Originally Posted by gettinbumped

On the A320 now, but as a 757/767 Captain we flew our LOC approaches in VS. We set MDA in the alt window. Not sure that would have saved them here though, as they has reported the runway in sight and were maneuvering to land.

Clearly mistakes were made by the crew. Exactly what they did wrong I won't speculate about because I'm totally unfamiliar with UPS's procedures, and the A300 Automation. What's important to me here is WHY were those mistakes made, and what can be done so that they aren't repeated. A certain someone on this board would like to say: "They screwed up. Case closed". And this person apparently is a Sim instructor. It's NEVER that simple. Ever. We would all be well served to have some humility and explore every aspect of this accident from the FAR 117 carve out to which EGPWS was installed to NOTAMS to UPS's training procedures to mountainous airport ops to ATC effectiveness. THATS how we all become better pilots. Not arrogantly dismissing the mistakes that were made without examination

Originally Posted by BoilerUP

Originally Posted by MX727

Here is the link to the docket:

Docket

Factual Report

FDR

CVR

Originally Posted by HIFLYR

If you are in LOC or LOC* and the to and from way points are correct you can capture it from above same goes for NAV.

Originally Posted by Spur

The FMS was still direct BHM with a Flight Plan Discon as they flew the LOC, which is why they were unable to capture the profile from above.

Originally Posted by HIFLYR

I understand the previous poster said you could not capture the VNAV path from above in a A300, I was just pointing out you can if its set up right.

Originally Posted by PurpleToolBox

WOW. I just watched the hearing with the "technical panel" in reference to dispatchers, dispatch software (LIDO), and ACARs system for UPS. The dispatch process really received a harsh review of procedures.

The was an issue regarding an FAR (don't remember which) that require the dispatchers to notify the flight crew of any information that is deemed critical or necessary for flight operations. One of the UPS reps was asked if he were aware of this, he said "yes."

In 2011, UPS asked LIDO to leave out remarks on METARs inserted by human observations which are included at the end of automated METAR observations. Those remarks were pulled from the flight releases and ACARs ATIS requests. No NOTAM or Read File was given to alert the crews that this was done.

One person testified that according to the FOM, pilots are supposed to use ATIS in order to get the current weather (he did not elaborate if he meant ACARs ATIS or actually listening to the ATIS to hear if there were any pertinent remarks). I assume he meant listening to ATIS. But in further testimony, someone testified that the information was not on ATIS.

Nobody could speak to how or when LIDO charts or the LIDO flight planning software were certified.

The dispatcher dispatched the flight to Birmingham using the RNAV18 approach because the dispatcher saw the NOTAM about the LOC18 approach NA at night note. The dispatcher didn't notify the crew about the LOC18 NA at night because he felt, according to Jeff Chestnut, that he would be "talking down to the crew." However, during a line of questioning about what type of information would be useful to notify the crew, the UPS rep thought having a single runway with only a single applicable approach with a forecast ceiling of OVC004 would not be information required to be given to the crew.

Also, they were questioned about what issues or if there was a process about how dispatchers would consider or determine to delay a flight. The UPS rep said that there was no official process that it is generally up to the dispatcher to determine if he/she should delay the flight. However, he pointed out that they were given enough fuel for an alternate into Atlanta which could be used to hold, loiter, or divert.

There were detailed questions about if the OVC006v010 was controlling for the approach. Another person said the 10Sm visibility was sufficient and legal to conduct the approach and that dispatchers know that the pilots will go around if they don't break out.

The panel was also asked about FedEx and if UPS had a real time risk management alert system or monitoring system. A FedEx jet was behind the UPS jet but elected to delay for the opening of the main runway. They were asked how you relay something of that nature (runway opening) to the crew. The UPS rep said that it would be relayed via a NOTAM, said that he thought it was up to the comfort level of the crew if they should delay. He also said that UPS has no real time risk monitoring system. He was asked about "FedEx has a note that says Runway 18 is a CFIT Moderate runway. What does that mean to you?" He fumbled and mumbled and when asked if UPS had some type of rating or scale he responded with "the dispatcher does."

I just thought the entire line of questioning was interesting and eye opening for both dispatchers and pilots. I guess my point is, it seems they were legal, but were they safe? I'm not condemning the crew. I just think the system failed them, on many levels and this is just one ... contrary to a post provided by someone else earlier in this thread. I'm not posting this to ruffle feathers or to start a purple versus brown or anything else type of fight. I just hope we as professionals can solve these challenges so that this never ever happens again. We owe it to ourselves, our families, and our customers might they be passengers or shippers.

Originally Posted by ShyGuy

This sounds like another Vertical Speeding into the ground accident, very unfortunate and avoidable. It's not standard obviously but if VS has to be used then the MDA should have been set for the altitude so the airplane could capture it and stay there. I'm curious since the FP never sequenced I assume they had no donut/football VDEV either. What were they using to guide themselves down past the FAF? Sounds like 1.5VS was set all the way until the GPWS alert which explains their descent rate of 1500fpm through 1,000 AGL.


The last US airline crash of Colgan had a PIC with an extremely checkered history. This UPS case had trouble with the PIC as well. Once hired failed 3 recurrent home study consecutively April-Sept-April. After 10 yrs as a FO couldn't pass through 757 upgrade and went back to FO. Two yrs later tried the same thing and again couldn't finish and went back to FO. Failed day 3 of a AQP session as well in the 17th year of FO.