This brings to mind a second question...
What incentive does the company have to honor the contract, and keep flying ratios within the TA ratios?
(All I'm looking for is a fail safe that protects DAL pilots)

Sure we could file a grievance, but if there are no penalties that would come of it then it's the equivalent of a delicate slap on the wrist.

In this scenario, we, the pilot group, are the ones who once again take the hit.

 

Arbitrators and Courts don't look kindly on willful contract violations. The Delta pilots are still under an injunction from a 2001 Appelate decision, and the damage decision was overtaken by the settlement of C2K. Group grievance decisions have awarded Delta pilots substantial amounts of money from Delta contractual violations in the past, and courts have ordered both companies and unions to pay up. Remember the APA fine payable to AMR management in the 1990's?

 

.............

 

You have to be kidding me?! We shouldn't put penalties in an agreement because that presupposes they (the company) could violate the contract and it would be OK".

Are you being serious? So when we do make it to the judge and the contract had spelled out clearly in the contract the dollar amount penalty the company had to pay, this would be of no use to us? Have you ever done any sort of business agreement outside of ALPA in your entire life?

Now that I am beginning to understand the way DALPA thinks, it has dawned on me how we get such weak and unenforceable contract language that the company easily exploits.

 

Pre-agreed penalties, called "liquidated damages", are sometimes included in commercial contracts. In this case, determining a mutually agreeable dollar amount would be a Herculean task.

What is liquidated damages? definition and meaning

 

I gotta say that yes, you are right but the accumulator would be starting from a much higher pressure and would not lose as much pressure as it currently can with 1 to 1.19....

Denny

 

You guys are both absolutely right here, it would be practically impossible to determine a fiscal, or otherwise, direct penalty against the company in the event that ratios are not honored to the extent outlined in the TA.

Slow, you were referencing a refusal to work overtime from the pilot group, as allowed per the PWA, at the time. The total revenue loss as a result of the cancelled flights is easy to quantify. Quantify the direct loss then settle on an agreed upon fiscal penalty somewhere in the middle.

Tom, attempting to quantify non-compliance with scope provisions is practically an impossibility. Rather such non-compliances are then absorbed, i.e. forgiven, into a new agreement. Attempting to determine the penality after a scope non-compliance issue would be even more difficult, and time would not be in our facor.
It is for that exact reason we should have a predetermined penalty agreed upon before contract signing to protect the interest of the pilot group.

The absence of that backstop, or incentive, to keep the flying balance as outlined would prevent a "pump and dump" scenario.

Furthermore, I can see the term fleet being to loosely manipulated to tip the numbers in the company's favor.
For example, the new 737's we are going to be receiving from Boeing next year will be delivered in the ER configuration, thus allowing to reach some destinations in Europe. Would that then declassify the 737 as domestic narrow body fleet, or would the ratios look more at routes?
If we are focusing more on aircraft fleets, as opposed to mainline routes, we may be looking at different interpretations of what is considered compliance/non-compliance.

I'd like more protections and guarantees that mainline flying would be protected. If an agreement of penalties of non-compliance are agreed upon, then I believe those stipulations may pacify some of the pilot grops concerns.

 

Ugh, too much text.

 

Very well said. Thank You.

 

nah, place holder.