But hey ... "he knows what he speaking about?"

LMAO

 

AOL.com Article - Pilots reported fatigue, erred in UPS cargo jet crash

"NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman warned UPS and union officials that they risk their status as parties in the board's investigation if they publicly interpret facts presents in the case."

Holy cow, she has got to go! She has blatantly biased and unfounded statements at press conferences as to mishap causes while the wreckage is still steaming on the ground.

Mrs. Kettle, your pot is calling.

 

I'm a bit confused: why are there "sound of rustling, similar to impact," prior to the EGPWS "too low terrain"?

 

I agree. You'd think there would have been an earlier warning from the EGPWS. That CVR just gives me the chills. Very disturbing.

 

Is there an ignore button anywhere?

 

I don't think the A300 at UPS has "Enhanced" GPWS ?

It may be the old technology ?

It may have been mentioned in the hearing, I was unable to listen in its entirety.

 

I took the rustling to be clipping tree tops. The capt even asked if he had hit something.

 

Wow, if this is true it would be very enlightening. In my opinion - and I am absolutely NOT an expert, I think EGPWS would have issued a more than adequate warning about the impending danger. If UPS did not pay the extra $$ for EPGWS and it's found that EPGWS would have saved the crew - heads should roll. I do find it hard to believe that the FARs would allow an A-300 to fly without an Enhanced GPWS though.

 

I'm confused as to why they got a Mode 4 alert in the landing configuration. It should be inhibited.

 

WOW. I just watched the hearing with the "technical panel" in reference to dispatchers, dispatch software (LIDO), and ACARs system for UPS. The dispatch process really received a harsh review of procedures.

The was an issue regarding an FAR (don't remember which) that require the dispatchers to notify the flight crew of any information that is deemed critical or necessary for flight operations. One of the UPS reps was asked if he were aware of this, he said "yes."

In 2011, UPS asked LIDO to leave out remarks on METARs inserted by human observations which are included at the end of automated METAR observations. Those remarks were pulled from the flight releases and ACARs ATIS requests. No NOTAM or Read File was given to alert the crews that this was done.

One person testified that according to the FOM, pilots are supposed to use ATIS in order to get the current weather (he did not elaborate if he meant ACARs ATIS or actually listening to the ATIS to hear if there were any pertinent remarks). I assume he meant listening to ATIS. But in further testimony, someone testified that the information was not on ATIS.

Nobody could speak to how or when LIDO charts or the LIDO flight planning software were certified.

The dispatcher dispatched the flight to Birmingham using the RNAV18 approach because the dispatcher saw the NOTAM about the LOC18 approach NA at night note. The dispatcher didn't notify the crew about the LOC18 NA at night because he felt, according to Jeff Chestnut, that he would be "talking down to the crew." However, during a line of questioning about what type of information would be useful to notify the crew, the UPS rep thought having a single runway with only a single applicable approach with a forecast ceiling of OVC004 would not be information required to be given to the crew.

Also, they were questioned about what issues or if there was a process about how dispatchers would consider or determine to delay a flight. The UPS rep said that there was no official process that it is generally up to the dispatcher to determine if he/she should delay the flight. However, he pointed out that they were given enough fuel for an alternate into Atlanta which could be used to hold, loiter, or divert.

There were detailed questions about if the OVC006v010 was controlling for the approach. Another person said the 10Sm visibility was sufficient and legal to conduct the approach and that dispatchers know that the pilots will go around if they don't break out.

The panel was also asked about FedEx and if UPS had a real time risk management alert system or monitoring system. A FedEx jet was behind the UPS jet but elected to delay for the opening of the main runway. They were asked how you relay something of that nature (runway opening) to the crew. The UPS rep said that it would be relayed via a NOTAM, said that he thought it was up to the comfort level of the crew if they should delay. He also said that UPS has no real time risk monitoring system. He was asked about "FedEx has a note that says Runway 18 is a CFIT Moderate runway. What does that mean to you?" He fumbled and mumbled and when asked if UPS had some type of rating or scale he responded with "the dispatcher does."

I just thought the entire line of questioning was interesting and eye opening for both dispatchers and pilots. I guess my point is, it seems they were legal, but were they safe? I'm not condemning the crew. I just think the system failed them, on many levels and this is just one ... contrary to a post provided by someone else earlier in this thread. I'm not posting this to ruffle feathers or to start a purple versus brown or anything else type of fight. I just hope we as professionals can solve these challenges so that this never ever happens again. We owe it to ourselves, our families, and our customers might they be passengers or shippers.