Incredibly dangerous! I would be willing to bet no carriers' Evac procedures call for an Evac with the engines running. So the question is, why were folks bouncing down slides behind running engines?

 

Great video, but I noticed there weren't any ABPs at the bottom of the slides helping people off. Lucky there weren't more injuries on the slides since those things are damn slippery.

 

Yes, I'm sure you're correct. Everyone's Evac checklist most likely has a shutdown engines step.

You do notice that about 35 seconds into the video, the right engine does get shutdown, right?

It's possible that the cabin crew initiated the evacuation based on their view of the fire and weren't able to notify the cockpit right away.

 

The ARFF crews in both FLL and LAS did amazing jobs. In both cases they have the main body of fire knocked down within 1-2 minutes of initiating fire attack. Great training videos from both incidents.


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This topic strikes a cord with me, so bear with the rant.

Yes I did notice. 35 seconds of great potential for people to be killed! You should be evacuating into a relatively safer place than what your are leaving - not one that is more hazardous! And in those 35 seconds, that place was definitely more hazardous (not withstanding any circumstances out of the control of the crew of course). In this case there is no reason to believe the crew could not have shut down engines.

We are speculating who gave the Evac command - maybe it was the captain - only the report will tell. I've seen it in training events, flight crews skipping the EVAC checklist items, where the EVAC command is given before all engines are shutdown. It can be devastating for the passengers.

That's why FA's should not initiate EVAC - UNLESS - and I want to repeat UNLESS - there is NO DOUBT the cabin environment is unlivable and the flight crew is not responsive or unavailable.

This is why, in those critical seconds, cool heads prevail and proper training and practice pay big dividends. ​The September 8, 2015, engine fire during takeoff of British Airways flight 2276, a Boeing 777, at McCarran International is a good example.

Don't get me wrong - no Monday morning quarterbacking here - just looking at the big picture. Cabin atmosphere not breached - ARFF on scene - and slides blown with engines still running. I think there is a lot to be learned from this accident.

 

We should wait an not jump to conclusions. I just had an aircraft where the motor kept running for 90 seconds after the Fuel Cutoff Switch was placed into Cutoff. Yes, unlikely but possible.

I can also see where the cabin crew sees the fire and initiates the evacuation. But the cockpit crew are responding to an left engine fire and are waiting 30 seconds for the fire warning to go away until firing the second bottle and then waiting another 30 seconds. All while the right engine is on and the cabin crew or perhaps passengers started their own evacuation.

DAL had an engine failure in an MD88 and started taxiing when the tower told them they had people evacuating.

 

Yes, 35 seconds is way too long. It's the direct, measurable consequence of misguided SOP policies. Time it yourself, realistically, following your Company's SOP - which in this example requires obtaining your FO's concurrence with all planned, irreversible actions.

Below is a typical scenario - not specific to the 767.

You hear the call, "XYZ123, your left engine is on fire," in your earpiece. You're stunned (1 sec), and seek confirmation (4 secs). Your FO is talking to Company so you shake him out of whatever he's doing (3 secs). He's stunned (1 sec), and seeks confirmation (4 secs). If your Company has no procedures for Engine Fire on the Ground, you carry out the Engine Fire Drill and back it up with its checklist. You seek and obtain your FO's concurrence (4 secs). You carry out the memory items: Confirm engine #1 Start lever, Confirmed, Cut-off, Confirm Fire Switch #1, Confirmed, pull, confirm valve light ON, Discharge extinguisher #1, confirm Discharged light ON, wait 5 secs, if fire not extinguished, Discharge extinguisher #2, confirm light ON (12 secs min). By SOP, you must wait for your FO to get the QRH, find the right page, read - including any preambles - and confirm the checklist items (14 secs). You decide to evacuate (1 sec), tell your FO (2 secs), and get his concurrence (2 secs). You call for the Pax Evacuation Checklist (3 secs). Your FO finds the page (3 secs). He reads it line by line, you carry out the actions and call them out. Stop the airplane, set the parking brake, shut down engines (4 secs). All this adds up to almost a minute. Other items, such as selecting pressurization mode to manual and opening the outflow valve, lowering the speed brakes and starting the flaps down, etc., might take another 10 secs. Even if you have an Engine Fire on the Ground procedure that takes only 5 secs total before you shut the engines down, you're still over 35 seconds. (Food for thought regarding SOP policies.)

 

Not jumping to any conclusions. The video clearly shows the evacuation in progress with the number two engine producing thrust.

Are you trying to justify the EVAC with engines running? The FA argument I would agree could happen - or a pax running for the door handle. But the FA's are supposed to control their cabin. And they DO NOT initiate evacuations (unless under the most absolutely dire scenario) for some important reasons they cannot control the engines or the parking brake. And a fire on one engine and a failed cut-off valve on the other engine? Lets be honest here.

The only questions I ask are who or whom initiated the evacuation and why the engines weren't shutdown first. If we all - as professionals - can't see the incredible danger posed to those making a 20-foot leap down a rubber slide onto concrete (only to throw a running jet engine into the mix), then I must have different standards.

Furthermore, to counter your argument of EVAC delay due to dealing with the number one engine fire I present this: If at any time the captain decides an evacuation is required, common sense and judgement dictate he would abandon those tasks and perform an "Evacuation Checklist" Procedure. EVAC procedures will cover all engines and fire bottles as necessary. But the EVAC "command" will be right after the engines are all shut down first, I'll guarantee it.

If anyone finds in their SOP EVAC "command" to be before engines are shut down, please let us know.

 

Check out the video of the British Airways 777 at KLAS:


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jBnj5OGravc


Same thing with the right engine blowing the right rear slide around (although not quite as long).
A question for ARFF guys, how close were these trucks to being empty of foam (or is it light water)? At the rate those turrets throw out, I've heard they can be empty in 3 minutes. Would they hold some in reserve or empty the tanks? They did a fantastic job but this looked a lot more stubborn than the Dynamic accident. Still an incredible response.

 

At our shop, the evacuation checklist wasn't even in the QRH. (or if it was it wasn't fumbled with) The checklist was permanently attached to the chart holder on the control wheel. The Captain performed it himself. The FO's only responsibility was notifying ATC (as directed by the Captain) and proceeding to his evac station. Took about 15 seconds.