commutable trip.

If they notify you of a trip before 12 hours and you don't acknowledge the trip 3 hours prior you have to be 'promptly available' from original report until 6 hours after.


That is the big question, what is promptly available mean? according to scheduling that means you better be at the airport at that moment to work that flight...or else!

ALPA hotline disagrees and says that means " reasonable report aka 2 hrs ish"

BUT has anyone ignored the calls and at the trip sign in time answered and said, "Ill be there when I can" delayed the flight etc?

Would love to know, cause ALPA never followed up with the follow up in this case.

 

Sailing, I agree management buys airplanes, we don't. But, management can also decide to tank the company without any harm to themselves while outsourcing our jobs, rinse, wash repeat. It seems we would have learned something from the last decade.

• FedEx typically runs their airplanes two cycles a day. They have very low utilization, which is why DC8's still survive in cargo service. Who cares what they cost to operate ... they don't operate that much and the margins are better than in the pax business
• Boeing designed the 757 for a 20 year life
• The FAA considers the service life of a 757 to be 50,000 cycles, the 737 is 75,000
• To continue in operation past the "service goals" the aircraft must go through heavy maintenance every 30 to 72 months. Economically, my understanding is that parks the airplane. More so on the Airbus A320 than the Boeing and more so on the 757 than the MD fleet although all have a 48,000 to 50,000 limit
• There are three parties at the table on the life extension programs. The operator, the manufacturer and the FAA. Two of the three would like to see new airplanes, only one wants to keep what they've got*
• Delta's 757's are the most efficient jets in the fleet. The 737's efficiency does not come anywhere near the 25% or higher improvement that would be needed to fund their replacement ... and a 737 can't do everything a 757 can do
• Skywest and Republic have been well managed and are in an excellent position to win a "survival of the fittest" contest to provide domestic flying under codeshare agreements. They are a real white paper player for the C Series, or equivalent, with no legacy overhead. With musical seniority lists and certificates, I mean no legacy overhead, not even their own.
• Operators like Southwest have replaced 737NG's with new 737's as they wear out. There is no efficiency payback.
• We are pretty much at the top of the efficiency curve. The improvements nowadays are much closer to the margin and do not come near as quickly.
• Cost to replace the 757 fleet with less capable 737's is approximately $14 Billion. Cost to do so with the 787 $31.5 Billion. Profits in 2010 if we are lucky around $1.25.

I believe this next round of labor negotiations (not just ours) will seal the fate of domestic flying. It is the most critical round of negotiations which will effect a vast number of mainline pilots careers, survival of regional players and probably the survival of our union.

All I'm saying is there is a lot more to this than C2K pay rates and an arbitrary percentage. There are some very large economic forces which will exert pressure on management like they are the pebble holding the San Andreas fault together. On path to relief will likely be seen in the form of outsourcing the problem of capital expenditures. The problem is ALPA's reluctance to make the rapid changes necessary to view representation inclusively and build bridges across certificates. As an example I cite the only committee not to reach a consensus at this year's BOD.

* not necessarily true in Airbus' case since the French government owns a significant percentage of Air France. Boeing (Douglas) really has no incentive to support life extension programs if they believe it possible to sell new airplanes.

 

Outstanding post. Agree or disagree, it's worth reading through at least twice.

 

... and since someone will claim I'm yelling "surrender" I'm not. Just saying to play the game smart. Part of the reason Hitler got his butt beat as badly as he did was he refused to even consider defensive strategies.

Management's got the strategic default play perfected. Have we developed our defensive position? A quick look through our playbook (our PWA, after several chances for Section 1 repairs and a few tweaks) is, nope.

I'm not saying we don't have good field position. Just pointing out four attempts at a hail mary and turn the ball over with no defense is ... ill considered. Just trying to interject a little balance before we get too excited about a 10% ' ish operating margin. For historical perspective, here's a little recap of United's 2000 contract from one historian:

 

Really? Please tell us what you think happened and then I'll tell you what really happened

 

Just read it as reported in ALPA's magazine.* Feel free to share your insights, as well as strategies

Also, can you explain how the Compass divestiture was a "win" for our representational relevance, building bridges, controlling outsourcing, contract restoration, etc ... Really, truly, humbly, I'm asking.

