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I'm not quite sure which industry you're referring to, because it's not the one I've observed at FedEx. It's not the one I've heard of through friends at United, American, or Delta.

It's certainly not the atmosphere I strive to create when I'm flying as a Capt, and it's certainly not the thinking I had as an FO.

Are there still individuals in the Industry who have egos writing checks their bodies can't cash, quite confident there are.

In this mishap, sure seemed a bit like the FO was hinting and hoping quite a bit. Capt sure lost SA, and I don't think he ever knew it. Was he just seeing what he wanted to see versus two dots off localizer and 1 1/2 high, surely don't know.

The FOM policy of First Air, as I understand it, was a no-fault go around policy. Yet, in one of the incidents it was said that go arounds should be reported. Was there some misguided manager pointing out the added fuel expense going around caused? Not sure, just kind of skimmed the report trying to figure out how the Industry caused it, and how your book is going to save us all and eliminate human error from the Industry.

I hope every FO reads this report and really comes to grips with whether they will let the Capt kill them. I hope every Capt reads this report and wonders whether the FO will really speak up and save the day, and reinforces the necessity to do so. (When you're with me, Speak up-don't mumble it when I'm gooning it up cuz I for sure won't hear ya)

Used to give and attend a lot of safety briefings. One of my favorite slide's was: Learn from other people's mistakes, you don't have enough time to make them all yourself.

 

The FO didn't speak up directly until it was too late. An earlier firm "go-around" would have prevented it.

The CA was ignoring his feeding him of information... he needed to hear something more direct, which he did but it was too late.

 

732 drivers should know better than to trust those old APs and FDs to this extent.

IMHO as an FO you either speak up or you don't... doing the "in between @^*%" is what will drive the other guy to tune you out.

And I'm not referring to letting the CA fly you into the ground, I'm referring to not speaking up for silly nonsense (like why the CA didn't turn on landing lights for the back taxi at an airport that didn't have traffic around for 100 miles), speak up for the important stuff (like the CA who's going to fly you into the ground) and do it assertively.

 

I don't know if there's a question in there somewhere or if you're just thinking out loud, so I have to assume there is.

The four Air Carriers you mention constitute such a small fraction of a percent of the industry, it has to be expressed in thousands. It's hard to call it representative, even if your observations and secondhand information are accurate.

The answer to the first part of your question, "how the Industry caused it, and how your book is going to save us all and eliminate human error from the Industry", is complex and far beyond the space allotted for posts here. But you yourself spotted a couple of subtle pressures, compulsory reporting of go arounds and added fuel expense. Harmless by themselves - generally pilots can take quite a bit of it - such pressures can and do accumulate over the years. And if the pilot is not taught and trained to recognize and handle them efficiently, they will mess up his otherwise intelligent list of priorities.

As for the second part, I don't think my book - or anyone else's - will save you, or eliminate human error from the industry, nor do I claim that it can. That's a challenge for future generations of pilots and other industry professionals willing to accept it. The purpose of my efforts is stated on pages 10 and 17:

This treatise attempts to expose the causes and effects of the erosion of the captain's authority, argues in favor of restoring it, and suggests ways to do it. It will have served the intended purpose if the reader pauses for a moment to reflect on observations made here. It will have served the piloting profession if the issues raised become topics of formal professional debate... As stated above, the purpose of this work is not to convince or persuade the pilot population: its purpose is to get pilots to pause for a moment and judge the merits of the points raised.

