Boeing can't find paperwork for door plug
#11
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,026
Boeing doesn't need belief. All Boeing needs to do is not produce the documentation.
Boeing is not the government. Boeing sells things to the government. Boeing is a contractor. Boeing does not tell the FAA what to do or dictate the time of day.
#12
Regulatory Capture?
Jedi Mind Tricks?
I'm not convinced that the theory is the practical reality.
#14
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2015
Posts: 986
what Jedi Mind Tricks? Forkner’s trial lasted 3 days and he was witted in 27 minutes. Fortunately for him drunk texting and being a moron is not against the law.
#15
#16
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2015
Posts: 986
wouldn’t it be great if the FAA had some leadership and actually knew how to do their job. They have been watching Boeing for 5 years and all this stuff has happened under their “enhanced scrutiny!” If anything criminal is going on it’s at the FAA.
#17
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,026
No, someone else did, which is how it came up: you, responding to me, responding to their statement that "Boeing IS the governent." I disagreed, saying it's not, and you contradicted, saying "maybe, in theory."
They're a manufacturer, not an operator. A manufacturer is not at all like a repair station or operator, and does create much of what exists, including the standards, practices, tooling, techniques, etc. The rest of the world that uses their product must do what the manufacturer dictates, . The rest of the world can inspect, and maintain, but only in accordance with what's prescribed by the manufacturer. The manufacturer is not the government, but is the creator. When one attempts to view a manufacturer through any other lens and make a comparison, one can't be made and the understanding falls flat.
In the general aviatoin experimental world, it's a little like the comparison between the builder-owner, and someone who flies or buys the builder's airplane, except that once type certificated, the manufacturer (Boeing) becomes more beholden to is own dictates in assembly and construction (yet with latitude at the same time: they are still the manufacturer and can change construction methods, techniques, practices, and so forth). The manufacturer has oversight in the production process, but that oversight is not the same as oversight for a repair station, which must assure compliance with Boeing's approved documentation, and with FAA regulation.
The FAA approves Boeings documentation, but there are limits. Boeing employers the engineers who produce the data. The FAA reviews it. There are limits. If Boeing prescribes a double row of rivets for part of a wing station and continues beyond a rib with a single row, the FAA may approve the drawings and even the wing assembly without specific knowledge why only a single row of rivets was used, the design or load criteria applied, etc. The FAA will observe and consider the testing done on components, and even grand scale events that range from load tests to destruction, to test flight data, but the FAA is neither big enough nor employers engineers to the scale and scope to overlook and monitor every rivet and every engineering decision, nor every assembly action. That requires documentation, and the FAA does spot check and observe the shop floor, and also the paperwork.
In the maintenance world, paperwork is everything, because that's largely what the FAA has to go with across the board, and what the FAA issues: paperwork. Maintenance documentation is a very, very big deal. One can manufacture or maintain an airplane perfectly, but if the paperwork is not complete or is inaccurate, that will be the basis of enforcement action, and also the documentation used to hang the individual, certificate holder, or manufacturer.
A unique aspect of enforcement comes into play here, though. The FAA lives in a world of administrative law, part of which is, as the originator and the enforcer of the regulation. The FAA determines not only if someone has violated the regulation, but what to do about it. Lawmaker, cop, judge, jury, and executioner, all in one, and the upshot is that when the FAA takes action, one is guilty until proven innocent, and one's first defense comes in the appeal process, after one has already been convicted by the FAA. The FAA, in turn, generally (but far from always) seeks to enforce with some degree of evidence (but doesn't require it), on the general principle that the case should stand up to appeal. The FAA often acts, with full knolwedge that it won't stand up to appeal (and is famous for it), too. If the FAA hears a report of a low-flying aircraft, for example, they may take enforcement action against the pilot...but until they can actually place the pilot in the cockpit of that airplane on that day, the case is weak and likely won't stand up...so the FAA works hard to get that documentation. It nearly always comes from the pilot, when he tries to defend himself (and until he responds and admits he was there, the FAA frequently has nothing to use). It's the paperwork or admission by the subject of FAA scrutiny that often becomes the mechanism of conviction (the "nail in the lid," as it were).
