Biggest problem with the Nic award is it put furloughed guys below new hires. Had that not happened and had it been slotted more fairly I think you'd have seen a JCBA between East-West.

Either way you split it, a decade ago the West guys were the Mesa of the majors flying clapped out equipment, they won the aviation lottery. They really should be ecstatic for anything and everything they are getting here. Same goes for the East guys, they were so beat down over the past 13 years +/- that this merger really kinda saved them and has allowed them to retire in a manner in which they should after spending decades as a major airline pilot.

It's been such a positive for the East AND West I would hope folks don't ***** about the outcome. As for AA, from what I could tell they were slowly dying and shirking, Parker & CO hopefully will get us ALL back on track. We should be more worried about Spirit, Frontier, SWA, etc. than where we line up on the seniority list, because if things don't go our way we'll be back at the bottom of another one.

Did you read that before you hit enter?

USAPA was to the west exactly what ALPA was to me-the legally elected CBA. I had NO vote in the ALPA merger policy, the selection of or merger committee or their plan.

The MOU called for the process that led to the PA. It's that simple, the legally elected officials and the company came to an agreement. Had the west pilots voted no, the MOU would have failed.

When I first read the MOU I didn't think the west would vote for it. They agreed to the status quo of seniority lists, without the right to represent themselves. THEY AGREED TO IT, then sued claiming it was illegal.

Good afternoon, this is CA John Hale with the Flight Department Hotline for Friday June 1

Let me speak straight – our current term sheet calls for about 400 pilots to be furloughed in 2012,




Read more here: Sky Talk: Talks between American, pilots union continue this week

Yup, by Summer (actually it was Spring), Hale back peddled to ensure he was not cramping Horton's strategy. You'll note the continued negotiations referenced at that time. We remained terribly short-staffed that summer and beyond. If 400 pilots were to be furloughed, they would have been furloughed. This was 18 months prior to Parker taking over and during that time not only were they not furloughed, but recalls and flows along with street hiring commenced at a later date. Again, the arbitration panel will ferret this out and apply it any way they see fit in the final hybrid list. My gut says this unquantified hypothetical won't even make the radar screen.

Lol! "Move along! Nothing to see here! Never mind our only other bankruptcy exit plan that outlined our pilots' career expectations! Mr Arbitrator, look over here in this other corner!" You are a riot, EagleFly guy.

Thanks ! :D

If the arbitrators want to apply assumptions (not a single pilot was furloughed at AA during the 18 months prior to Parker) to their formula, so be it. In fact, Personally, I'd take that 400 furlough application to AA provided they also factor in US Airways hopelessly fragmented and even more tenuous future which in that case would be just as applicable. ;)

Trust me. You want as little weight as possible applied to consideration of the pre-merger conditions of the respective carriers.

Really? "Hopelessly fragmented and even more tenuous future"? Can you document that with any public statements or analyst statements? If so, I'll buy off on your argument. If not, I'm guessing that statement won't hold water in the arbitration.

AA's bankruptcy was very publicly documented, including a POR that involved further transitions of mainline flying to the regionals and additional pilot reductions.

I was waiting for someone to demonstrate my point. Congrats......you're it. ;) The point was AA's pre-merger situation just as US Airways is speculative and subjective based on ones position and interests. Read the UAL-CAL SLI award and you'll see both those parties did the very same thing there too.

There is just as much documentation that AA flush with over 6 billion in cash at time of filing was simply exercising a strategic bankruptcy to absolve themselves of undesirable labor debt and obligations as opposed to a purely financial one. Both Boeing and Airbus had zero problem inking deals with AA for close to 1000 aircraft orders and options 6 months prior to filing. A better question regarding US Airways fragmentation, is what was the expected timeline to combine the two separate operations ?

After all, it is the only airline still not merged close to a decade after committing to do so with no end in sight. Call me crazy, but that seems pretty fragmented to me, but again, it matters little what we as individual pilots or even the Integration committees assert or claim. Just as in UAL-CAL, the panel will have little difficulty assessing those factors and discarding the subjective claims. Of all the complex issues involved in this SLI, pre-merger financial conditions present and future are among the easiest to quantify. It may be they place little emphasis on that aspect anyway, so try not to get too worked up over this issue.

I just re-read your post and have absolutely no idea what you're trying to say... I made your point by asking a simple question? -- and you still did not answer it. Every analyst article I can find seems to disprove your assertion that US was fragmented (in terms of financial performance). If anything, the fragmented pilot group made Wall Street quite happy (and rich). Happy Wall Street = long life.

