Amish Pilot

Much Thanks!

Bucking Bar

Actually the ATR-72-212 burned about half the fuel of the CRJ200 (1,600PPH v/s 3,200) and also came with active noise reduction. The CRJ earned it back at altitude where it would routinely scoot along at .80 to .82 in the the days when time was considered more important than efficiency. So, for a 1/3 increase in speed you got a smaller airplane burning twice the fuel. The Dash 8 Q 400 is really a different animal. A lot more power and a lot more fuel burn.

Inside the ATR, it is an Airbus product. What appear to be the same bins, overhead panels, etc as the A320. Cockpit was also very "Airbus." It is wider than any of its regional jet competition.

On routes within the "400NM ring of death" where ATC commonly assigns flow control into major hubs, the ATR could be the FASTER airplane, since it operated in UN-congested airspace (10,000 to FL180). The ATR had runway data from anywhere and could often take off mid field if ATC needed separation for jets on the same RNAV departure.

ATR sold the airplanes with nice pamphlets explaining it was a thoroughly modern airplane which was much more environmentally friendly, bigger and more comfortable. Delta immediately had these removed (since they pointed out the drawbacks of the CRJ fleet Delta had just committed 11 Billion for)

The ATR-72's draw backs were its lack of power for hot, high, mountainous areas. We had to watch SE drift down numbers to get to Tennessee from Atlanta. You will never see that airplane out west. It's packs used to freeze up and block air flow. The un-intuitive trick was to run them full hot for a couple of minutes during the summer, melt the ice out, then go back cold. While melting, gobs of ice would get blown out into the distribution manifolds. A creative pilot could let the ice build behind their vent until they had a nice snowball, aim across the flight deck and try to score a direct hit on the other guy.

The ATR flew like an MD88 and had a similar number of mechanical idiosyncrasies. It was easy to load the thing aft CG and put it on its tail.

acl65pilot

Looks like they are making it cheaper for someone to buy......

forgot to bid

Interesting. And frustrating with the bold part.

I wonder how the -500 series 72 is? I know the -500 series 42 was a nice plane. The Coex guys loved that thing. And what's not to love of about a 6 bladed prop?

XtremeF150

http://http://www.ainonline.com/avia...order-total-60

Notice towards the bottom of the article they are still considering the 100 seat ATR. Maybe just cooling their heels to see if they can get a launch customer. Perhaps in the U.S. if our scope isn't locked up on turboprops. Things to keep our eyes on.

Bucking Bar

It looked dorky, but it was fun to fly. It had crew bunks (cargo nets made hammocks), and it was impossible to defer the APU

Hoser

Never could find the start button for that APU, remember the square cockpit cup holders, and of course the horn that no one could hear outside!

Hoser

capncrunch

Side question:

On the move reserve days request, we put the day off first then the day on?

Wasatch Phantom

Interesting Perspective:

Collapse Of The U.S. Regional Airline Industry Is A Real Concern
by Darren Shannon at Aviation Week blog
2/14/2012

There are worrying signals that a significant part of the airline industry could implode in the coming months, and despite the doom-and-gloom predictions from Europe, this catastrophe is occurring on the other side of the Atlantic.

U.S. regional airlines have always been perceived as tertiary to the majors and low-cost carriers that are household names in the country. But despite the low-key brand awareness, most U.S. passengers have some first-hand experience with regionals as legacy carriers increasingly rely on these smaller operators for feed.

Those feeder contracts used to be lucrative, with the majors assuming most of the risk while providing nearly double-digit margins for a slew of regional companies. Indeed, these contracts were so healthy that regional airlines at times came to the financial aid of those same majors.

But those days are long gone, as mainline operators rein in costs, restructure the loosely written capacity purchase agreements and stringently enforce every condition of the new contracts.

The effect of these changes has been devastating. Mesa Air Group, a leading force in the growth of 50-seat jet feed in the early part of this century, is a shadow of its former self, having shed most of its fleet during a Chapter 11 protection proceeding from which it emerged last year as a privately owned company with just a handful of contracts.

ExpressJet has disappeared completely after rewritten contracts by then-owner Continental Airlines eventually forced a sale to SkyWest, once a stalwart of fiscal sobriety that is now posting consecutive quarterly losses because of that acquisition. Elsewhere, Pinnacle Airlines’ future is bleak after recently noting that only two of its contracts—both with Delta Air Lines—are viable, and Republic Airways’ journey into mainline branded operations has come almost full circle as the carrier attempts to offload Frontier Airlines. Alarmingly, Republic last week also promoted its relationship with AMR Corp., which entered Chapter 11 on Nov. 29, 2011, as its saving grace.

The viability of privately owned Trans States Holdings and Air Wisconsin is less known, although chatter from within indicates all is not well at either carrier, and while US Airways’ patronage of Air Wisconsin means the feeder will shift capacity from New York LaGuardia to Washington Reagan National Airport, it came at the expense of the major’s own regional subsidiary, Piedmont Airlines.

Piedmont’s distress is mirrored at other wholly owned feeders, with Delta’s Comair perpetually for sale and AMR’s American Eagle Airlines operation under review and likely dependent on a combination of new scope clauses and drastic cuts in fleet costs.

The regionals’ only option is to ask suppliers to share their pain. Now this is nothing new to the airline industry and the majors have asked the same of their suppliers, which included the regionals. But this temporary solution does little to stanch a systemic problem in the regional airline industry. It simply cannot survive with the current business model.

And it will only get worse. While reduced aircraft payments will provide a timely reprieve for many operators, there are other issues that need to be resolved, many of which were summarized in an internal memorandum posted this month by Mesa Chairman/CEO Jonathan Ornstein.

In that message, Ornstein warned that while his Chapter 11 reorganization eliminated some aircraft costs, the downsizing of the U.S. airline industry has produced a crew roster heavy in seniority but with a smaller fleet to spread that higher cost. Compounding this is an unexpected maintenance requirement for the airline’s fleet of Bombardier CRJ900s that the launch customer thought was coming several years from now, and, says Ornstein, new regulations that will increase fixed costs.

But the most telling part of that memo was Ornstein’s insistence that he, like his peers, is signing contracts that will never make a profit simply to “live to fight another day.” This can only ensure that the regional industry is destined for failure.

Consolidation has been a byword for the global airline business model for years, but that will do little to help U.S. regionals; in fact, it has contributed to their dilemma. Something deeper is required, but for now that solution is as absent as their profits.

johnso29

If you want to move your work day on 3/2 to a day off on 3/7 you would put 02 in the first two blocks then 07 in the next two.