NC Citation crash Friday
03-21-2012, 04:18 AM
#11
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Joined APC: May 2006
Position: ATP, CFI etc.
Posts: 6,056
Originally Posted by Adlerdriver
Forming your own theories in private is not necessarily harmful.
Forming them and making them public on a open access forum can be.
The big difference between your speculati......I mean forming theories and the "pros" you mentioned is that they actually examine evidence BEFORE they develop theories.
Forming them and making them public on a open access forum can be.
The big difference between your speculati......I mean forming theories and the "pros" you mentioned is that they actually examine evidence BEFORE they develop theories.
03-21-2012, 06:01 AM
#12
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2007
Position: 767 Captain
Posts: 3,988
Originally Posted by Cubdriver
No need for secrecy about theories. No one is taking them very seriously here because the evidence is obviously pretty scarce. It will be a year or more before NTSB gives us theirs which may only be a good theory as well. On the other hand, sharing ideas about safety can help make us safer pilots. You are welcome to share your theory- we are all ears. Perhaps you think mine was good enough?
Sharing ideas about safety is fine. However, I don't see the point in sharing ideas about an event that didn't happen the way you assume.
Until we know what these pilots actually did, the decisions they made and what external factors contributed to the outcome, what is there to discuss? You said yourself that evidence is scarce and no one's taking your theories too seriously. So, what's the point?
You want to have a discourse about operating into airports where terrain is an issue or the value of stabilized approaches? Let's do it. That option is available anytime. We don't need to start rumors about a crash currently under investigation in order to discuss safety issues.
03-23-2012, 08:07 AM
#13
New boss = Old boss
Joined APC: Mar 2005
Position: Ca B737
Posts: 2,762
Come on Adlerdriver. Stop with the sanctimonious rhetoric. It's human nature to speculate. It's a kind of commiserating.
What we know so far:
The first approach was way too high. Eyewitnesses say he was 2000 feet above the ground as he crossed the threshold. (I'm thinking that's probably wrong).
He made a tight decending turn for a second attempt.
His landing speed was too high and he touched nose gear first.
The right wing dipped and the jet cartwheeled in a fireball.
It was a single pilot Citation.
All this criticism for those who speculate about causes of crashes has always bothered me. We are not laymen. We know something about airplanes and pilots. We are in a position to speculate. It's just speculation after all and we all know it. Any "outside" reader of this forum looking for an answer is not going to find it here. Speculation is just that. There are no answers here.
I, for one, have formed an opinion about this crash. If I'm proven wrong after the investigation is complete, I'll say to myself, "Huh, how about that." I'll learn from the experience and move on. You know what though? I'm usually right. I'll bet you are too.
OK go ahead and flame me. I'm expecting it. You see, that too is human nature.
What we know so far:
The first approach was way too high. Eyewitnesses say he was 2000 feet above the ground as he crossed the threshold. (I'm thinking that's probably wrong).
He made a tight decending turn for a second attempt.
His landing speed was too high and he touched nose gear first.
The right wing dipped and the jet cartwheeled in a fireball.
It was a single pilot Citation.
All this criticism for those who speculate about causes of crashes has always bothered me. We are not laymen. We know something about airplanes and pilots. We are in a position to speculate. It's just speculation after all and we all know it. Any "outside" reader of this forum looking for an answer is not going to find it here. Speculation is just that. There are no answers here.
I, for one, have formed an opinion about this crash. If I'm proven wrong after the investigation is complete, I'll say to myself, "Huh, how about that." I'll learn from the experience and move on. You know what though? I'm usually right. I'll bet you are too.
OK go ahead and flame me. I'm expecting it. You see, that too is human nature.
03-23-2012, 09:22 AM
#14
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2007
Position: 767 Captain
Posts: 3,988
No flaming from me. Do what you want.
Your definition of what you "know" and mine differ. I'll be happy to speculate/discuss theories, whatever, face to face with other pilots over a cold one. I've learned a great deal in that environment. I just don't think it's the best way to go here on this forum.
I'll be the first in line to sh*t on some dumbass that hurts the rep of our profession by killing himself and his pax with poor judgment. I just think we owe it to all our brother pilots to avoid the dogpile until we know the facts (eyewitnesses don't count - we all know how accurate they can be). I know I'd appreciate the same courtesy if I wind up in a smokin' hole.
Your definition of what you "know" and mine differ. I'll be happy to speculate/discuss theories, whatever, face to face with other pilots over a cold one. I've learned a great deal in that environment. I just don't think it's the best way to go here on this forum.
I'll be the first in line to sh*t on some dumbass that hurts the rep of our profession by killing himself and his pax with poor judgment. I just think we owe it to all our brother pilots to avoid the dogpile until we know the facts (eyewitnesses don't count - we all know how accurate they can be). I know I'd appreciate the same courtesy if I wind up in a smokin' hole.
03-23-2012, 10:06 AM
#15
New boss = Old boss
Joined APC: Mar 2005
Position: Ca B737
Posts: 2,762
Originally Posted by Adlerdriver
(eyewitnesses don't count - we all know how accurate they can be). I know I'd appreciate the same courtesy if I wind up in a smokin' hole.
03-23-2012, 02:04 PM
#16
Moderator
Joined APC: May 2006
Position: ATP, CFI etc.
