UPS 6 @ DXB, DGAA preliminary information
04-03-2011, 06:59 PM
#1
Gets Weekends Off
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04-04-2011, 10:53 AM
#2
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2009
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From the Wall Street Journal:
"The preliminary accident report issued Sunday by United Arab Emirates investigators comes three days after the U.S. House of Representatives approved a broad aviation bill including a provision effectively blocking adoption of tough new U.S. rules under consideration to crack down on air transport of lithium batteries."
"The preliminary accident report issued Sunday by United Arab Emirates investigators comes three days after the U.S. House of Representatives approved a broad aviation bill including a provision effectively blocking adoption of tough new U.S. rules under consideration to crack down on air transport of lithium batteries."
04-04-2011, 12:02 PM
#3
The NeverEnding Story
Joined APC: Sep 2005
Posts: 7,505
I really like the format of GCAA's report; I think it provides much better awareness for the actual flight path than the NTSB's factual reports.
That said, that report reads like my biggest nightmare as a professional pilot; its amazing the crew got as far as they did.
That said, that report reads like my biggest nightmare as a professional pilot; its amazing the crew got as far as they did.
04-04-2011, 06:49 PM
#4
...Whatever It Is!
Joined APC: Jul 2006
Posts: 4,680
Originally Posted by BoilerUP
I really like the format of GCAA's report; I think it provides much better awareness for the actual flight path than the NTSB's factual reports.
That said, that report reads like my biggest nightmare as a professional pilot; its amazing the crew got as far as they did.
That said, that report reads like my biggest nightmare as a professional pilot; its amazing the crew got as far as they did.
04-04-2011, 11:35 PM
#6
Where's my Mai Tai?
Joined APC: Aug 2006
Position: fins to the left, fins to the right
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EPARTURE FROM DXB
The aircraft pushed back at 14:41 UTC, departing Dubai International Airport (DXB) at 14:51 UTC (18:51 GST local time) on a scheduled cargo service to Koln-Bonn, Cologne (CGN), Germany.
The aircraft was dispatched with no known technical limitations. The aircraft was dispatched with Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) 2 items which were not contributory to the accident.
The departure runway was runway 30 Right (RW30R) from DXB. The First Officer (F/O) was the Pilot Flying (PF) 3 , the Captain was the Pilot Non Flying (PNF) 4 for the sector from DXB to CGN.
The aircraft was cleared for a RANBI2D departure from Dubai - which required a left hand turn after takeoff from DXB, heading west to towards the RANBI waypoint, then a right hand turn heading north/west overhead the RANBI waypoint towards the BALUS waypoint, which was on the Emirates FIR/Bahrain FIR boundary.
The take off and climb out from DXB was uneventful with the exception of a PACK 1 fault which was reset by the PNF at 14:55 UTC at 13,000 ft enroute to the BALUS waypoint.
ENROUTE DXB-CGN
15:11 UTC, Bahrain Air Traffic Control (BAH-C ) confirmed the aircraft was in radar contact and cleared the flight crew to the next waypoint, COPPI. The crew acknowledged the BAH-C transmission as the aircraft was climbing to the designated cruise altitude of 32, 000 ft. Over head the BALUS waypoint the aircraft entered into the Bahrain Flight Information Region (FIR).
1 minute after passing the BALUS waypoint approaching the top of climb, there was the sound of an audible alarm on the CVR consistent with the fire bell alarm; this occurred at 15:12 UTC.
FIRE WARNING/EMERGENCY DECLARATION/SMOKE IN THE FLIGHT DECK
Following the fire bell annunciation, the CAPT assumed control of the aircraft as PF, and the F/O reverted to PNF while managing the fire warnings and cockpit checklists.
The CAPT advised BAH-C that there was a fire indication on the main deck of the aircraft. The crew informed BAH-C that they needed to land as soon as possible. BAH-C advised the crew that Doha International Airport (DOH) was at the aircraft's 10 o'clock position at 100 NM DME. DOH was the nearest airport at the time the emergency was declared, DXB was approximately 148 NM DME.
The CAPT elected to return to DXB, and following the request to land as soon as possible to BAH-C, the crew declared an emergency.
