Think about that, if the company doesn't want to offer a proposal that's acceptable to the majority of the pilots, then they don't really want to "do a deal" and reap the benefits of the merger.

 

Does anyone know if the "101 page report" that is reportedly circulating through Congress is available - and if so, where? Thanks.

 

Did anyone attend the CEO exchange in IAH this week? If so, any information about the meeting? Thanks, Sluggo

 

Going to work today. My feet feel very heavy this morning.

 

Isn't it interesting how Smisek says "we can't look in the rear view mirror"
when referencing pre-bankruptcy contracts, yet he says we should look back (in the rear view mirror)
at union issues when coming up with a reason why the contract hasn't gotten done yet.....
The possibility that anyone (jRM'ers, lCA's, mGR's, hELPERS, etc.) might actually buy his BS is nauseating.

 

Sounds like someone needs to adhere to the FARs.

 

..........

 

Here's a summary of the report (the report contains the supporting docs):


The United pilots are deeply concerned about inadequate pilot training and the compromise in safety brought about as a result of the merger between legacy United Airlines and legacy Continental Airlines, as the airline seeks a Single Operating Certificate (SOC) from the FAA. The adoption of harmonized aircraft operation procedures must occur when two large and complex airlines such as United and Continental merge. It is important to note that on the fleets of concern, the B757/767 and B777, that legacy United pilots are adopting 80 percent of the changes in procedures. The new management of United Airlines has chosen to train pilots on this large volume of flight related procedures through computer-based training (CBT). This training is broken down into four phases; Phase 1, Phase 2, Phase 3A/3B and Phase 4. Historically, such a large volume of procedural changes, some of which are quite complex, would have required practice in a learning environment such as a simulator or classroom that allow for peer review and discussion. Computer-based training is acceptable for introduction or review, but unacceptable for cognitive absorption and development of the muscle memory required to produce practiced and proficient performance. United's CBT via the internet has caused confusion and distractions, and pilots are now conducting on-the-job training on revenue flights with passengers aboard rather than in a simulator or classroom environment. This is akin to two surgeons watching a new surgical procedure power point and then practicing it together on an unsuspecting patient. United ALPA, representing the legacy United pilots, has appealed to all levels of United management and the FAA to resolve this issue, but to no avail.
We, the pilots of United Airlines, are perplexed by the FAA's process in accepting and approving what we deem to be inadequate training. The FAA typically requires a complete indoctrination course for pilots learning to operate airliners using procedures under a new FAA operating certificate, as is the case for legacy United B757/767 and B777 pilots. It also seems illogical that the FAA would assign an official who was recommended for suspension to approve the transition plan, integration and issuance of a Single Operating Certificate (SOC) for combining two airlines that will form the world's largest airline, United Airlines. Less than three years ago, the same FAA Administration recommended Bobby Hedlund, the head of the UAL/CAL Joint Transition Team, for suspension for dereliction of duty in allowing Southwest Airlines to fly hundreds of flights with aircraft in an unsafe condition.1 Congress and its Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure held hearings on the Southwest situation, during which this FAA official's misconduct was brought to light.2 United Airlines proved incapable of completing even the truncated portion of the already deficient SOC transition plan and were subsequently allowed, by this same official, to modify and further reduce the required portion of the operational integration. This approval will result in an operation in which only half of the flight procedures for the common fleets, few of the procedures of the other fleets and almost none of the maintenance procedures will be integrated prior to United Airlines receiving a SOC from the FAA. The training program for the new procedures for the first half of the flight through the cruise portion has yet to be developed for the B757/767 and B777 fleets.
Why the rush to SOC? For United management it would seem that executives' personal compensation, in the form of poorly designed financial incentives, compromises safety. Why would the FAA not protect the interests of the flying public against such a conflict of interest? And why would the FAA appoint an inspector, known to have been previously deficient in his safety oversight of Southwest Airlines, oversee such critically important certificate integration? Why would these same officials, including United's Principal Operations Inspector (POI), dismiss United ALPA's safety concerns, which include this rush to SOC, the inadequacy of training and a number of other ongoing and disturbing safety concerns (Exhibits A & A2)
United ALPA has tried to bring the deficiency of the SOC training to the attention of the new United management; every level of the FAA (Exhibits B-E), including the Administrator himself; the federal courts; and now Congress. Everyone is hiding behind the FAA. A number of stakeholders, including the public and their representatives in Congress, have been working under the assumption that the FAA is the top cop on the airline beat and ensures the highest levels of safety. We have found during UAL's rush to receive an SOC that the FAA often isn't effective or even methodical in its monitoring of airlines' self-regulation due to limitations in the data it receives or chooses to analyze. The FAA is at best a weak safety monitor and at worst compliant and compromised when working with airline managers whose goals are cost-cutting at the expense of safety and for their own personal benefit.

And this is Smisek's response:

United’s Smisek Says Pilot Union Leaders ’Crossing a Line’

By Mary Jane Credeur - Nov 17, 2011
United Continental Holdings Inc. (UAL) Chief Executive Officer Jeff Smisek criticized a pilots union for making “inappropriate” safety complaints on changes to flying procedures while negotiating a new contract.

Pilots from United Airlines and Continental Airlines are still in separate union chapters after a merger that formed the world’s biggest airline, and United pilots sued to block new flying procedures.

“Unfortunately, they are crossing a line that is shameful and inappropriate between safety and industrial relations,” Smisek said today at the Wings Club in New York.

More than 100,000 flights have occurred since the new procedures took effect, and the changes were approved by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration as part of the merger integration plan, showing that safety isn’t in question, he said.

“If there are ever any legitimate safety concerns, I assure you we will be responsive,” he said. “We have examined all these issues very closely.”

To contact the reporter on this story: Mary Jane Credeur in Atlanta at [email protected]

To contact the editor responsible for this story: James Langford at [email protected]

 

Monkeyfly: Mr. Smisek, how many flight hours and pilot ratings do you possess?

JS: ...

Monkeyfly: No further questions.

 

Latest CEO Exchange mantra regarding pilots:

"No one employee group should benefit at the expense of another."*

* DISCLAIMER: The term "employee group" means pertaining to rank-and-file employees. At no time past or present has the term "employee group" been used in reference to the members of the Executive offices of the Company. The aforementioned "Executives" are considered a special class subject to their own rules, compensation and benefits and as such are not intended for inclusion in any discussion referencing "employee groups" or "employees" in general. "Executives" are an elite class whose knowledge and skill necessarily separate them from being subject to the same conditions and sacrifice as the average, rank-and-file employee.