Hornet Pilots grounded
03-23-2010, 04:54 PM
#1
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Hornet Pilots grounded
I can't believe the Navy is overreacting to this. Punish them yeah but permanent grounding? 
Oceana F/A-18 pilots grounded after low flyover - dailypress.com
Oceana F/A-18 pilots grounded after low flyover - dailypress.com
03-23-2010, 05:20 PM
#3
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Permanent grounding is pretty harsh. But, not all that surprising. It appears they tried to game the system, get a little "Mavericky" for the home crowd, and got caught. Hopefully their misfortune will save someone else's career in the future. Take note: Flybys can be bad for your career.
03-23-2010, 05:31 PM
#4
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Not surprising at all.
Everyone in the community knows what will happen if you get caught doing something like that.
It is instances like this why you end up briefing all the way up the chain of command. I had a squadronmate who was getting ready to do the USC/UCLA fly-over and he had the CNAF calling him right as he was walking to tell him to not mess it up! CNAF level interest!
They knew the chances they were taking. It is the environment that we work in now.
On another note - anybody know what ever happened to that Green Mountain Boy that did the barrell roll around the formation at the game?
I can't imagine that the USAF, Reserves, or ANG would be very much more forgiving of acts like that.
USMCFLYR
Everyone in the community knows what will happen if you get caught doing something like that.
It is instances like this why you end up briefing all the way up the chain of command. I had a squadronmate who was getting ready to do the USC/UCLA fly-over and he had the CNAF calling him right as he was walking to tell him to not mess it up! CNAF level interest!
They knew the chances they were taking. It is the environment that we work in now.
On another note - anybody know what ever happened to that Green Mountain Boy that did the barrell roll around the formation at the game?
I can't imagine that the USAF, Reserves, or ANG would be very much more forgiving of acts like that.
USMCFLYR
03-23-2010, 08:57 PM
#5
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USMCFLYER,
I'll see if I can find out. However, everyone I've talked to says it was simply an overshoot/underun gone bad, and he lag rolled the formation. It was not premeditated, or so goes the consensus.
I'll see if I can find out. However, everyone I've talked to says it was simply an overshoot/underun gone bad, and he lag rolled the formation. It was not premeditated, or so goes the consensus.
03-23-2010, 09:07 PM
#6
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Posts: 829
Another example of how military leadership emphasizes the wrong things. Flyby's are some of the least risky things we do. They are usually well-planned and flown by experienced pilots.
If one were to scrutinize the last 20 years of mishap data, how many organized/sanctioned flyby mishaps would be found? My guess would be close to zero.
Now, poor pilot skills, those have led to many mishaps. I can speak for all of the services except for the Army (I was both an AETC and CNATRA IP) and can say that the emphasis is on just getting them out the door. It is nearly impossible to wash out a student in USAF UPT or USN/USCG/USMC flight training.
It does not stop at flight training. To quote KC10FatBoy from another thread: "We've had C-5 crews do circles on the NATs and near missed airliners. We've had C-17s land gear up. We've had KC-10 crews enter accelerated stalls. We've had crews fly into so much sovereign airspace without clearance from the host country, I can't list them all here. We've had crews land at the wrong airfields. We've had crews make one digit mistake in entering lat longs for the NATs and thus lost separation and caused TCAS RAs on the NATs. Blah blah blah blah blah. ....."
Every year, marginal students are sent to the fleet with a known deficiency in basic flying skills - a risk that is accepted without question by those leaders who refuse to attrite them. Marginal flying skills are accepted in the operational squadrons. Minimally experienced crews are paired up without a second thought. This is what the AF Times reported about the 2009 E-3 mishap at Nellis: "Neither pilot was an “experienced” E-3 pilot, but that is common for E-3 crews, the report said. [CP] had logged only 132 hours in E-3s. [AC] had 387 E-3 hours and 1,819 hours overall in Air Force planes."
Military leadership makes decisions every day that result in real increases in risk. They refuse to take steps to make real improvements in crewmember proficiency or capability. No one thinks twice. But......fly over a stadium at 800' vs 1,000' and there is going to be hell to pay for that incredible risk that you took.
If one were to scrutinize the last 20 years of mishap data, how many organized/sanctioned flyby mishaps would be found? My guess would be close to zero.
Now, poor pilot skills, those have led to many mishaps. I can speak for all of the services except for the Army (I was both an AETC and CNATRA IP) and can say that the emphasis is on just getting them out the door. It is nearly impossible to wash out a student in USAF UPT or USN/USCG/USMC flight training.
It does not stop at flight training. To quote KC10FatBoy from another thread: "We've had C-5 crews do circles on the NATs and near missed airliners. We've had C-17s land gear up. We've had KC-10 crews enter accelerated stalls. We've had crews fly into so much sovereign airspace without clearance from the host country, I can't list them all here. We've had crews land at the wrong airfields. We've had crews make one digit mistake in entering lat longs for the NATs and thus lost separation and caused TCAS RAs on the NATs. Blah blah blah blah blah. ....."
