granted, there can always be a first time, but while we're still waiting for that event we've seen enough C-17s need hours/days to get to final parking that you'd think someone up the chain would say, "How about we concentrate a bit more on the threat that's been taking us out instead of the one that we've been more concerned about?"

Totally from the hip here, so shoot it down and I'll take my hits for throwing it out there, but could part of the blame be placed on a possible C-17 mentality of trying to make the flying more intense than is really required? Granted, the skill set of tactical approaches is needed, and the crews have to stay proficient, but in cases where there's a history of difficulties can't the crews put the "we're going into the $h!+ now guys" mentality aside for an approach every so often? Maybe you do that already; like I said shooting from the hip here.
Great post. Saw this a few years ago at Balad. Intel guys make their plots of SAFIRES and mortar attacks, and the strat crews think they're "going downtown" and have to be "tactical". Biggest danger we actually had there was all the near mid-airs from so many people wanting to do lights-out operations (including the helicopters repositioning on the airfield).

Yes, there's a threat...yes, the enemy may shoot at you with...something. What's the real likelihood of small arms or RPGs or even a MANPAD bringing down a big aircraft? And what's the likelihood of crunching metal or hurting someone by being "tactical" more than you really need to. Where's the tradeoff? It's worth thinking about.
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