As for dismissing subjective claims, one would hope so -- that's why they are called "neutral" arbitrators. Their "job" is to examine every aspect of the merger, based on precedent (which, by the way includes career expectations). Who knows how much weight they will place on these expectations -- 5%, 10%, 25%? Who knows. Anyone that claims that they know exactly how much it will be weighted is as crazy as anyone that claims it won't have any bearing at all. After all, if you read all of the most recent arbitration results, it was at least considered.

You keep suggesting that the arbitrators will not undermine one of their own. Well, I would agree. Which is exactly why they will consider a myriad of things -- including career expectations. Their counterparts did just that in previous arbitrations. So why would it be any different this time?

As for AA's 6 billion in cash and the suggestion that the bankruptcy was a means to shred the labor contracts, that doesn't hold up when compared to the current negotiated contracts. If they meant to reduce labor costs, we would not see agreements like the F/A's T/A or own MOU, restoring (even raising) those costs. I would argue that the BK was meant to shed more long-term debt and be used a leveraging tool to lower other costs, which we see maintained throughout the merger (i.e. reducing supplier costs, outsourcing more, etc.). It was a strategic bankruptcy meant to bring overall costs in-line with competitors. How would that have played out for you? I have no idea, but I'm willing to bet it would not have been good.

The simple fact is that both airlines needed the merger equally -- the employees at AA to avoid additional outsourcing and layoffs, and US for increased revenue streams which ensure long-term survival. The question is, how will the arbitrators view those very different prospects? That is grounds for a beer (or bottle of rum) bet...

*sigh*

This isn't an integration of Wall street players (or management). Of greater interest (and seemingly more relevant) is how any such corporate "financial performance" would have translated to the Pilots financial performance, namely the thickness of their wallets going forward separately vs. combined. It is my assertion that unlike UAL and CAL, the pilots of both East and West pre-merger compensation wallowed WELL below that of legacy standards and that was due to the FRAGMENTED operations of a single entity, yet operationally split carrier. You appear to assert AA was in collapse and AA pilots careers were in decline due to furloughs (that never occurred) and was saved by US Airways, I disagreed with that.

The point was the subjectivity of opposing opinions and the fact they are essentially meaningless. If history is any teacher, the arbitrators almost universally consider that aspect (as per UAL-CAL), the only question is to what degree ?

Again, my point was that there are multiple subjective pilot opinions on each carriers pre-merger status and future and none of ours counts. The arbitrators will determine that value, if any and so why work yourself into a lather ?


Now it is me having no idea of what you are trying to say. On one hand, you're arguing the certainty of AA's pre-merger weakness in conjunction with US Airways lack of weakness and now based on the above you seem to agree on the subjectivity of it all and that was my point. Considering that, why have you not recognized yet that BOTH of our opposing opinions on this are meaningless ?


I did ? :confused:

Where have I said that and specifically WHO will they not "undermine" ?

It DOES hold up because the team that orchestrated the destruction of AA pilots pensions and (hopefully) retiree medical (the two biggest financial benefits of AA's C11) was Horton's team, not Parker's. In fact, above you reiterate my contention is WAS a "strategic" bankruptcy and not one typical of a business that had little future as a going concern. But again, WHY are you asserting something you see as certainty and then diffuse that by highlighting the its subjectivity ?

Perhaps there is a bit of SELECTIVE interpretation going on, eh ?


No, it's YOUR assertion that both carriers needed the merger EQUALLY. Others can make a viable assertion that each carriers NEED of the other was NOT equal. That's not to say both benefitted from the merge, just that what was brought to the party was not one of absolute equality. I understand your desire to see this merger as one of equals, but I don't think the arbitrators will. If you read the UAL-CAL award, you'll note that in THAT case the committees demonstrated that each carrier had strengths and weaknesses, but overall neither was superior to the other. The considerations to assist them was information THEY quantified including not only economic background, including global alliances and hubs, but economic status and prospects at merger closing date including financial status, fleet compositions and pilot staffing.

Will this panel come to the same conclusion that pre-merger US Airways was equal in all respects to pre-merger American Airlines ?

Personally, I don't think so, but they might as anything is possible. If you want to believe they were, I'm not stopping you, but I'm sorry, I just can't agree with it. Perhaps the arbitrators will agree with you on this instead of me ?

Personally, I'm perfectly comfortable they'll get this aspect of the SLI dead-bang on target.