NTSB bans airline, pilots union from participating in UPS 1354 crash investigation


Mike D. Smith | [email protected] By Mike D. Smith | [email protected]
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on August 25, 2014 at 4:26 PM, updated August 25, 2014 at 4:42 PM

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The National Transportation Safety Board has blocked a pilots union and UPS Airlines from giving any more technical assistance in the investigation of the crash of UPS Flight 1354.

The cargo airline's Airbus A300 crashed short of the runway on approach to Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport before dawn on Aug. 14, 2013, killing the two pilots on board.

The NTSB's investigation is in its final stages, officials have said.

The agency issued a statement Monday that the International Pilots Association violated the terms of participation in the investigation by providing its own analysis of the crash through a press release on the one-year anniversary.

UPS Airlines then publicly commented by posting a response to IPA's analysis on a website.

Both parties acted without first consulting with the NTSB, according to the agency.

Those actions violate their "party status" agreement, which allows them to give technical assistance in the investigation, according to NTSB.

With this status revoked, the union and the airline may no longer assist. The ban will last until the investigation is complete.

The NTSB has sent letters informing the parties of this change.

"NTSB investigations depend heavily upon technical input from the accident parties," acting NTSB Chair Christopher A. Hart said in a statement. "If one party disseminates information about the accident, it may reflect that party's bias. This puts other parties at a disadvantage and makes them less willing to engage in the process, which can undercut the entire investigation."

IPA spokesman Brian Gaudet said that the organization won't comment on the NTSB's decision or the crash until the final report is released.

NTSB spokesman Eric Weiss said the investigation's final report may be complete in early September.

That is disappointing that the parties would not follow the rules.
Seems self-serving, but I believe that the NTSB path works too.

At my airline, on a precision approach, we set the MCP to MA as soon as we have Glideslope capture.

On a nonprecision, we use LNAV/VNAV. We set the MCP for the MDA (or 500' if it's a visual...we can't fly a visual without some sort of electronic glideslope as backup). Once we're past the FAF, and at least 300' below the MA, then we reset the MCP to the MA..sounds like the same thing the UPS crew did.

We basically don't even train to use Vert speed during an approach....about the only time we normally use it on approach is if the controller vectors us to the LOC well above the GS...then we use it to get down to GS capture...

Doesn't really matter how you set up the approach if you fly through minimums without the rwy in sight.

In this occasion, They clearly wanted to use VNAV guidance to the MDA-and had they set it up properly (sequenced the FMS properly), the autopilot would have automatically disconnected while they were still IMC. Wishfully-that startling event might have prompted a go around and there wouldn't be a mishap to learn from.

They had mental image that they were excessively high. In reality, they leveled off 200' above the FAF altitude prior to the FAF-still kind of fast, but workable. IMO staying at 2500' was a conscious decision, something I do quite frequently on my VNAV approaches. That allows the automation to grab the intended descent angle prior to the FAF and allows a great altitude cross check crossing the FAF in the same way grabbing the ILS glideslope prior to the FAF does as well.

IMO-they also failed to cross check the stepdown fix. Had they caught how close they were to that altitude, quite possible the Capt would have backed the V/S off to the 700 ft/min he originally commanded after the automation failed to Capture the descent angle as he had expected prior to the FAF. (The Automation Didn't catch it because the FMS still thought they were going direct to KBHM, then back out to one of the initial fixes for the LOC 18 approach)

Then both of them missed the MDA. I think because both of them had an expectation that the Wx was better than it actually was. As the Acft passed 1000' MSL, sink rate warning was triggered, V/S was reduced, Rwy called in sight and the autopilot was disconnected-impact with the trees was 1 second later.

Of note: mins using the stepdown fix are 1200'; Airport elevation is 650' so typical stable approach criteria of 1000 ft/min started at 1650 and the 1500 ft/min descent was maintained well beyond that.

One of the great sayings I've heard in my career is "If I have to say what's going on when I'm on final I'm going around". One of the things I hated reading about in this CVR is how irritated the Capt was with ATC keeping them high for the approach-I promise you, if you tell ATC you want a 360 to better align for the approach or more time to setup for the approach, ATC will give it to you.

The WHY's of this mishap will be the subject of the NTSB meeting Sept 9th. Fatigue might or might not be one of the formal causes, but it's for sure going to be way up there.

NTSB abstract available

http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/2...ht%201354e.pdf

Accident report has no mention of the trees that UPS flight impacted. What type trees, estimated growth in height per year and what program the BHM airport had to trim these trees. If only they had been 25 feet higher!!
Flying into Hilton Head, SC has always been a challenge especially at night. Town of Hilton Head refuses to trim back the trees. Early 70’s, a King Air departed Hilton Head doing a shallow climb out and impacted these trees. Fate is The Hunter…EK Gann

Just curious, but why would UPS not activate the automated 500' (or 400') or at least the "minimum" callout from the Airbus flight warning computer?

Such a great safety net. The FAA abstract above stated that the fleet was equipped but did not activate these features.

NTSB Final Report

http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2014/AAR1402.pdf