Posts: 6,056
The idea is to not end up in smoking hole by use of thoughtful discussions of what probably happened. I am the last person who wants to enjoy the ill-fortune of another. I have been witness to deadly accidents of my friends- I lost a close skydiver friend last year for one, and I know that poor speculation and speculation placing the blame where it should not placed is offensive. We have to avoid doing that. But I agree with Mike it is natural to explore mishaps and aviation forums are a valid place to do it. The family does not have to be here. Perhaps they would want to be here if the discussion was thoughtful and sincere enough. After all, they are not getting an NTSB report any sooner than the rest of us.
02-15-2013, 06:31 AM
#17
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Position: ATP, CFI etc.
Posts: 6,056
Looks like the official study is in on this tragedy.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Citation's hot, high approach ends in tragedy
(D.J.Kenny, AOPA Online, 02/15/13) The numbers don’t leave much room for argument. In light airplanes, accidents are most common but least severe during landings. Of the more than 4,000 landing accidents over the past 10 years, less than two percent were fatal. And there’s little doubt that jets offer huge safety advantages over piston engines or even turboprops. In 2010, there was just one accident involving a certified passenger jet flown under Part 91. But landing a jet requires considerably more precision than setting down your typical piston single. They don’t slow down easily—after all, they’re designed to go fast—so exact control of airspeed, altitude, and descent path are all crucial to putting the mains on the intended touchdown point. An extra 10 knots may increase the landing distance by 1,000 feet. So can crossing the threshold just 50 feet too high. Coming in hot and high is a poor practice in any airplane; in a jet, it can eat up an awful lot of runway...
NTSB Identification: ERA12FA225
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, March 15, 2012 in Franklin, NC
Probable Cause Approval Date: 01/15/2013
Aircraft: CESSNA 501, registration: N7700T
Injuries: 5 Fatal.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report. The pilot was not familiar with the mountain airport. The airplane was high during the first visual approach to the runway. The pilot performed a go-around and the airplane was again high for the second approach. During the second approach, the approach angle steepened, and the airplane pitched nose-down toward the runway. The nosegear touched down about halfway down the runway followed by main gear touchdown. The airplane then bounced and the sound of engine noise increased as the airplane banked right and the right wing contacted the ground. The airplane subsequently flipped over and off the right side of the runway, and a postcrash fire ensued. Examination of the airframe and engines did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The examination also revealed that the right engine thrust reverser was deployed during the impact sequence, and the left engine thrust reverser was stowed. Although manufacturer data revealed single-engine reversing has been demonstrated during normal landings and is easily controllable, the airplane had already porpoised and bounced during the landing. The pilot’s subsequent activation of only the right engine’s thrust reverser would have created an asymmetrical thrust and most likely exacerbated an already uncontrolled touchdown. Had the touchdown been controlled, the airplane could have stopped on the remaining runway or the pilot could have performed a go-around uneventfully.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The pilot's failure to achieve a stabilized approach, resulting in a nose-first, bounced landing. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's activation of only one thrust reverser, resulting in asymmetrical thrust.
Full narrative available
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Citation's hot, high approach ends in tragedy
(D.J.Kenny, AOPA Online, 02/15/13) The numbers don’t leave much room for argument. In light airplanes, accidents are most common but least severe during landings. Of the more than 4,000 landing accidents over the past 10 years, less than two percent were fatal. And there’s little doubt that jets offer huge safety advantages over piston engines or even turboprops. In 2010, there was just one accident involving a certified passenger jet flown under Part 91. But landing a jet requires considerably more precision than setting down your typical piston single. They don’t slow down easily—after all, they’re designed to go fast—so exact control of airspeed, altitude, and descent path are all crucial to putting the mains on the intended touchdown point. An extra 10 knots may increase the landing distance by 1,000 feet. So can crossing the threshold just 50 feet too high. Coming in hot and high is a poor practice in any airplane; in a jet, it can eat up an awful lot of runway...
NTSB Identification: ERA12FA225
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, March 15, 2012 in Franklin, NC
Probable Cause Approval Date: 01/15/2013
Aircraft: CESSNA 501, registration: N7700T
Injuries: 5 Fatal.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report. The pilot was not familiar with the mountain airport. The airplane was high during the first visual approach to the runway. The pilot performed a go-around and the airplane was again high for the second approach. During the second approach, the approach angle steepened, and the airplane pitched nose-down toward the runway. The nosegear touched down about halfway down the runway followed by main gear touchdown. The airplane then bounced and the sound of engine noise increased as the airplane banked right and the right wing contacted the ground. The airplane subsequently flipped over and off the right side of the runway, and a postcrash fire ensued. Examination of the airframe and engines did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The examination also revealed that the right engine thrust reverser was deployed during the impact sequence, and the left engine thrust reverser was stowed. Although manufacturer data revealed single-engine reversing has been demonstrated during normal landings and is easily controllable, the airplane had already porpoised and bounced during the landing. The pilot’s subsequent activation of only the right engine’s thrust reverser would have created an asymmetrical thrust and most likely exacerbated an already uncontrolled touchdown. Had the touchdown been controlled, the airplane could have stopped on the remaining runway or the pilot could have performed a go-around uneventfully.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The pilot's failure to achieve a stabilized approach, resulting in a nose-first, bounced landing. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's activation of only one thrust reverser, resulting in asymmetrical thrust.
Full narrative available
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