I fly a 350, and you can hardly see in the tanks. Maybe at night with a flashlight and you hold down the little flap door under the fuel cap. But during the day its near impossible to see inside. And yes, you need a ladder. The fuel gauges are very accurate in the King Airs. Is it normal procedure? As far as I know, no its not. Definitely seems like this guy just cuts corners if you ask me. The most foolish mistake one could make is running out of fuel... Especially not even half way through the flight...

NTSB report n the KA-http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief2.aspx?ev_id=20001211X11244&ntsbno=DEN99LA014 &akey=1

He had mistaken the 600lbs indication for fuel in the aux tanks since they max out at 600. King air's take from the aux's first. The gauges go to zero and then back again to indicate the fuel in the other tanks when the toggle switch is chosen. He decided that meant he had fuel in the mains as well and didnt check further to confirm how much. Unfortunately, his first gauge check that had shown 600lbs, was actually the mains. King airs show the mains first, only when the toggle switch is held down do they show the aux's. He had mistaken this first indication for the aux's. And just assumed there was more fuel in the mains. But why he didnt check to make sure he had at least another hour of fuel plus reserves ontop of the 600lbs is beyond me.
So no fuel was actually in the aux's. I find it very alarming this guy was flying a King air and couldnt figure out how to read the fuel indication correctly or properly plan for fuel consumption. Day one at FSI would cover that. Did he even get any training in the king air?
King airs burn about 600lbs an hour during the first hour due to climb fuel burns. So dual failure at 60mins, makes perfect sense.

As for whether or not this has anything to do with the jet accident, only time will tell. But it wouldnt surprise me if some kind of pilot error or lack of preflight actions was the cause due to his past with the King air.

 

I don't visually check the fuel in the tanks (mains or auxs) of our 300s, but there are numerous checks of the fuel quantity in the checklist prior to takeoff and when completing the cruise checklist once leveled off. We also have a fuel totalizer (guess this is not common) which is very accurate and the fuel taken on is compared with the expected required when paying for the fuel.

 

Yeah, same here. So many fuel checks, fuel totalizer, total burned, total remaining. I cant imagine how someone could screw that up.
I think I have ran into you at an airport recently...

 

If so I must have been opposite direction
Pattern entry? Baugh Hum Bug!

 

NTSB Identification: ERA14FA073
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, December 17, 2013 in Atlanta, GA
Aircraft: RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY 390, registration: N50PM
Injuries: 2 Fatal.


This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On December 17, 2013, about 1924 eastern standard time (EST), a Raytheon Aircraft Company 390 Premier 1, N50PM, was destroyed when it impacted trees, terrain, and was consumed by a postcrash fire, while returning to land on runway 26 at Fulton County Airport – Brown Field (FTY), Atlanta, Georgia. The airplane had departed a few minutes prior. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the flight to New Orleans Lake Front Airport (NEW), New Orleans, Louisiana. The private pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.


According to voice recordings obtained from the air traffic control tower (ATCT), the accident flight was given a departure heading of 290 degrees and was cleared for takeoff. Immediately after takeoff the pilot requested to return to the airport; however, he did not request any assistance after being queried by an ATCT controller. The pilot was given instructions to enter the right downwind for runway 26 and was told to follow landing traffic; no further transmissions were recorded from the flight.


According to an eyewitness that lived next to the accident location, the airplane struck a tree and veered to the right and subsequently impacted the ground.

According to written statements provided by line personnel at the fixed base operator (FBO) where the airplane had been fueled, they had towed, or repositioned, the airplane to their ramp from a nearby service center and parked it on their ramp area about 1720. The accident pilot contacted the FBO about 1740 and requested 125 gallons of Jet-A fuel with prist, to be loaded into each wing. The pilot and passenger arrived at the airplane about 1900, loaded their baggage inside the airplane cabin, and departed the ramp area about 15 minutes later.


The wreckage debris field was about 260 feet in length, on a course of 095 degrees, and was located about 3 miles to the northeast of the intended landing runway. The airplane impacted a tree about 80 feet above ground level and the left wingtip and navigation light were located at the base of the initial tree impact location. Another tree strike was located about 100 feet from the initial impact location and the right wing navigation light was located in the immediate vicinity. Subsequently, the airplane impacted the ground in a nose down inverted attitude and then came to rest approximately 50 feet away on a heading of 289 degrees. Ground scaring and burn patterns are consistent with a postcrash explosion and fire.

The cockpit voice recorder, enhanced ground proximity warning system, and two primary flight displays, were sent to the NTSB Recorders Laboratory for download.