Every year, marginal students are sent to the fleet with a known deficiency in basic flying skills - a risk that is accepted without question by those leaders who refuse to attrite them. Marginal flying skills are accepted in the operational squadrons. Minimally experienced crews are paired up without a second thought. This is what the AF Times reported about the 2009 E-3 mishap at Nellis: "Neither pilot was an “experienced” E-3 pilot, but that is common for E-3 crews, the report said. [CP] had logged only 132 hours in E-3s. [AC] had 387 E-3 hours and 1,819 hours overall in Air Force planes."
Military leadership makes decisions every day that result in real increases in risk. They refuse to take steps to make real improvements in crewmember proficiency or capability. No one thinks twice. But......fly over a stadium at 800' vs 1,000' and there is going to be hell to pay for that incredible risk that you took.
03-23-2010, 09:07 PM
#7
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Originally Posted by HuggyU2
USMCFLYER,
I'll see if I can find out. However, everyone I've talked to says it was simply an overshoot/underun gone bad, and he lag rolled the formation. It was not premeditated, or so goes the consensus.
I'll see if I can find out. However, everyone I've talked to says it was simply an overshoot/underun gone bad, and he lag rolled the formation. It was not premeditated, or so goes the consensus.
03-23-2010, 09:34 PM
#8
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Position: FAA 'Flight Check'
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Originally Posted by HuggyU2
USMCFLYER,
I'll see if I can find out. However, everyone I've talked to says it was simply an overshoot/underun gone bad, and he lag rolled the formation. It was not premeditated, or so goes the consensus.
I'll see if I can find out. However, everyone I've talked to says it was simply an overshoot/underun gone bad, and he lag rolled the formation. It was not premeditated, or so goes the consensus.
As LIM points out - I'd sure not be changing the story now!USMCFLYR
03-23-2010, 09:53 PM
#9
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Position: FAA 'Flight Check'
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LivingInMEM;782996]Another example of how military leadership emphasizes the wrong things. Flyby's are some of the least risky things we do. They are usually well-planned and flown by experienced pilots.
I did one in Beaufort for the Water Festival once. The FAA rep at the meeting said "just don't go supersonic". I thought to myself - every O-5 and above will be at that Festival - I'm not doing anything stupid while on display like that.
If one were to scrutinize the last 20 years of mishap data, how many organized/sanctioned flyby mishaps would be found? My guess would be close to zero.
A supersonic flyby at sea.YouTube - F-14 Flyby Explosion
Now, poor pilot skills, those have led to many mishaps. I can speak for all of the services except for the Army (I was both an AETC and CNATRA IP) and can say that the emphasis is on just getting them out the door. It is nearly impossible to wash out a student in USAF UPT or USN/USCG/USMC flight training.
Every year, marginal students are sent to the fleet with a known deficiency in basic flying skills - a risk that is accepted without question by those leaders who refuse to attrite them. Marginal flying skills are accepted in the operational squadrons.
No one thinks twice. But......fly over a stadium at 800' vs 1,000' and there is going to be hell to pay for that incredible risk that you took
The aviators, both from Strike Fighter Squadron 136 at Oceana Naval Air Station and both Georgia Tech alum ni, were supposed to pass over Bobby Dodd Stadium in downtown Atlanta at 1,000 feet, the standard altitude for military flyovers.
Plans called for two jets to pass overhead after the conclusion of the national anthem, shortly before Georgia Tech took the field against Wake Forest on Nov. 7.
Instead, the two F/A-18 Super Hornets flew just a few hundred feet above the stadium.
Plans called for two jets to pass overhead after the conclusion of the national anthem, shortly before Georgia Tech took the field against Wake Forest on Nov. 7.
Instead, the two F/A-18 Super Hornets flew just a few hundred feet above the stadium.
I know of one O-5 who lost his wings when he took it upon himself to fly a plane back from Key West to Beaufort after one of the two generators repeatedly fell off line on deck. He felt pressure to get the plane back. Outside of Tampa - wouldn't you know it - he lost the second generator. This guy was a former MAWTS IP (similar to TopGun/Fighter Weapons School) and was certainly in line for a squadron command. Probably the only thing he had ever done wrong in his career - this meaning that he was not some well known crazy/dangerous pilot like Bud Holland.
USMCFLYR
03-23-2010, 11:14 PM
#10
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Posts: 829
That Tomcat one does not count, that was a pure aircraft malfunction that was not related to the fact that it was a flyby. He could have been flying a straight low-level or been running cold after taking the Phoenix shot, and would have had the same results.
