Facebook, Twitter, public Access to information and public pressure due to other nations grounding the aircraft, yes. Saying “trump” as a reason wins you the dumb dumb award of the day!

 

I didn’t mean that he was the direct reason. However, we are in the middle of trade disputes with China and the EU. CAAC and EASA grounding the MAX was the low hanging fruit in the much bigger picture.

 

I’ll bet if your own family was wiped out on a Max you wouldn’t be calling it an emotion based grounding inspired by social media. Not when it is so obvious that Boeing tried to make an old dog do new tricks as cheaply and quickly as possible.

 

So in your opinion, what share of the responsibility for the crash, if any, would you place on the pilots in both cases?

 

Certainly there is a degree of blame with them as well. However, Boeing is well aware that there are varying levels of experience and training quality among their customers around the world. And no, I wouldn’t dare say “it never would have happened in the US” (remember Colgan?). To then go ahead with a design that is inherently unstable and lacks properly engineered system redundancy in a critical flight control system is completely inexcusable. Zero sympathy here for the box Boeing has put themselves in.

 

My previous job was overseas. What do you say when a local check airman passes another local check airman who is literally 50/50 on a V1 cut i.e. literally crashes on a routine V1 cut roughly half the time because he ‘guesses the wrong rudder’? When was the last time you crashed the sim? How about on a V1 cut?

Or how about when a local check airman won’t let you add 20 knots to Vr in reported windshear position and purposefully tries to crash you? Sorry, no ALPA Training Committee.

I won’t even go into the whole saving face culture that literally led to a perfectly good 777 crashing into a seawall. They also tried to blame Boeing.

It’s not “we are AMERICANS and we are better than everyone else.” That’s the political correctness thing I was talking about... Our motherboards are wired differently. Would you have any qualms speaking up if you saw your captain screwing up? In this country, we take something as simple as that for granted. In many other parts of the world, you do not make captain lose face. Think about that.

Wanna read about flying in China? Here’s the link to ‘Flying Upside Down” and read it.

https://www.scribd.com/doc/273231452...pside-Down-pdf

When you read it, bear in mind that these people were the first to ground the MAX...

 

The COS accident is one that my dad did the investigation on. I was flying the Shuttle at the time. He had a vested interest in the outcome.

Parker Hanfin made the rudder PCU. It was the same part from the original guppy. So not a new issue. In fact, that was the problem the slide would wear, and allow hydraulic fluid to be ported to the wrong side of the actuator, in effect reversing what rudder was input.

It was a wear issue with parts. The FAA solution was tighter limits on overhaul of rebuilt units and life limited parts. Apples and Oranges to the MCAS. The MCAS is a basic design shortcoming to multiple failure events, one was a worn out part issue.

So the solution was inspection within a certain cycle limit. Grounded if over that limit. Parker Hanfin was part of the problem. Internal documents actually showed this possibility, and an external overhaul outfit was the one that blew the whistle. Ultimately, ironic because the FAA tightened the overhaul limits--and said Parker was the only approved overhaul outfit.

So.....can't really compare the two, and is why you really haven't heard any other comparisons.

I agree that the groundings were probably politically motivated by the Chinese, but now after investigations, were probably justified--but happened for the wrong reasons. Now the FAA is stuck. They have to certify a return to service and keep the Chinese happy enough to also approve the return to service. Political land mines from a safety investigation? I don't want to be the dude that signs off on this one.

 

The FAA, and Canada's regulatory authority, grounded the MAX when the Ethiopian aircraft's stabilizer jackscrew was found in the full nose-down position. That is what conclusively linked the two accidents together.

That's a strange statement as including "your own family" makes it an emotional decision.

 

Boeing didn’t crash the planes. In the Lion Air case, the CA was at least able to use common sense and pull the nose up AND use the trim switch to help out. That’s how he managed to stay afloat and fight against MCAS 20 times. They crashed because he gave the FO controls, while he tried to look in the QRH for a solution. The FO was beyond incompetent. He had an extremely checkered history and should not have been flying planes. Once he had the controls, he only pulled back the yoke. He trimmed for about 2 seconds and that was it. Pulled back on the yoke and never touched trims or throttles.


For Ethiopian, it’s even worse. They knew about the phenomena. They should have flown out of it just fine. Even after cutting out the trim cutoff switches, despite being very fast, the FO did trim the nose manually with the wheel handle..... he just trimmed the wrong way (nose down) and then reported to the captain that he can’t get the nose up. In their desperation they re-engaged the trim cutoff switches but even after than only used the yoke trim switches for a couple few clicks. Again, sheer incompetence. And the FO with 300 something hrs and 152 hrs in a Boeing was beyond useless.



The grounding has gone on way too long and is nothing more now than politics. The FAA wants to save face and is dragging this out. EASA and China will only lift the ban when they want, and for political posturing will not do it when the FAA does.


Yes, Boeing was an idiot for hooking up MCAS to only one AOA sensor and not putting any of this info in the manuals. But still, the planes crashed because of incompetence. And for Lion air, their MX department got a free pass in the NTSC final report. Ridiculous! The crash happened at the end of October yet the first instance of an AOA screw up was Oct 9. In the USA, major airlines would have removed the plane from service after that many write ups until the AOA sensor issue was repaired/fixed or replaced outright. That’s the difference. It’s not just about pilot training and skills. That plays a huge factor too. But over in Indonesia, the MX crew kept signing the plane off so it could get fixed at the main hub station, but they never fixed it either. The last flight before the fatal crash, where the JSer saved the day, that operating crew flew the plane all the way to Jakarta with the CA stick shaker going off the entire flight. Hell with that, they should have turned around and headed back to Bali, and the CA should have done a complete and thorough write up. Instead, he continued to Jakarta, landed, and then wrote up the problem in the most ridiculous manner that never addressed the main meat of the matter. Jakarta MX at Lion Air in their typical incompetence signed it off. As usual. The next day it crashed.

 

^^^^^ THIS!!!!

Dave, thanks for sharing the story about your dad’s investigation of the UAL crash. With the subsequent US Air crash in Pittsburgh, we still didn’t ground the jet. My point is that there was an underlying issue in early 737’s that brought down 2, but didn’t lead to the fleet wide grounding. Did we make a mistake then of not grounding them back then? Or did we overkill it here?

But notice your last sentence. Nobody wants to be the first guy to certify this plane... you’re absolutely right. That’s because we’ve let emotions and politics into a realm where neither belongs.