UPS Accident - BHM

Subscribe
3  43  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57 
Page 53 of 61
Go to
Agree this is very educational/informative. It's ironic how the PDF memo cougar found starts after SWA's GPWS issues at BHM...

As far as precedence between the 8260 and the JO 6850...the memo and 8260 repeatedly point out that below MDA on non-precision IAPs, penetration of TERPS OCS isn't implied or guaranteed...hence the visual nav via PAPIs (in this case) with their TCH and PAPI OCS ensuring safe/clear passage to landing.

Since JO 6850 gets into PAPI OCS and TCH specs very deep, I'd think that once an IAP mandates the use of VGSIs (in this case at night), below MDA, 6850 takes precedence.

Side note: In PAPI construction/implementation, TCH setting comes first via the chart I posted from the JO, then PAPI angle/placement and OCS are tweaked in compliance with the TCH from step a. See 503.a - c of JO

USMC, as far as my search goes...I'm not looking for ones an A300 would go into so much as ones ANY HG4 aircraft would go into. I think by throwing those other parameters into the search, the haystack of possible runways is small. BHM is the only needle I've found, but the search continues nonetheless.
Reply
While the discussion of approach criteria, Glidepath angles and TCHs has been informative, it is doubtful all that had anything to do with this accident.

How many aircraft crashed short of the runway on this approach during all the years it was in service? One?

Much has been made of the fact that it was VFR, a night approach into a black hole may meet the technical definition, but who would try that without reference to instruments?
Reply
It wasn't VFR.
Reply
From a earlier post.


METAR KBHM 141053Z 01003KT 10SM OVC070 23/22 A2999 RMK AO2 SLP146 T02330222


6:06 AM 73.4 °F 71.6 °F 94% 29.99 in 9.0 mi Calm Calm - N/A Overcast

SPECI KBHM 141106Z 00000KT 9SM FEW005 OVC070 23/22 A2999 RMK AO2 FEW005 FU
Reply
Just because it was VFR over the AWOS machine doesn't necessarily mean there weren't any scud clouds out there on the approach between the aircraft and the runway.
Reply
At the very least, it should be VMC regardless of the "official" weather over the AWOS machine.

Committing to the approach is not committing to land.
Going around is what we're expected to do if we lose sight of the runway post minimums
Reply
Quote: It wasn't VFR.
Quote: From a earlier post.


METAR KBHM 141053Z 01003KT 10SM OVC070 23/22 A2999 RMK AO2 SLP146 T02330222


6:06 AM 73.4 °F 71.6 °F 94% 29.99 in 9.0 mi Calm Calm - N/A Overcast

SPECI KBHM 141106Z 00000KT 9SM FEW005 OVC070 23/22 A2999 RMK AO2 FEW005 FU
Quote: Just because it was VFR over the AWOS machine doesn't necessarily mean there weren't any scud clouds out there on the approach between the aircraft and the runway.
Quote: At the very least, it should be VMC regardless of the "official" weather over the AWOS machine.

Committing to the approach is not committing to land.
Going around is what we're expected to do if we lose sight of the runway post minimums
FXDX - You've stated the same a few times in the thread. Can you share what you know?

A few different posters have said it throughout the thread that it was VFR at the time. Was this only based on the AWOS report, coupled with the fact that they called runway in sight 13 seconds before first impact?

I didn't see any weather mentioned in the NTSB briefing that I went back through. For those that do not believe it was VMC, where are you getting the information from?
Reply
I said it was VFR. I wasn't there. Someone said otherwise. Weather said it was. I think I'll admit it is not relevant now. (For me anyway)
Reply
The notams regarding the papi and LOC/DME for RW18 have just been reissued, is this standard procedure until the NTSB produce their report?
Reply
Read the last post on pprune regarding the UPS accident
Reply
3  43  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57 
Page 53 of 61
Go to