BAH-C acknowledged the request, cleared the aircraft for a series of right hand heading changes back to DXB onto a heading of 106° - the turns and remaining straight line distance to DXB totalled approximately 150 nm.
EMERGENCY DESCENT AND TURN BACK TO DUBAI
At approximately 15:14 UTC, the Auto Pilot (AP) disconnected, followed at 15:15 by a second audible alarm similar to the fire bell. At about this time the flight crew put on the oxygen masks and goggles. The crew experienced difficulties communicating via the intercom with the masks on, which interfered with the Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) 5 .
The aircraft pushed back at 14:41 UTC, departing Dubai International Airport (DXB) at 14:51 UTC (18:51 GST local time) on a scheduled cargo service to Koln-Bonn, Cologne (CGN), Germany.
The aircraft was dispatched with no known technical limitations. The aircraft was dispatched with Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) 2 items which were not contributory to the accident.
The departure runway was runway 30 Right (RW30R) from DXB. The First Officer (F/O) was the Pilot Flying (PF) 3 , the Captain was the Pilot Non Flying (PNF) 4 for the sector from DXB to CGN.
The aircraft was cleared for a RANBI2D departure from Dubai - which required a left hand turn after takeoff from DXB, heading west to towards the RANBI waypoint, then a right hand turn heading north/west overhead the RANBI waypoint towards the BALUS waypoint, which was on the Emirates FIR/Bahrain FIR boundary.
The take off and climb out from DXB was uneventful with the exception of a PACK 1 fault which was reset by the PNF at 14:55 UTC at 13,000 ft enroute to the BALUS waypoint.
ENROUTE DXB-CGN
15:11 UTC, Bahrain Air Traffic Control (BAH-C ) confirmed the aircraft was in radar contact and cleared the flight crew to the next waypoint, COPPI. The crew acknowledged the BAH-C transmission as the aircraft was climbing to the designated cruise altitude of 32, 000 ft. Over head the BALUS waypoint the aircraft entered into the Bahrain Flight Information Region (FIR).
1 minute after passing the BALUS waypoint approaching the top of climb, there was the sound of an audible alarm on the CVR consistent with the fire bell alarm; this occurred at 15:12 UTC.
FIRE WARNING/EMERGENCY DECLARATION/SMOKE IN THE FLIGHT DECK
Following the fire bell annunciation, the CAPT assumed control of the aircraft as PF, and the F/O reverted to PNF while managing the fire warnings and cockpit checklists.
The CAPT advised BAH-C that there was a fire indication on the main deck of the aircraft. The crew informed BAH-C that they needed to land as soon as possible. BAH-C advised the crew that Doha International Airport (DOH) was at the aircraft's 10 o'clock position at 100 NM DME. DOH was the nearest airport at the time the emergency was declared, DXB was approximately 148 NM DME.
The CAPT elected to return to DXB, and following the request to land as soon as possible to BAH-C, the crew declared an emergency.
BAH-C acknowledged the request, cleared the aircraft for a series of right hand heading changes back to DXB onto a heading of 106° - the turns and remaining straight line distance to DXB totalled approximately 150 nm.
EMERGENCY DESCENT AND TURN BACK TO DUBAI
At approximately 15:14 UTC, the Auto Pilot (AP) disconnected, followed at 15:15 by a second audible alarm similar to the fire bell. At about this time the flight crew put on the oxygen masks and goggles. The crew experienced difficulties communicating via the intercom with the masks on, which interfered with the Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) 5 .
04-04-2011, 11:36 PM
#7
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9
Following the initiation of the turn back to DXB, having been cleared to 27,000 ft, the crew requested an expedited, immediate descent to 10,000 feet (ft).
Following ATC clearance, the flight crew initiated a rapid descent to 10,000 ft. BAH-C advised the crew that the aircraft was on a direct heading to DXB and cleared for landing on DXB runway 12 left (RW12L) at their discretion.
The Fire Main Deck checklist was activated. According to the system logic, the cabin began to depressurise, PACKS 2 and 3 shut down automatically, and PACK 2 and 3 positions were then manually selected to OFF on the overhead panel in accordance with the checklist instructions. 6/7/8
Based on the DFDR data, at 15:15 UTC, PACK 1 shut down, with no corresponding discussion recorded on the CVR.
