737 Max EICAS deadline 12/27/22
#1
We are two weeks out from the 12/27 deadline to certify the Max 7 and the Max 10 after which Boeing would be required to incorporate a modern (1990s era?) crew alerting system prior to certification of the type.
This morning on the Airlines Confidential podcast hosted by former Spirit Airlines CEO Ben Baldanza, Ben suggested (beginning around 04:30) that no politician was going to stand up and say that the Max doesn’t NEED a common safety feature and that Boeing would likely miss the deadline. He went on to say that they most likely already had a solution and that they would end up paying for it. Was he hinting that (in his opinion) they might have an EICAS plan for the Max 7 and Max 10, even if that meant a new type certificate?
My opinion only - Would an extension be the right thing for us… yes, obviously. The right thing for aviation safety… that’s debatable. EICAS has been the gold standard for human factors in flight deck design since the mid 1990s. It is unconscionable that Boeing has allowed the 737 to languish in the dark ages for two generations of that airplane. In a perfect world they should require EICAS and an overhead panel redesign not only for the Max, but a retrofit for the NG as well.
So given Baldanza’s comments, and 13 days remaining before the deadline… talk amongst yourselves.
This morning on the Airlines Confidential podcast hosted by former Spirit Airlines CEO Ben Baldanza, Ben suggested (beginning around 04:30) that no politician was going to stand up and say that the Max doesn’t NEED a common safety feature and that Boeing would likely miss the deadline. He went on to say that they most likely already had a solution and that they would end up paying for it. Was he hinting that (in his opinion) they might have an EICAS plan for the Max 7 and Max 10, even if that meant a new type certificate?
My opinion only - Would an extension be the right thing for us… yes, obviously. The right thing for aviation safety… that’s debatable. EICAS has been the gold standard for human factors in flight deck design since the mid 1990s. It is unconscionable that Boeing has allowed the 737 to languish in the dark ages for two generations of that airplane. In a perfect world they should require EICAS and an overhead panel redesign not only for the Max, but a retrofit for the NG as well.
So given Baldanza’s comments, and 13 days remaining before the deadline… talk amongst yourselves.
Last edited by ZapBrannigan; 12-14-2022 at 06:40 AM.
#3
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Mar 2017
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Regardless, these planes will be flying for another 30 years, better to suck up the pain now and move on from this rather than drag it out.
#5
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Oct 2005
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From: 737 FO
#7
Prime Minister/Moderator

Joined: Jan 2006
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From: Engines Turn or People Swim
A few different switches and knobs, and some behind-the-scenes systems differences don't really alter the fundamental character of cockpit operations.
It seems to be assumed (reasonably IMO) that an EICAS system would so fundamentally alter the process for handling abnormals/emergencies that it would probably need to be a different type. Or if not, the differences training would be very substantial.
Even a common type with differences doesn't guarantee that an airline will be allowed by it's CMO to operate a single fleet, and not all airlines would necessarily want to. Even the CRJ 200 and 700/900 were operated as separate fleets by some airlines, even though it's all one type rating
#8
Even a common type with differences doesn't guarantee that an airline will be allowed by it's CMO to operate a single fleet, and not all airlines would necessarily want to. Even the CRJ 200 and 700/900 were operated as separate fleets by some airlines, even though it's all one type rating
Here, supposedly the feds didn’t want us to fly both the -300 and the Max.
What did they do at AirTran when they flew both the DC9 and the 717? That’s the same type isn’t it?
#9
Gets Weekend Reserve
Joined: Jul 2007
Posts: 4,259
Likes: 240
From: B737CA
Those are common types with differences (for pilot qualification purposes).
A few different switches and knobs, and some behind-the-scenes systems differences don't really alter the fundamental character of cockpit operations.
It seems to be assumed (reasonably IMO) that an EICAS system would so fundamentally alter the process for handling abnormals/emergencies that it would probably need to be a different type. Or if not, the differences training would be very substantial.
Even a common type with differences doesn't guarantee that an airline will be allowed by it's CMO to operate a single fleet, and not all airlines would necessarily want to. Even the CRJ 200 and 700/900 were operated as separate fleets by some airlines, even though it's all one type rating
A few different switches and knobs, and some behind-the-scenes systems differences don't really alter the fundamental character of cockpit operations.
It seems to be assumed (reasonably IMO) that an EICAS system would so fundamentally alter the process for handling abnormals/emergencies that it would probably need to be a different type. Or if not, the differences training would be very substantial.
Even a common type with differences doesn't guarantee that an airline will be allowed by it's CMO to operate a single fleet, and not all airlines would necessarily want to. Even the CRJ 200 and 700/900 were operated as separate fleets by some airlines, even though it's all one type rating
I personally wouldn't think that to be that big of a difference to where the faults are listed, but this is well above my paygrade. I also think it's rather dumb that the FAA would make MAX 7 and MAX 8 so different to make them essentially a separate fleet.
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