i heard these guys crashed into a house that produced meth ?! true or not?

 

Picture I saw of the aftermath showed the airplane in somebody's backyard, but miraculously didn't look like they hit any structures.

 

I've never seen anything on paper but from what I hear no matter what you do you aren't going to restart them once they drop below 10%.

 

Read on:

Request To Reword the Reason for Engine Modification

Air Wisconsin Airlines requests that the proposed AD be reworded to indicate that the desired reason for the engine modification is to enhance safety, and not as a result of the accident, as stated. Otherwise, the implication is that the CF34 engine does not meet the certification requirements, which, is inaccurate. The commenter also states that they believe the justification stated in the NPRM is a gross misrepresentation of the situation and events, which led up to the referenced accident. The commenter states that the failure of the engines to restart after the flameout event was a direct result of the flight crew failing to properly follow in-flight engine restart procedures. The commenter states that every engine is tested during the aircraft certification test flight process to ensure it meets the requirements of Federal Aviation Regulation 25.903.
We do not agree. The proposed AD does not state that the 4-step seal was the cause of the accident, but that the proposed AD resulted from the investigation of the accident. The investigation found that under certain high-power, high-altitude engine shutdown events, interference between the rotating and stationary portions of the 4-step air balance piston seal can develop. We did not change the AD.

Request To Clarify "Piece-Part Exposure'' Definition

Air Wisconsin Airlines states that if the desire is to ensure engine modification at first exposure, then the requirement should indicate to accomplish the GE seal modification service bulletin at "piece-part-exposure''. Piece-part exposure should be defined as "removal of the combustion liner'' but no later than the first life- limited part shop visit, since this is when the HP turbine life-limited parts (and typically the combustion liner) are removed. The commenter also states that the proposed AD compliance requirements are not entirely clear. The air balance piston seal is a non-serialized part, which makes it difficult to track and manage the part. The commenter states that they have observed a maintenance and overhaul shop that overlooked a particular requirement to incorporate a modification, because of an interpretation of what "piece-part exposure'' was.
We partially agree. We agree that the 4-step seal should be removed when the combustion liner is removed at piece-part exposure. We do not agree removal must be tied to the life-limited parts. We changed the piece-part exposure definition in the AD to state "For the purposes of this AD, piece-part exposure means when the 4-step seal is removed from the engine or when the combustion liner is removed.''

Request To Change Incident Description Statement

GE requests that we change the incident description statement of "Both engines experienced high-altitude flameouts'' which appears in the proposed AD Summary and Unsafe Condition, to "As a result of a high-altitude airplane stall and upset, both engines experienced high- power flameouts.'' The commenter states that this change is a more accurate representation of the event.
We do not agree. As we have said previously the proposed AD does not state that the 4-step seal caused the accident. GE found during the course of the investigation that under certain high-power, high- altitude engine shutdown events, interference between the rotating and stationary portions of the 4-step air balance piston seal can develop. We did not change the AD.

Request To Change the FAA's Reason for the AD Action

GE requests that we change the FAA's reason statement for the AD action, from "We are proposing this AD to prevent the inability to restart both engines after flameout due to excessive friction of the 4- step seal, which could result in subsequent forced landing of the airplane'' to "We are proposing this AD to enhance the ability to restart an engine after flameout by reducing the friction in the 4-step seal, which could result in subsequent forced landing of the airplane.'' The commenter states that this change would be a more accurate representation and support the assessment that this is a very rare occurrence and the recommended actions are not prevalent as proven by the category level of the relevant service bulletins.
We do not agree. As already noted, the accident was not attributed to the friction of the 4-step seal. We have found an unsafe condition with the product. The proposed wording suggests the modification or replacement may not be adequate to address the inability to restart due to the friction. We did not change the AD.

Conclusion

We have carefully reviewed the available data, including the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD with the changes described previously. We have determined that these changes will neither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

 

Hey, there's a story on this over at FlightPod Television (Episode 003)

Vykus

 

We've all done "different" things in aircraft we've flown. You can't even compare this situation. These pilots disrespected themselves, their families, fellow pilots, and the profession for flying the way they did. There was NO EXCUSE for the poor and immature decisions they made that night while flying that CRJ. Read the NTSB accident report again. All we can be thankful for is that they didn't take anybody out on the ground or in the aircraft with them. It doesn't take knowledge of high speed aerodynamics to know when an aircraft is going to stall, either. We all make mistakes. What they did was inexcusable. Sorry if the truth hurts.

 

Below 15k ft, the starting envelope is greater than or equal to 9% N2...so if that were the case they better change the AFM.