SWA LGA Gear Up Landing
#201
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2005
Posts: 8,902
Correct, and KTVU released it after verifying with an individual with the NTSB. Now granted, they didn't ask about the qualifications of the individual but the fact remains a NTSB personnel did confirm those names for KTVU.
#202
Must be True
Sincerely,
Ho Lee Fuk,
Station Manager
KTVU
Chanel 2, Oakland
"All the news, whether it's accurate or not".
#204
NTSB ISSUES SECOND INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE ON SOUTHWEST AIRLINES ACCIDENT IN NEW YORK
August 6, 2013
WASHINGTON – In its continuing investigation of the July 22 accident in which Southwest Airlines flight 345, a B-737-700, landed hard at New York’s LaGuardia Airport (LGA), the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:
• The captain has been with Southwest for almost 13 years and has been a captain for six of those years. The captain has over 12,000 total flight hours, over 7,000 of which are as pilot-in-command. In 737s, the captain has over 7,900 hours, with more than 2,600 as the pilot-in-command.
• The first officer has been with Southwest for about 18 months. The pilot has about 5,200 total flight hours, with 4,000 of those as pilot-in-command. In 737s, the first officer has about 1,100 hours, none of which are as the pilot-in-command.
• This was the first trip the flight crew had flown together and it was the second leg of the trip. The first officer had previous operational experience at LGA, including six flights in 2013. The captain reported having flown into LGA twice, including the accident flight, serving as the pilot monitoring for both flights.
• The en route phase of the flight, which originated in Nashville, was characterized by the flight crew as routine. On approach into LGA, the first officer was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. SWA 345 was cleared for the ILS Runway 04 approach.
• The weather in the New York area caused the accident flight to enter a holding pattern for about 15 minutes. The crew reported that they saw the airport from about 5-10 miles out and that the airplane was on speed, course and glideslope down to about 200-400 feet.
• The crew reported that below 1,000 feet, the tailwind was about 11 knots. They also reported that the wind on the runway was a headwind of about 11 knots.
• SWA 345 proceeded on the approach when at a point below 400 feet, there was an exchange of control of the airplane and the captain became the flying pilot and made the landing.
• The jetliner touched down on the runway nose first followed by the collapse of the nose gear; the airplane was substantially damaged.
At this point in the investigation, no mechanical anomalies or malfunctions have been found. A preliminary examination of the nose gear indicated that it failed due to stress overload.
Investigators have collected five videos showing various aspects of the crash landing. The team will be analyzing these recordings in the coming months.
Parties to the investigation are the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Southwest Airlines, and the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association.
This is a factual update only and no interviews are being conducted.
August 6, 2013
WASHINGTON – In its continuing investigation of the July 22 accident in which Southwest Airlines flight 345, a B-737-700, landed hard at New York’s LaGuardia Airport (LGA), the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:
• The captain has been with Southwest for almost 13 years and has been a captain for six of those years. The captain has over 12,000 total flight hours, over 7,000 of which are as pilot-in-command. In 737s, the captain has over 7,900 hours, with more than 2,600 as the pilot-in-command.
• The first officer has been with Southwest for about 18 months. The pilot has about 5,200 total flight hours, with 4,000 of those as pilot-in-command. In 737s, the first officer has about 1,100 hours, none of which are as the pilot-in-command.
• This was the first trip the flight crew had flown together and it was the second leg of the trip. The first officer had previous operational experience at LGA, including six flights in 2013. The captain reported having flown into LGA twice, including the accident flight, serving as the pilot monitoring for both flights.
• The en route phase of the flight, which originated in Nashville, was characterized by the flight crew as routine. On approach into LGA, the first officer was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. SWA 345 was cleared for the ILS Runway 04 approach.
• The weather in the New York area caused the accident flight to enter a holding pattern for about 15 minutes. The crew reported that they saw the airport from about 5-10 miles out and that the airplane was on speed, course and glideslope down to about 200-400 feet.
• The crew reported that below 1,000 feet, the tailwind was about 11 knots. They also reported that the wind on the runway was a headwind of about 11 knots.
• SWA 345 proceeded on the approach when at a point below 400 feet, there was an exchange of control of the airplane and the captain became the flying pilot and made the landing.
• The jetliner touched down on the runway nose first followed by the collapse of the nose gear; the airplane was substantially damaged.
At this point in the investigation, no mechanical anomalies or malfunctions have been found. A preliminary examination of the nose gear indicated that it failed due to stress overload.
Investigators have collected five videos showing various aspects of the crash landing. The team will be analyzing these recordings in the coming months.
Parties to the investigation are the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Southwest Airlines, and the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association.
This is a factual update only and no interviews are being conducted.
#206
Can't abide NAI
Joined APC: Jun 2007
Position: Douglas Aerospace post production Flight Test & Work Around Engineering bulletin dissembler
Posts: 11,999
#207
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jun 2010
Position: Doing what you do, for less.
Posts: 1,792
No kidding. Sooner or later that culture is going to end up killing a lot of people. And its going to be really sad because of how preventable it should've been.
#208
It always feels righteous to point out the mistakes of a competitor with a good overall safety record until you wake up one morning, flip on the TV, and see it is your company's turn for a big CNN event.
#209
And of those 3, MDW, was hardly caused by "rushing". Have you read the final report? I have. They were on speed, fully stabilized and in the touch-down zone. They landed on a runway that turned out to be (shockingly) far more degraded than was reported by the tower, with unknown flawed performance data from the OPC.
Curious how very few remember things like this;
Pan Am Flight 759 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
PanAm 759 took-off from MSY in to a TRW that tragically encountered an unrecoverable microburst killing all 145 onboard and 8 on the ground. A Southwest flight departing to HOU was first offered that same take-off clearance - and refused it -due to what the crew observed outside. It was then offered to and accepted by the #2 in line - Clipper 759.
Cowboys all I tell ya'.
Last edited by 4th Level; 08-08-2013 at 03:01 AM.
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