Originally Posted by Adlerdriver (Post 2797312)

Of course their efforts weren't working. They had the long forgotten throttles locked in the forward position, driving the aircraft to and past VMO. They needed to SLOW DOWN - just like anyone else trying to deal with a runaway stab situation and requirements to use the manual trim wheels. That was the "tool" to which they need to resort - flying the aircraft. Yoke, throttles, pitch, power, CRM... basics. Turning a failed system back on was not the "only other tool".

It's amazing anyone here is actually claiming that it's understandable that a fully trained 737 crew of a national airline can ignore their airspeed during this event for 6 minutes. There's no excuse. None.

Originally Posted by Adlerdriver (Post 2797329)

:rolleyes: You seem to have a problem with someone calling a spade a spade.
I'm not excusing any accidents in particular. Many here, including you, seem to want to give these guys a pass and put all the blame on Boeing. I'm just not feeling as forgiving and "it could happen to anyone" as some of the bleeding hearts here seem to be. Based on the clear evidence provided by the FDR, it's my opinion (and I'm not the only one) that these two pilots screwed up badly. The media firestorm and the myriad of "experts" spouting BS about MCAS have turned this into a sympathy party for pilots who should have been able to handle a relatively basic malfunction.
Boeing did a terrible job with this system and they should share the blame for these accidents because a single point, single input failure is an amazingly stupid design. But all that did was drastically raise the probability of a runaway stabilizer event happening on these aircraft. That malfunction is not an unrecoverable event and in the hands of a competent crew should have ended in a safe landing. If you actually think that this outcome could happen to you under the same circumstances, then you really should choose another line of work.

Originally Posted by Adlerdriver (Post 2797329)

:rolleyes: You seem to have a problem with someone calling a spade a spade.
I'm not excusing any accidents in particular. Many here, including you, seem to want to give these guys a pass and put all the blame on Boeing. I'm just not feeling as forgiving and "it could happen to anyone" as some of the bleeding hearts here seem to be. Based on the clear evidence provided by the FDR, it's my opinion (and I'm not the only one) that these two pilots screwed up badly. The media firestorm and the myriad of "experts" spouting BS about MCAS have turned this into a sympathy party for pilots who should have been able to handle a relatively basic malfunction.
Boeing did a terrible job with this system and they should share the blame for these accidents because a single point, single input failure is an amazingly stupid design. But all that did was drastically raise the probability of a runaway stabilizer event happening on these aircraft. That malfunction is not an unrecoverable event and in the hands of a competent crew should have ended in a safe landing. If you actually think that this outcome could happen to you under the same circumstances, then you really should choose another line of work.

Originally Posted by cencal83406 (Post 2797337)

The two FedEx pilots in Narita should have chosen another line of work. Unfortunately they didn’t and it didn’t work out for them.

Go arounds are pretty simple if you don’t PIO yourself into the ground. I’m sure you share the same sentiment though about that accident.

Originally Posted by Chris Close (Post 2797335)

If at or near VMO at that density altitude, with full down trim on the horizontal stab, what back pressure on the yoke is required to maintain level flight? Let alone climb? Is it even possible to maintain altitude under this configuration?

Originally Posted by Adlerdriver (Post 2797346)

Why do we need to entertain a scenario that starts with an aircraft at an airspeed it should never have attained in the first place if the pilots were actually flying it? To answer your question though, once they turned the cut-out switches off, the aircraft was controllable, more so if it had been slowed to a normal, appropriate speed. Choosing (or simply allowing by inattention) the airspeed to increase beyond redline introduced aerodynamic forces that exceeded manual trim ability, introduced issues like Mach tuck and turned the situation into an unrecoverable event. That’s still on the pilots, not some random, uncontrollable outside forces. Fly the airplane.

Originally Posted by cencal83406 (Post 2797337)

The two FedEx pilots in Narita should have chosen another line of work. Unfortunately they didn’t and it didn’t work out for them.

Go arounds are pretty simple if you don’t PIO yourself into the ground. I’m sure you share the same sentiment though about that accident.

Originally Posted by Adlerdriver (Post 2797350)

Not really sure what your point is. They screwed up and paid with their lives. Same with UPS.
My comment was aimed at you and your constant attempt to paint these pilots in the Max as victims. They could have survived that flight by flying the aircraft.
I’m sorry that offends you but it’s the truth. Acknowledging pilot error in any accident isn’t ****ing on anyone’s grave. Death doesn’t absolve the pilots of their responsibility in the outcome. Each flight isn’t a crap shoot with an outcome decided by pure luck. We bring our A-game and in most situations determine what happens with it.

Originally Posted by rickair7777 (Post 2796755)

Maybe plummeting towards the ground with insufficient pitch up response?

Yes they could have spun the wheel by hand, but maybe they didn't think that was fast enough?

Originally Posted by Chris Close (Post 2797335)

If at or near VMO at that density altitude, with full down trim on the horizontal stab, what back pressure on the yoke is required to maintain level flight? Let alone climb? Is it even possible to maintain altitude under this configuration?

Originally Posted by JohnBurke (Post 2797361)

The aircraft should never be allowed to get to that condition in the first place.