Adlerdriver

I understand the "gist" of your comment which is why I mentioned the axe. Personally, I don't share that "mantra" and scoff pretty heavily at the Delta fail (and any other similar fails) equally, regardless of the company, size of the a/c or flavor of pilot. Maybe I'm naive, but I don't think quite as many of us on the "internets" are inclined to give legacy guys a pass on these things as you may think.

But, maybe that's just me. I spent some time at an ACMI with some outstanding pilots and jumpseat off line in highly professional RJ cockpits all the time which may keep me away from those narrow minded attitudes you mention.

John Carr

Which was basically all I was saying.

And I NEVER said you had that mantra/mentality.

aeroengineer

A little over a year ago I was speaking to an FAA employee (FAA inspector as I recall and he had flown 121 in the past before his FAA gig) and we were discussing the Colgan crash. My take was without talking to the captain is we'll never know what the captain thought he was dealing with. Icing or more specifically tail-plane icing which would have required a completely different response or some other issue entirely. Just no way to know for sure. My .02. (I can't say if he was "established" at this point in the ILS approach maybe someone else can chime in) The FAA inspector's take was that the captain was trying to recover AND not bust his altitude (putting his job at risk) as stall recovery has been about preventing altitude loss and recovering from the stall. In hindsight he and his passengers lost a lot more but he wouldn't be the first in any industry to do something unsafe to try and safeguard employment. Turns out I guessed right when I noticed the change in the PTS standards for stall recovery (amount of allowable altitude loss during recovery) could be traced to this accident. I do know one thing I personally have the lessons learned from this tragedy burned in my mind and I will utilize altitude available to may sure the plane is flying again.

John Carr

We'll never know what Renslow was thinking. Not the FO woth the flap retraction. And I don't have the benefit of hearing the FAA guy's thoughts and the context.

But even for a pilot like Renslow, I doubt it was his job he may have been worried about. ALL of us have made a boo boo.

Yes, I know he worked for a crappy employer, but I don't buy the employment idea.

And the PTS was changed because the FAA FINALLY realized how completely stupid and usless it was to have the old PTS standards.

Especially in larger transport category aircraft.

On a PC, a passable stall maneuver wasn't so much about the recovery as it was getting set up for the maneuver itself.

Afterwards, stall training became way more real world and practicle.

aeroengineer

Yes sir on this we wholeheartedly agree.

I also noticed in the 2014 time frame (at least in my little corner of the world) that there were still some instructors hadn't gotten the memo sts and seemed to try and teach the old standards. Of course the old standards are what THEY learned originally.

trip

Agree here, I've done many checkrides/SIMS in T-prop and jet where if you lost +100' in a recovery it was a fail/re-do. So the the procedure became at first indication of stall, max thrust and haul back on the yoke, NO KIDDING!

The rules were re-written in blood and training has become real world.

John Carr

It also became more about how you set up for the maneuver from the get go and not the ACTUAL RECOVERY ITSELF.

FlyJSH

It was my opinion and still is what we trained for at Colgan was recovery from slow flight rather than a recovery from a stall. We slowed, got behind the power curve, and powered out of it with some reduction in AOA. It certainly wasn't what I as a CFI taught a student flying a 152 or a King Air to do when faced with an actual stall.

There were a number of dominoes that fell that night. His actions were the last.

Marvin was one of the nicest guys you could hope to meet.

I am not defending or judging. I just miss my friend.

John Carr

The other airlines I worked at at that time were the same

An exercise in slow flight and then powering/accelerating out of it. The landing configuration being the worst.

PurpleToolBox

I'm sorry I disagree with you. Perhaps you were taught that way but if you were you were taught wrong. You never yanked back on the yoke because doing so only worsened your situation. It was more of a "hold" the yoke keeping the nose up maintaining level flight while the power increase allowed for you to accelerate out or away from the stall.

The old standard wasn't unsafe, it didn't teach pilots that all they have to do is release back pressure, accelerate and you'll live another day. Had either procedure been performed that night, they would be alive. Yanking back on the yoke wasn't taught or shouldn't have been and pulling back during the stall is precisely what killed them. Raising the flaps only doomed any chance or a recovery.