A short interval after the AP was disengaged, the CAPT informed the F/O that there was limited pitch control of the aircraft in the manual flying mode, the CAPT then requested the F/O to determine the cause of the pitch control anomaly.
The DFDR data indicates that there was a control column movement anomaly between the input by the crew on the control column forward and aft and the corresponding elevator movement: the elevator was not deflecting to the required range of travel relative to the control inputs.
During the turn back to DXB, the AP was re-engaged, and the aircraft descent was stabilised at 15:17 UTC.
At 15:17 UTC the CAPT told the F/O to pull the smoke evacuation handle 9 . This was not part of the Fire Main Deck Non-Normal checklist.
The CAPT informed BAH-C that the cockpit was ‘full of smoke' and commented to the F/O about the inability to see the instruments.
The CAPT instructed the F/O to input DXB into the Flight Management System (FMS). The F/O acknowledged the request and commented about the increasing flight deck temperature. It was not clear from the CVR if the FMS was programmed for DXB, although the DFDR indicated that the ILS/VOR frequency was changed to 110.1 MHz which was the frequency for DXB RW12L.
Based on the information available to date, it is likely that less than 5 minutes after the fire indication on the main deck, smoke had entered the flight deck and intermittently degraded the visibility to the extent that the flight instruments could not effectively be monitored by the crew.
At approximately 15:19 UTC, during the emergency descent, at approximately 20,000 ft cabin altitude, the CAPT, as PF, declared a lack of oxygen supply.
Following a brief exchange between the CAPT and F/O regarding the need for oxygen, the CAPT transferred control of the aircraft to the F/O as PF. Portable oxygen is located on the flight deck and in the supernumerary area, aft of the flight crew's positions when seated.
At this point the recorded CVR is consistent with the CAPT leaving his seat, after which there is no further CVR information that indicates any further interaction from the CAPT for the remainder of the flight.
TRANSIT FROM THE BAHRAIN TO EMIRATES FIR
The normal procedural requirement of transiting into the Emirates FIR, inbound for DXB was a radio frequency change from BAH-C to UAE-C.
At 15:20 UTC, BAH-C advised the crew to contact UAE-C with a frequency change to 132.15. At approximately the same time, the PF transmitted ‘mayday, mayday, mayday can you hear me?'.
Following the initiation of the turn back to DXB, having been cleared to 27,000 ft, the crew requested an expedited, immediate descent to 10,000 feet (ft).
Following ATC clearance, the flight crew initiated a rapid descent to 10,000 ft. BAH-C advised the crew that the aircraft was on a direct heading to DXB and cleared for landing on DXB runway 12 left (RW12L) at their discretion.
The Fire Main Deck checklist was activated. According to the system logic, the cabin began to depressurise, PACKS 2 and 3 shut down automatically, and PACK 2 and 3 positions were then manually selected to OFF on the overhead panel in accordance with the checklist instructions. 6/7/8
Based on the DFDR data, at 15:15 UTC, PACK 1 shut down, with no corresponding discussion recorded on the CVR.
A short interval after the AP was disengaged, the CAPT informed the F/O that there was limited pitch control of the aircraft in the manual flying mode, the CAPT then requested the F/O to determine the cause of the pitch control anomaly.
The DFDR data indicates that there was a control column movement anomaly between the input by the crew on the control column forward and aft and the corresponding elevator movement: the elevator was not deflecting to the required range of travel relative to the control inputs.
During the turn back to DXB, the AP was re-engaged, and the aircraft descent was stabilised at 15:17 UTC.
At 15:17 UTC the CAPT told the F/O to pull the smoke evacuation handle 9 . This was not part of the Fire Main Deck Non-Normal checklist.
The CAPT informed BAH-C that the cockpit was ‘full of smoke' and commented to the F/O about the inability to see the instruments.
The CAPT instructed the F/O to input DXB into the Flight Management System (FMS). The F/O acknowledged the request and commented about the increasing flight deck temperature. It was not clear from the CVR if the FMS was programmed for DXB, although the DFDR indicated that the ILS/VOR frequency was changed to 110.1 MHz which was the frequency for DXB RW12L.