It is semantics and I don't want to debate the details, but 1,000' AGL is not always interpreted as 1,000' above the stadium (although 200' feet above the stadium would certainly be below the accepted standard). You are right, the tapes and FDRs give away all of the secrets.
Military leaders are often like water and electricity, they follow the path of least resistance. How's that?
The hard way (sts) - identify a dangerous pilot BEFORE they can cause damage or mission failure, such as during training. It takes real leadership to stand in front of the boss and say that this person should not be here, and it takes real leadership from the Wing CC/Commodore to be willing to face HHQ when they start getting calls from the lawyer. You are right to say that the Wing King is more likely to discount the testimony of the gradebook/IPs/CC if the student is saying the right things. The other hard way (sts) - defend a one-time mistake made by an otherwise good pilot and refuse to terminate his career to make an example. The immediate supervisors in this case should be commended for standing behind their guys after they made a mistake (vs committing a crime).
The easy way is what the RADM did - take some publicized event and drop the hammer, although there are many instances of less publicized instances where the hammer wasn't even considered. Take some one-time event where the pilot leaned forward a little too much (such as your generator story) and drop the hammer, even though everyone in the wardroom (including the skipper) knew of some other instance where an equivalent level of risk was taken by someone and there were no ramifications because nothing went wrong. As a matter of fact, that same skipper probably had an equally poor decision (considering ORM) in his past that he got away with.
It takes spine to invoke a lesser level of punishment on the public cases when everyone is looking for blood, such as was done in that Green Mountain incident that you talked about. It's called judgment.
I am not saying what they did was right. I am not saying that they were not incredibly ignorant in thinking that their flyover wouldn't get publicity. I am saying that their transgression is not to scale with the punishment that they got.
Someone decided to let two new E-3 pilots to fly together at night - that decision resulted in $100 million dollars in damage and nearly led to the loss of 32 crewmembers. Has that person faced any consequences? No, but why not? Their judgment was just as poor as the Hornet drivers. Their ORM considerations were even worse than those of the Hornet drivers.
Here's a sidenote, can a flyover at 1,000' be more dangerous than one at 500'? Absolutely! What if a wingman is behind the powercurve at 1,000' and is trying to get back in position as they are approaching the stadium? Isn't there a danger of a midair if he's got a vector into lead? Whether at 1,000', 2,000', or 5,000' - once the airplanes hit (if they hit hard enough), there is no controlling where they go. For every altitude, there is a specific location where, if the collision occurs, the resulting mass will fall into the stadium. Of all of the risk factors, altitude is only one and it is no greater a risk factor than most others.
Those 2 Hornets were in a stable (no closure) formation. There was no risk of midair. Their flight path was straight and level well prior to the stadium and they did not initiate a turn until well past the stadium. Even when the turn was initiated, it was away from the wingman and the wingman took additional spacing in the turn. Those 2 jets at 500' were far less of a risk to the people on the ground than 2 jets at 1,000' or even 2,000' would be if one of those jets had a vector into the other. Even at 1,000', a dual engine flameout due to bird ingestion results in the aircraft pretty much going on it's own path with little input available to the pilot - the Hornet without engines is closer to a brick than a glider. Unfortunately, our simple minded leadership can't recognize that. They can't seem to use judgment. They can't analyze the facts and recognize that only one or two (low altitude) risk factors are present, and those risk factors aren't even "high risk" factors. As a matter of fact, O'Hanlon went the opposite direction and declared that there were nearly tragic consequences: "Fryman failed to provide effective [crew resource management] for his flight lead and allowed an unsafe flyby to occur with nearly tragic consequences," Rear Adm. R.J. O'Hanlon wrote in documents obtained by Navy Times. "Despite his spotless record, his complacent, passive response to a major altitude transgression is unforgivable in my view." Really, nearly tragic consequences?
They were violations to regulation to be sure, but do we permanently ground those who violate regulation every time? It was a momentary lapse in judgment. The article notes that they fessed up after landing and the Admiral himself noted a previously spotless record and the fact that both officers were dedicated and motivated.
RADM O'Hanlon is a joke. I don't know enough about the guy or his history, but I am fairly confident that if I had a track record of his decisions, I could find some that were just as egregious or dangerous as this flyby was. Good job advancing the "one-mistake" Navy - always a healthy environment for a warfighting force.
I tend to agree with some of the comments found on related blogs such as:
RADM O'Hanlon. Where were you the last 15 years when Holly Graf was abusing crews as XO and CO of Naval surface combatants?,
The Navy is now run by people who think its purpose is not to fight as indicated by O'Hanlon's comments. They're going to suffer major defeats in the beginning of our next war until they are replaced by folks like Lt. Cmdr Fryman. It is unfortunate, but probable., and
As Navy reserve officer, I think you are spot on. The Navy has become risk averse.
