Keep it under the red line by clicking off the A/T? I hope I don't have to... but I don't see it being much of a challenge either.

Yes, it is easy, but some accident crews make it easier than others, especially when the apparent deficiency lies in basic flying fundamentals. And yes, appropriate and judicious application of pitch trim is something I would reasonably expect from any pilot with a solo endorsement, let alone a type rating in a transport category aircraft. I certainly remember in primary training how quickly I learned the importance of pitch trim; could not hold altitude or airspeed worth a darn unless I used it, and used it often; it eventually became instinctive. If this is a skill that only the "top 1%" have...then that's a problem.



While everyone is busy piling on Boeing, nobody is asking about the basic training and experience (or lack thereof) that the accident crews had. Here in the states, we get up in arms whenever someone suggests relaxing the 1500 hour/ATP rule. Whereas apparently in Ethiopia, pilots get typed at 100 TT, and that gets a pass.

Clicking off the A/T wouldn't have done anything in this case. TL's would've stayed at the climb setting.
But you obviously would've immediately realized that oh, the stick shaker is false (look at the yoke reaction - he initiated a stall recovery due to the shaker), and pulled back on the thrust levers even when you're not exactly sure why the shaker is going off, your airspeed readings are off, and you have all sorts of other warnings and conflicting messages showing up.

I'm glad everyone here is such a superior pilot that something that has killed 2 qualified crews would not be "much of a challenge".

Clearly the ATP rule worked well for the Atlas crew.

Airspeed was close enough to be reliable for discerning a stall (or not) the whole time.
Groundspeed and looking out the window could've helped as well.
Only one side had activated for the shaker (big clue right there).
At no point did anyone pull back the thrust levers.

I get it, initial reaction, shaker goes off, yeah probably try a stall recovery... it's what they spring load us to do in training.

None of that excuses the next 5 minutes of staying at basically full thrust. Nearly 3 minutes of which was in overspeed. If you can't comprehend this basic fact of how this accident happened then you do not belong anywhere near an aircraft.

Congrats, the monday morning quarterback of the week award goes to you.

Seriously - your ATP needs to be revoked for stupidity.

I don’t want to venture down this rabbit hole again, but hours in your logbook mean nothing. It’s quality over quantity in aviation. They may have better training programs than in the states. FAA regulation is not supreme throughout the world, nor does it provide the safest environments in all aspects. The hour comparison of a foreign trained pilot to a pilot trained in the states is irrelevant. Look at EASA for example. I don’t know you, but I can guess fairly confidently you wouldn’t pass their training.

It’s easy to read a “report” from the comforts of your own home playing xbox and eating Doritos, judging the crew on what they should/shouldn’t have done. The point is they were set up for failure from the very beginning, out of their control unfortunately.

It's hard to claim that pilots followed procedure if they cut off stab trim, then put the switches back again.

Which procedure is it that directs crew to re-establish stab trim by returning the stab trim cutoff switches to their former position?

No, not well said, at all. You're responding to the statement that any event is recoverable.

This is not true. Not every event is recoverable. Not by a long, damn shot.

Pretty sure that reducing thrust in the Max would increase NOSE DOWN pitch -- for the same reason that MCAS exists in the first place.