* (reading between the lines Comair asked for a life jacket and we told them to go find their own, but that's just a guess. Got no opinion on that. But, that's what I think, the floor is yours! )

 

The airplanes we need going forward will cost Alaska or SkyWest/Republic/whoever just as much as they will cost DL mainline. Every penny. And I don't buy that MBA fantasy land accounting trick of "well if they operate it for us we don't have the debt" nonsense. If a C-Series flies in Delta colors, Delta will pay 100% of its cost including 100% of the cost of the debt and debt servicing. The only difference is employee costs and that when amortized into the overall cost is absolutely peanuts.

As for the XX Billion to replace such and such fleet, or the XXX Billion to replace almost everything, yeah I suppose if we replace an entire fleet in a day and pay cash then it would cost that much. Airlines have to buy planes and yes sometimes on a large scale. That is nothing new, it has happened too many times to count.

If we can't afford, and/or the debt is too much for us to get however many 787s, A320 NEOs, C-Series, 797s or whatever else we need then there is no way an outsourced provider will be able to afford them or the debt the come with either based on deals inked with us as their primary or exclusive means of paying for them in the first place.

If we give away more scope, of course whatever we give away will be outsourced. But that will be because of management's desire to leverage their bonuses on the backs of cheap SJS labor. But there is no way someone else can afford to get those very same planes, and fly them for us, if we can't afford to do it ourselves in the first place.

As for C12K, regardless of how that ends up, we will begin the discussion in a significantly better debt/credit situation either way.

 

OK, I thought you were referring to the report of the Career Security Protocol Committee which covered the NSL discussion/debate...

 

Not to engage in thread creep, but I'm curious if UAL's take on a NSL has changed with the better chances of success as a result of their merger?

IMHO, a NSL it's a terrible idea, but parts of the platform are useful. Particularly if focused within the brand, or system. One hole in our scope is that we allow one part of "Delta" to hire while another part furloughs. A bridge that preserves seniority and longevity would be best built on the foundation of a common list.

I would also like to see ALPA require that outsourcing agreements be flown by ALPA members. Phase them in with contract expiration, so Republic and SkyWest have a couple years to organize. Then our MEC Chair, I mean, National's President has ratification authority on their contract. Start building the economic foundation under us.

Those are the kinds of ideas that I mean when I state "play defensively." That way, during a downturn pilots keep their Delta jobs and the company has less opportunity to restructure to the trendy flavor of the day.

 

Not really. Several factors come into play:

• SkyWest in particular has a very good looking balance sheet. They can obtain financing cheaper than anyone. Within the blood bath that is DCI bidding, SkyWest even uses this advantage to beat rivals for RJ flying while paying their pilots significantly more (and treating them better) than say, Mesa.
• Offshore carriers (if permitted) have subsidies and financing arrangements that make their jets significantly cheaper. Google, "Emirates, import export bank" I bet France (the government) gives Air France (owned by, guess who) quite a deal on Airbus (French jobs program, keeps the peasants from burning the place down)
• Not all costs are just pay rates. Longevity enters into the picture. Part of the reason for the constant shuffle among DCI partners is the destruction of pilot longevity to reduce costs. In my category the top FO earns 211% of what the new hire does. Second year that drops to 137%, but is really more due to vacation and other bene's.
• Delta has outsourced somewhere in the neighborhood of $28,000,000,000 to DCI going forward. Sure, that is enough to buy their jets. But Delta enjoys greater flexibility than if it had committed for these jets directly. If I recall, Republic actually (was dumb enough to) sign some three year deals on surplus jets coming off the US Air outsourcing disaster.
• In a game where a 5% margin is success or death, marginal differences make or break the airline. This debate started with me pointing out ALL of our profits this year could be summed up in two words, bag fees.