Based on the information available to date, it is likely that less than 5 minutes after the fire indication on the main deck, smoke had entered the flight deck and intermittently degraded the visibility to the extent that the flight instruments could not effectively be monitored by the crew.
At approximately 15:19 UTC, during the emergency descent, at approximately 20,000 ft cabin altitude, the CAPT, as PF, declared a lack of oxygen supply.
Following a brief exchange between the CAPT and F/O regarding the need for oxygen, the CAPT transferred control of the aircraft to the F/O as PF. Portable oxygen is located on the flight deck and in the supernumerary area, aft of the flight crew's positions when seated.
At this point the recorded CVR is consistent with the CAPT leaving his seat, after which there is no further CVR information that indicates any further interaction from the CAPT for the remainder of the flight.
TRANSIT FROM THE BAHRAIN TO EMIRATES FIR
The normal procedural requirement of transiting into the Emirates FIR, inbound for DXB was a radio frequency change from BAH-C to UAE-C.
At 15:20 UTC, BAH-C advised the crew to contact UAE-C with a frequency change to 132.15. At approximately the same time, the PF transmitted ‘mayday, mayday, mayday can you hear me?'.
04-04-2011, 11:37 PM
#8
Where's my Mai Tai?
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10
The PF advised BAH-C that due to the smoke in the flight deck, the ability to view the cockpit instruments, the Flight Management System (FMS), Audio Control Panel (ACP) and radio frequency selection displays had been compromised.
At 15:21 UTC, the PF advised BAH-C that they would stay on the BAH-C frequency as it was not possible to see the radios. The PF elected to remain on the BAH-C radio frequency for the duration of the flight.
At approximately 15:22 UTC the aircraft entered the Emirates FIR heading east, tracking direct to the DXB RW12L intermediate approach fix. The aircraft was now out of effective VHF radio range with BAH-C. In order for the crew to communicate with BAH-C, Bahrain advised transiting aircraft that they would act as a communication relay between BAH-C and the emergency aircraft 10 .
At 15:22 UTC, the F/O informed the relay aircraft that he was ‘looking for some oxygen'. During this time, UAE-C transmitted to the A/C on the guard frequency 121.5. The PF did not transmit an acknowledgement on the guard frequency but did transmit on 121.5 at a later point. The relay aircraft confirmed to UAE-C that the emergency aircraft was transmitting on the BAH-C frequency.
Following the rapid descent to 10,000 ft the aircraft leveled off at the assigned altitude approximately 84NM from DXB.
At approximately 15:26 UTC, the PF requested immediate vectors to the nearest airport and advised he would need radar guidance due to difficulty viewing the instruments.
At around 15:33 UTC, approximately 26 NM from DXB, the aircraft descended to 9000 ft, followed by a further gradual descent as the aircraft approached DXB, inbound for RW12L. The speed of the aircraft was approximately 340 kts.
APPROACH TO DUBAI AND OVER FLIGHT OF DXB RW 12L
15:38 UTC, approximately 10NM from RW12L, BAH-C, through the relay aircraft, advised the crew the aircraft was too high and too fast and requested the PF to perform a 360° turn if able. The PF responded ‘Negative'.
At this time the DFDR data indicated the gear lever was selected down, the speed brake lever moved toward extend and at approximately the same time there was a sound consistent with the flap handle movement; shortly afterward the PF indicated that the landing gear was not functioning.
The aircraft over flew the DXB northern airport boundary on a heading of 117°, the aircraft speed and altitude, based on the radar plots and DFDR information, was 340 kts at an altitude of 4500 ft and descending.
Following the over flight of DXB, on passing the south eastern end of RW12L, the aircraft was cleared direct to Sharjah Airport (SHJ) as an immediate alternate – SHJ was to the aircraft's left and the SHJ runway was a parallel vector. The relay pilot asked the PF if it was possible to perform a left hand turn. The PF responded requesting the heading to SHJ.