The very fact that you and I and several others on this site are debating some of those points suggests a modest but encouraging success. Perhaps an excerpt from the book's CONCLUSION will drive home the intended purpose:

Esteemed fellows: we share the same skies, we eat the same airline food, we drag our tired behinds into the same hotels, we struggle for the same justice and support and we fight for a piece of the same pie to bring home to our hungry kids. Above all, we share our love of flying and of airplanes. If you were neutral to the points raised here, it is hoped this work got you thinking and helped you take a stand on important issues. If you disagree, so much the better. It means you are already actively involved in shaping your profession. Argue your position to yourself and others by citing line examples to prove your point and to crystallize your thoughts. If you feel attacked, fight back with as much force. Pick up a pen or keyboard and publish your ideas to stimulate debate. The foregoing is the work of one man, a subjective being limited by the confines of personal disposition, approaching the realm of the living dead. So be critical. Test propositions advanced here by comparing the examples with your own experiences, one by one; disprove each argument, issue-by-issue, thought-by-thought, example-by-example.(p. 325)

(Italicized text from, G.N. Fehér, Beyond Stick-and-Rudder, Hawkesbury, 2013)

 

Out of curiosity, do you give your FOs a list of "silly nonsense" items they should ignore?

Also, when your FOs make one of these "silly nonsense" mistakes, do you correct them or let it slide?


I ask these questions because your comment reminded me of a trip when I was fresh off OE in an all-glass jet when all my previous experience was in steam gauge turboprops. On day one of a four day, he turned on the anti ice when I thought we didn't need it. Being the FNG and thinking I had memorized the limitation incorrectly, I pulled out the book and looked it up. What I read confirmed that my recolections were correct, so I asked him why he turned it on. I expected to get a tribal knowledge rule, a personal experience story where he had gotten icing outside the limits, or "opps, my mistake." All would have been valid responses. Instead I got something along the lines of 'there's a right way, a wrong way, a company way, and MY way to fly this plane'. His response to my questioning one piece of silly nonsense made it clear: I was to shut up and sling gear.

 

I actively fly both seats (2 companies) so I have a little bit of perspective on this.

No I don't give anybody a list, and I generally am very open to suggestions given the right time and place. I also rely on my experience and knowledge to keep the operation going. If someone makes a mistake I don't particularly care about I let it slide and demonstrate their mistake later hoping they will learn from that experience. As a simple example, if I see a bad landing coming I don't go into panic mode, I might get on a control here or there to keep it manageable, but I'll let things go through, then explain what they could have done better.

There's a time and place for everything and there's nothing wrong with asking questions to learn, that time isn't on an approach at 400 feet, we all have instrument ratings and we all SHOULD know what safe and unsafe is (which is sometimes different from stable or unstable), if something doesn't feel right make it know and make it known loud and clear.

My earlier comment was more directed at when you're on an approach to minimums and somebody starts piping up about unimportant items, if you're up at the flight levels there's nothing wrong with having a conversation about stuff, it is, however, very important to make your tone clear in that there is a difference between a conversation and being a nitpicker.

 

I agree, we are saying the same thing. It also appears the Captain thought everything was A OK. It was not. One can assume the Captain was stupid or something else was going on. I have to assume the Captain must know what a valid ILS looks like but for some reason that morning he didn't.

 

Building on that I find these reports to be lacking in that they assume just because someone got "rest" before a flight it means they actually slept. With as much day/night cycle flying as people go through when you sleep and when you rest may be two completely different times. I don't think the rest rules can really address that well.

For instance there are situations where (under the rules I fly under) I am required to take 16 hours of rest... That's just an awful idea. I'd rather take 9 in the hotel room and get home sooner then "make up" the rest period at home, 16 hours ruins my sleep cycle, where 9 hours would be perfect.

Now not saying that's what happened here, but it's something that I think is often misjudged.

 

Hardly.
You mentioned academics and ground which as been qoute s a few times now. If you are trying to make some academic difference between what you call treatment and training it is as confusing as most of your quotes from your book.

 

Apocryphal I'm sure but the story of the salty CA who'd say,

"There's 5 votes on this flight deck. 1 for me, 1 for you. Then 1 more for me.
Then 1 more for you. Then I'll make the final call. Meaning anything iffy gets double checked by us both. And no harm, no foul either side."

Woulda/coulda/shoulda but that graybeard's in the left seat here, this thread doesn't even exist.