It is semantics and I don't want to debate the details, but 1,000' AGL is not always interpreted as 1,000' above the stadium (although 200' feet above the stadium would certainly be below the accepted standard). You are right, the tapes and FDRs give away all of the secrets.
Military leaders are often like water and electricity, they follow the path of least resistance. How's that?
The hard way (sts) - identify a dangerous pilot BEFORE they can cause damage or mission failure, such as during training. It takes real leadership to stand in front of the boss and say that this person should not be here, and it takes real leadership from the Wing CC/Commodore to be willing to face HHQ when they start getting calls from the lawyer. You are right to say that the Wing King is more likely to discount the testimony of the gradebook/IPs/CC if the student is saying the right things. The other hard way (sts) - defend a one-time mistake made by an otherwise good pilot and refuse to terminate his career to make an example. The immediate supervisors in this case should be commended for standing behind their guys after they made a mistake (vs committing a crime).
The easy way is what the RADM did - take some publicized event and drop the hammer, although there are many instances of less publicized instances where the hammer wasn't even considered. Take some one-time event where the pilot leaned forward a little too much (such as your generator story) and drop the hammer, even though everyone in the wardroom (including the skipper) knew of some other instance where an equivalent level of risk was taken by someone and there were no ramifications because nothing went wrong. As a matter of fact, that same skipper probably had an equally poor decision (considering ORM) in his past that he got away with.
It takes spine to invoke a lesser level of punishment on the public cases when everyone is looking for blood, such as was done in that Green Mountain incident that you talked about. It's called judgment.
I am not saying what they did was right. I am not saying that they were not incredibly ignorant in thinking that their flyover wouldn't get publicity. I am saying that their transgression is not to scale with the punishment that they got.
Someone decided to let two new E-3 pilots to fly together at night - that decision resulted in $100 million dollars in damage and nearly led to the loss of 32 crewmembers. Has that person faced any consequences? No, but why not? Their judgment was just as poor as the Hornet drivers. Their ORM considerations were even worse than those of the Hornet drivers.
Here's a sidenote, can a flyover at 1,000' be more dangerous than one at 500'? Absolutely! What if a wingman is behind the powercurve at 1,000' and is trying to get back in position as they are approaching the stadium? Isn't there a danger of a midair if he's got a vector into lead? Whether at 1,000', 2,000', or 5,000' - once the airplanes hit (if they hit hard enough), there is no controlling where they go. For every altitude, there is a specific location where, if the collision occurs, the resulting mass will fall into the stadium. Of all of the risk factors, altitude is only one and it is no greater a risk factor than most others.
Those 2 Hornets were in a stable (no closure) formation. There was no risk of midair. Their flight path was straight and level well prior to the stadium and they did not initiate a turn until well past the stadium. Even when the turn was initiated, it was away from the wingman and the wingman took additional spacing in the turn. Those 2 jets at 500' were far less of a risk to the people on the ground than 2 jets at 1,000' or even 2,000' would be if one of those jets had a vector into the other. Even at 1,000', a dual engine flameout due to bird ingestion results in the aircraft pretty much going on it's own path with little input available to the pilot - the Hornet without engines is closer to a brick than a glider. Unfortunately, our simple minded leadership can't recognize that. They can't seem to use judgment. They can't analyze the facts and recognize that only one or two (low altitude) risk factors are present, and those risk factors aren't even "high risk" factors. As a matter of fact, O'Hanlon went the opposite direction and declared that there were nearly tragic consequences: "Fryman failed to provide effective [crew resource management] for his flight lead and allowed an unsafe flyby to occur with nearly tragic consequences," Rear Adm. R.J. O'Hanlon wrote in documents obtained by Navy Times. "Despite his spotless record, his complacent, passive response to a major altitude transgression is unforgivable in my view." Really, nearly tragic consequences?
They were violations to regulation to be sure, but do we permanently ground those who violate regulation every time? It was a momentary lapse in judgment. The article notes that they fessed up after landing and the Admiral himself noted a previously spotless record and the fact that both officers were dedicated and motivated.
RADM O'Hanlon is a joke. I don't know enough about the guy or his history, but I am fairly confident that if I had a track record of his decisions, I could find some that were just as egregious or dangerous as this flyby was. Good job advancing the "one-mistake" Navy - always a healthy environment for a warfighting force.
I tend to agree with some of the comments found on related blogs such as:
RADM O'Hanlon. Where were you the last 15 years when Holly Graf was abusing crews as XO and CO of Naval surface combatants?,
The Navy is now run by people who think its purpose is not to fight as indicated by O'Hanlon's comments. They're going to suffer major defeats in the beginning of our next war until they are replaced by folks like Lt. Cmdr Fryman. It is unfortunate, but probable., and
As Navy reserve officer, I think you are spot on. The Navy has become risk averse.
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