Whatever it is, it's far less than the lawsuits from the family members of the dead.

 

Darn right. Pilots should file ASAPs if they have to file reports for GAs...for the simple fact they have to file a report. Any organization that requires that or pseudo-requires it should be reported (via ASAP). Pilots should keep reporting it until it changes.

 

Never heard of anyone getting in trouble for a go-around, however with the utilization of FOQA data I have heard of fellow aviators getting called about a GA or worse getting called about an unstable approach that warranted a GA but crew elected to continue!!

 

I happen to be someone who is probably alive today only because the pilot in the aircraft behind me decided to go around. At a non-towered field, he was in a high-performance biplane, had switched to CTAF too late to hear my report, and he couldn't see a darn thing. He had done a carrier-style approach that kept me out of his line of sight the entire time. He felt my propwash during his flare to land, decided that was unusual, and went around. Witnesses say he missed me by less than three feet. I went for a very wild cross-country ride as a result of his propwash, but I managed to not break anything.

When in doubt, and not on fire or landing dead-engine dead-stick, just go around. To paraphrase: "Better to be criticized by twelve than carried by six".

 

Happens more than one would think.

Plane lands on top of another in Texas crash - Telegraph

When I did tailwheel training my instructor would always emphasize using a slip if you needed to see around the nose. Some people did this routinely turning a bit sideways for a bit. Why did the landing aircraft not make position announcement?

 

Not on the Stinson, man.

 

Going down this thread, three considerations come to mind.

The late landing clearance:

ORD was (is?) notorious for issuing a landing clearance just about the time you flare; on more than one occasion, after touchdown - and everybody knew it was best to say nothing. It was the consequence of tight spacing or slower than expected exiting of the preceding landing. It's pointless to suggest that a landing clearance should be requested because the controller won't issue it until the previous landing clears the runway, even if you could get a word in - which you usually can't. Do these situations call for a go-around? Once again, it's a judgment call. Hard rules and analytical thinking would be useless here too, even absurd.

The "unstable approach" argument:

To assess these intangible facets of the approach we have two techniques. One is the above referenced flagging technique. Its purpose is to signal circumstances and events often observed in situational patterns known to be dangerous. Since we consciously look for these flags, the flagging technique significantly improves our ability to spot some dangerous developments. However, it also has potentially dangerous drawbacks of its own. First, over-dependence on such flags might lull us into a false sense of security. The absence of any Red Flags might tempt us to believe we have a green light, that all is well. Such delusions can then lead to even greater danger than the danger Red Flags were intended to signal. If we commit most of our mental resources looking for specific details (signs of danger), we load up our cognition and risk not only missing opportunities but also losing our situation awareness. Loss of situation gestalt(67) can result in sailing into dangerous waters, totally oblivious to developing conditions. Therefore, if we do depend on the flagging technique to keep us out of trouble, our first Red Flag should be "Fixation on Red Flags."

Second, mindless, robot-like knee-jerk reactions to Red Flags can lead to depletion of options. It might be fine to go-around if the speed gets out of tolerance during an approach, but there is no guarantee better speed control will be attained on subsequent approaches—at destination or the alternate (airport). And at some point, we have to land before we run out of fuel. Every missed approach in response to an "Unstable speed" or "Unstable profile" Red Flag reduces the number of our options or, at the very least, the combined values of remaining options. At some point we must choose between the risks of an unstable approach and running out of gas.

Here, too, pilots must look beyond the obvious, beyond the immediate, early enough to get the bulk of decisionmaking work done before they reach the critical point - where the flight is irreversibly committed. Just as go/no-go decisionmaking begins before brake release, land/go-around decisionmaking begins before starting the approach. Contrary to popular belief, decisions should be made at the earliest opportunity to avoid the "old maid syndrome." Those who delay their decision until the last possible opportunity to keep as many options open as possible oftentimes end up with none.

The requirement to "justify" either a go-around or no go-around:

This topic is far too complex to fit in here. Let it suffice to say that any requirement, be it explicit or subtle, to justify any operational decision, is not only unjust for the pilot, but also a disservice to the Air Carrier. It forces line pilots to conform rather than perform. The PIC is by law responsible (must bear the consequences of) for his decisions, but not accountable (not required to give an account of - though it may be to his benefit to do so).

The disastrous consequence for the Air Carrier is that his line captains might make living up to staff expectations their priorities and substitute decisions they can justify for decisions that get the job done. The pilot who falls victim to this pressure will follow the prescribed process rather than strive to complete his mission. Although he might be dead, he will always have a good excuse.

(67) Structure or configuration of… phenomena so integrated as to constitute a functional unit with properties not derivable from its parts in summation (Merriam-Webster).

(Italicized text from "Beyond Stick-and-Rudder")

 

It's been several years now, so my memory is not rock solid. I suppose I could go look up the detailed Nasagram I filed...

Failing that, I think the other aircraft DID announce that he was "on final", but I didn't connect his tail number to his aircraft type, nor did I know he was making a carrier-style approach and was utterly unable to see any traffic ahead of him, so it never occurred to me that I needed to tell him what he could surely see for himself, that there was a PA-12 on short final. I also had no way to tell that he had switched to CTAF too late to hear my report.

Then too, as it turned out, this particular pilot had 12,000+ hours in advanced acrobatic aircraft, so regardless of anything logical, he was God, and he let you know it in no uncertain terms. It was too bad, because with his arrogance, he forever tarnished the reputation of what is probably generally a pretty good group of pilots. Even so, I'm still glad he decided to go around.