In this case, Boeing may be better off not having the paperwork, regardless of the reason it's not available (employee stole it, rogue dog consumed it, whatever). Not having the documentation (paperwork) is a violation by itself, but not having the paperwork means whatever is on the paperwork can't be used as evidence. Boeing may find that the result of missing paperwork is less costly than turning over the paperwork, especially if documentation was made of the job having been done correctly (as that would constitute falsification, a more serious issue than missing documentation).
Regardless, it's the FAA overseeing this matter, not Boeing. Whether someone at Boeing destroyed or hid the documentation, or whether it was never generated, the FAA will still be the investigator and enforcer on the matter, and remains the overseer. The FAA doesn't micromanage any certificate holder or manufacturer and oversight is far from it (though it does feel that way at times), but oversight will come to bear where the spotlight lands (most recently door plugs, et al), in addition to the larger picture.
In the general aviatoin experimental world, it's a little like the comparison between the builder-owner, and someone who flies or buys the builder's airplane, except that once type certificated, the manufacturer (Boeing) becomes more beholden to is own dictates in assembly and construction (yet with latitude at the same time: they are still the manufacturer and can change construction methods, techniques, practices, and so forth). The manufacturer has oversight in the production process, but that oversight is not the same as oversight for a repair station, which must assure compliance with Boeing's approved documentation, and with FAA regulation.
The FAA approves Boeings documentation, but there are limits. Boeing employers the engineers who produce the data. The FAA reviews it. There are limits. If Boeing prescribes a double row of rivets for part of a wing station and continues beyond a rib with a single row, the FAA may approve the drawings and even the wing assembly without specific knowledge why only a single row of rivets was used, the design or load criteria applied, etc. The FAA will observe and consider the testing done on components, and even grand scale events that range from load tests to destruction, to test flight data, but the FAA is neither big enough nor employers engineers to the scale and scope to overlook and monitor every rivet and every engineering decision, nor every assembly action. That requires documentation, and the FAA does spot check and observe the shop floor, and also the paperwork.
In the maintenance world, paperwork is everything, because that's largely what the FAA has to go with across the board, and what the FAA issues: paperwork. Maintenance documentation is a very, very big deal. One can manufacture or maintain an airplane perfectly, but if the paperwork is not complete or is inaccurate, that will be the basis of enforcement action, and also the documentation used to hang the individual, certificate holder, or manufacturer.
A unique aspect of enforcement comes into play here, though. The FAA lives in a world of administrative law, part of which is, as the originator and the enforcer of the regulation. The FAA determines not only if someone has violated the regulation, but what to do about it. Lawmaker, cop, judge, jury, and executioner, all in one, and the upshot is that when the FAA takes action, one is guilty until proven innocent, and one's first defense comes in the appeal process, after one has already been convicted by the FAA. The FAA, in turn, generally (but far from always) seeks to enforce with some degree of evidence (but doesn't require it), on the general principle that the case should stand up to appeal. The FAA often acts, with full knolwedge that it won't stand up to appeal (and is famous for it), too. If the FAA hears a report of a low-flying aircraft, for example, they may take enforcement action against the pilot...but until they can actually place the pilot in the cockpit of that airplane on that day, the case is weak and likely won't stand up...so the FAA works hard to get that documentation. It nearly always comes from the pilot, when he tries to defend himself (and until he responds and admits he was there, the FAA frequently has nothing to use). It's the paperwork or admission by the subject of FAA scrutiny that often becomes the mechanism of conviction (the "nail in the lid," as it were).
In this case, Boeing may be better off not having the paperwork, regardless of the reason it's not available (employee stole it, rogue dog consumed it, whatever). Not having the documentation (paperwork) is a violation by itself, but not having the paperwork means whatever is on the paperwork can't be used as evidence. Boeing may find that the result of missing paperwork is less costly than turning over the paperwork, especially if documentation was made of the job having been done correctly (as that would constitute falsification, a more serious issue than missing documentation).
Regardless, it's the FAA overseeing this matter, not Boeing. Whether someone at Boeing destroyed or hid the documentation, or whether it was never generated, the FAA will still be the investigator and enforcer on the matter, and remains the overseer. The FAA doesn't micromanage any certificate holder or manufacturer and oversight is far from it (though it does feel that way at times), but oversight will come to bear where the spotlight lands (most recently door plugs, et al), in addition to the larger picture.
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