SHARJAH ALTERNATE/RIGHT HAND DESCENDING TURN
The PF was advised that SHJ was at 095° from the current position at 10 NM and that this left hand turn would position the aircraft on final approach for SHJ (RW30).
The PF acknowledged the heading change for SHJ. The PF selected 195° degrees on the Mode Control Panel (MCP), The AP disconnected at 15:40 UTC, the aircraft then entered a descending right hand turn at an altitude of 4000 ft as the speed gradually reduced to 240 kts until the impact.
The PF advised BAH-C that due to the smoke in the flight deck, the ability to view the cockpit instruments, the Flight Management System (FMS), Audio Control Panel (ACP) and radio frequency selection displays had been compromised.
At 15:21 UTC, the PF advised BAH-C that they would stay on the BAH-C frequency as it was not possible to see the radios. The PF elected to remain on the BAH-C radio frequency for the duration of the flight.
At approximately 15:22 UTC the aircraft entered the Emirates FIR heading east, tracking direct to the DXB RW12L intermediate approach fix. The aircraft was now out of effective VHF radio range with BAH-C. In order for the crew to communicate with BAH-C, Bahrain advised transiting aircraft that they would act as a communication relay between BAH-C and the emergency aircraft 10 .
At 15:22 UTC, the F/O informed the relay aircraft that he was ‘looking for some oxygen'. During this time, UAE-C transmitted to the A/C on the guard frequency 121.5. The PF did not transmit an acknowledgement on the guard frequency but did transmit on 121.5 at a later point. The relay aircraft confirmed to UAE-C that the emergency aircraft was transmitting on the BAH-C frequency.
Following the rapid descent to 10,000 ft the aircraft leveled off at the assigned altitude approximately 84NM from DXB.
At approximately 15:26 UTC, the PF requested immediate vectors to the nearest airport and advised he would need radar guidance due to difficulty viewing the instruments.
At around 15:33 UTC, approximately 26 NM from DXB, the aircraft descended to 9000 ft, followed by a further gradual descent as the aircraft approached DXB, inbound for RW12L. The speed of the aircraft was approximately 340 kts.
APPROACH TO DUBAI AND OVER FLIGHT OF DXB RW 12L
15:38 UTC, approximately 10NM from RW12L, BAH-C, through the relay aircraft, advised the crew the aircraft was too high and too fast and requested the PF to perform a 360° turn if able. The PF responded ‘Negative'.
At this time the DFDR data indicated the gear lever was selected down, the speed brake lever moved toward extend and at approximately the same time there was a sound consistent with the flap handle movement; shortly afterward the PF indicated that the landing gear was not functioning.
The aircraft over flew the DXB northern airport boundary on a heading of 117°, the aircraft speed and altitude, based on the radar plots and DFDR information, was 340 kts at an altitude of 4500 ft and descending.
Following the over flight of DXB, on passing the south eastern end of RW12L, the aircraft was cleared direct to Sharjah Airport (SHJ) as an immediate alternate – SHJ was to the aircraft's left and the SHJ runway was a parallel vector. The relay pilot asked the PF if it was possible to perform a left hand turn. The PF responded requesting the heading to SHJ.
SHARJAH ALTERNATE/RIGHT HAND DESCENDING TURN
The PF was advised that SHJ was at 095° from the current position at 10 NM and that this left hand turn would position the aircraft on final approach for SHJ (RW30).
The PF acknowledged the heading change for SHJ. The PF selected 195° degrees on the Mode Control Panel (MCP), The AP disconnected at 15:40 UTC, the aircraft then entered a descending right hand turn at an altitude of 4000 ft as the speed gradually reduced to 240 kts until the impact.
04-04-2011, 11:38 PM
#9
Where's my Mai Tai?
Joined APC: Aug 2006
Position: fins to the left, fins to the right
Posts: 1,723
Several Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) 11 caution messages were audible on the CVR indicating: Sink Rate, Too Low Terrain and Bank Angle warnings.
Radar contact was lost at approximately 15:41 UTC. The aircraft crashed 9nm south of DXB onto a military installation.
Radar contact was lost at approximately 15:41 UTC. The aircraft crashed 9nm south of DXB onto a military installation.
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