Lion Air 737 Max Accident
#41
On Reserve
Joined APC: Dec 2015
Posts: 14
It should NEVER happen. Period. If you haven’t looked at Berginair 301 you should, the CA had a bad airspeed that disagreed on t/o roll and elected to continue. At altitude they got slow but the CA airspeed said they were fast, he continued to pull back based on a bad airspeed even through the shaker and the FO saying I think we’re too slow. All that FO needed to do was push the nose down and 189 people would still be here. It is beyond unacceptable for a person to die because of poor CRM.
Accidents will happen, despite our amazing safety record recently aviation will always involve risk. But there is no excuse for CRM causing injury or death, it is entirely within our control.
Accidents will happen, despite our amazing safety record recently aviation will always involve risk. But there is no excuse for CRM causing injury or death, it is entirely within our control.
Funny that you didn’t follow what I was saying despite your screen name.
#42
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2018
Posts: 579
I followed just fine, thank you. Every day countless flights encounter nonstandard situations and great crews use CRM to mitigate, thus there is nothing for us to hear about.
My point is, it is a huge deal when an incident that could have been avoided with CRM costs lives. There is simply no excuse for it and every one of these instances should be broadcast as far and wide as possible until we eliminate them completely.
My point is, it is a huge deal when an incident that could have been avoided with CRM costs lives. There is simply no excuse for it and every one of these instances should be broadcast as far and wide as possible until we eliminate them completely.
#43
On Reserve
Joined APC: Mar 2014
Posts: 15
Lion Air: Sensor replaced day before crash, problems persisted
Problems were reported on a Lion Air jet that crashed into the sea off Jakarta even after technicians replaced a sensor on board the aircraft, investigators said.
Indonesian authorities confirmed Wednesday that the angle of attack (AOA) sensor was replaced after a flight from Manado, in North Sulawesi to Denpasar, Bali on October 28. The Boeing 737 MAX 8 then made another flight to Jakarta that same day, and the pilots reported further problems....
...Investigators said the jet experienced problems on its last four flights -- including, crucially, the flight that crashed, according to Soerjanto Tjahjono, the head of the National Transportation Safety Committee (KNKT).
Boeing released an operational bulletin on Wednesday, warning all airlines about how to address any erroneous readings related to the AOA sensor. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) later issued its own directive that advised pilots about how to respond to similar problems....
In its statement on Wednesday, Boeing said that the Indonesian transport committee had indicated that Flight 610 had "experienced erroneous input from one of its AOA sensors." [source]
=======
My question is how long it takes normally to replace the said AOA sensor and to properly recalibrate it ?
It appears that PK-LQP had about 11-12 hours in DPS to have AOA sensor replaced before its next flight to CGK.
Thx.
#44
I would guess an hour tops (assuming the part and technician are both present). That's not pitot-static, so probably no involved calibration required (a pitot probe can take hours to test/calibrate after installation).
Unscrew some screws, disconnect cannon plug, installation is the reverse of that. Probably have to seal the plate, might take some time for the sealant to dry, possibly some number of hours.
#45
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Aug 2005
Position: tri current
Posts: 1,485
The APA has put out a letter to all pilots to describe a system new to the Max that is not described in the Flight Crew Operating Manual. It is called Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) and will drive nose down stabilizer trim when the AoA exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. It only works in manual flight with flaps up.
#46
Line Holder
Joined APC: Jan 2014
Posts: 96
The APA has put out a letter to all pilots to describe a system new to the Max that is not described in the Flight Crew Operating Manual. It is called Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) and will drive nose down stabilizer trim when the AoA exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. It only works in manual flight with flaps up.
I also heard some reference to steep turns. If you trim during steep turns (my mantra learned during pilot training was "trim, trim, trim", but who knows now with the current aircraft) but let airspeed decay would the elevator not be able to unload the aircraft and Boeing wanted to help again.
Or is there some other reason for adding the MCAS other than the unlikely situation of the pilots trimming while slowing to that angle of attack that would trigger the MCAS. I could see something like that happening at altitude though but it could happen on earlier models also. Did the stretch change things where the stab might not allow elevator control? Of course, the older 737s ( I think) and the 727 could be put in a rare situation where you couldn't even trim electrically if you had opposite elevator input until you relaxed the elevator input and air load.
#47
Got to love how the FAA looks the other way and claims ignorance by allowing operators to put new aircraft into service with multiple changes and system enhancements. A 3 hour differences course (no mention of this system or even a paragraph in the AOM). No simulators produced prior to service introduction.
The bribery tentacles run deep into the polyester brigade.
Boeing and the airlines have the feds on their knees like a $10 hooker.
The bribery tentacles run deep into the polyester brigade.
Boeing and the airlines have the feds on their knees like a $10 hooker.
#48
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2018
Posts: 895
This is rapidly becoming a major scandal for Boeing.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-...d=hp_lead_pos2
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-...d=hp_lead_pos2
#49
This is rapidly becoming a major scandal for Boeing.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-...d=hp_lead_pos2
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-...d=hp_lead_pos2
#50
New Hire
Joined APC: Nov 2015
Posts: 7
Am I the only one who finds it odd that the 737 control yolk is missing a pitch trim disconnect button. Can someone who flies Boeing enlighten me as to the human factors philosophy in excluding a button that nearly every other airplane has on their controls.
Thread
Thread Starter
Forum
Replies
Last Post