And that is what I liked......a direct readout. A gauge or a number on the HUD/EFIS/etc. Just doing the winds ear/CFIT recoveries in the might radar equipped and pressurized King Air would have been better if I had had a reference to pull too!

Not knowing if the PF was still pulling back on the stick would have been easy to tell with some direct feedback of Alpha as FastDEW points out.

USMCFLYR

 

I agree, but once they got the pitot system thawed out they had everything they needed right in front of them. Including a flight director telling them where to put the nose, based on both AOA and airspeed.

I think the temporary loss of airspeed got them into a mode of thinking that later caused them to disregard all of their instruments. A direct AOA readout would certainly help with a loss of airspeed indication, the 330 apparently had a problem/AD on the pitot heat system. A very rare failure, almost unheard of in aircraft with triple redundant pitot systems.

I have had two complete pitot/static failures, both in military jets, AOA and attitude instruments saved the day with very little ruffle.






July 2009, Airbus issued new advice to A330 and A340 operators to exchange Thales pitot tubes for tubes from Goodrich Sensors and Integrated Systems.[152][153][154]

On 12 August 2009, Airbus issued three Mandatory Service Bulletins, requiring that all A330 and A340 aircraft be fitted with two pitot tubes manufactured by Goodrich Sensors and one Thales model BA pitot (or alternatively three of the Goodrich pitots); Thales model AA pitot tubes were no longer to be used.[155] This requirement was incorporated into Airworthiness Directives issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) on 31 August[155] and by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on 3 September.[156] The replacement was to be completed by January 7, 2010. According to the FAA, in its Federal Register publication, use of the Thales model has resulted in "reports of airspeed indication discrepancies while flying at high altitudes in inclement weather conditions", that "could result in reduced control of the airplane." The FAA further stated that the Thales model probe "has not yet demonstrated the same level of robustness to withstand high-altitude ice crystals as Goodrich pitot probes P/N 0851HL,".

On 21 December 2010, Airbus issued a warning to roughly 100 operators of A330, A340-200 and A340-300 aircraft, regarding pitot tubes, advising pilots not to re-engage the autopilot following failure of the airspeed indicators
wiki

 

Amen!!! At my airline, I'm taught NOT to lose altitude during the staged approach to stall scenarios. Lose more than 100 ft.? I bust!

A bunch of people are having to die before this faulty training is corrected. It's truly sad.

 

The FAA has suggested a change to the unrealistic method of min altitude loss during stall recovery:

Pilots of transport-category airplanes should be taught to reduce the angle of attack as their first response to a stall warning, the FAA said on Tuesday. In a new proposed advisory circular, the FAA says it aims to provide "best practices and guidance for training, testing, and checking for pilots to ensure correct and consistent response to unexpected stall warnings, and/or stick pusher activations." The AC is an apparent response to the Colgan Air and Air France crashes, in which the pilots' reaction to stall warnings was part of the accident chain. Jet pilots have often been trained to use power as the initial means of recovery, to minimize altitude loss.


The AC also notes that training in stall recovery is most effective when using simulators that are as realistic as possible. If the simulator experience doesn't duplicate reality, instructors should explain the differences, the AC says. For example, certain simulators may not be able to accurately duplicate the motion cues associated with accelerated stalls. The AC also suggests that while it's a good idea to introduce some distractions while practicing the stall encounter, instructors are discouraged from introducing "multiple compounding malfunctions," to avoid confusion. The FAA is accepting comments on the proposed AC until Jan. 12, via Docket No. FAA-2011-1359 at Regulations.gov.

 

This is just so weird, never in my training, military or civilian, was I taught to minimize altitude loss. It was always about gaining speed to get the wing flying again. So this is a big surprise to me that the FAA was mandating people minimize altitude loss and thus pulling back which would/could prevent you from fixing the problem ... lack of airspeed.

 

aoa, aoa, aoa. Fly the wing! +1!

Edit....for some reason I can't get all caps here.....

 

Interesting read put out last year:

http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviat.../SAFO10012.pdf

 

It's nothing but a snapshot of how messed up the FAA is. With the F and the second A being the culprits.

ANYTIME you combine federal and administration, you're bound to get something messed up in the first place, and for it to take a looooonnnggggg time to fix.

It was in the ATP PTS, as well as many many airline training programs to "minimize altitude loss" in not only the recovery, but also the entry. As well as use it as a pass/fail criteria. Sadly, it simply devolved into more of a teaching the student how to enter the stall with minimal loss than it ever was about 1) recognizing the onset of the stall and 2) recovering aircraft control, speed, and altitude. You know, ACTUAL real world life saving actions. As well as how get out of the shaker, try to maintain an AOA (that you have no idea of), etc.

As well as maintaining altitude in the recovery and not going above the entry altitude when the shaker activated, and stabilizing at the speed at which the maneuver was started, etc.

 

Did you open the link I provided, and read it?

 

And the plot thickens ...

It looks like it wasn't an FAA problem, but more of an airline interpretation problem. My issue is, why wasn't this caught by the inspectors or check airman certifying these programs?