Yes you did. Again, during training students don't have contact, as a working crewmember, with the company's passengers.

Look, I've been in this business for over 30 years. I've seen PhD’s hired who aced their ATP writtens. These same people aced their periodic company written exams throughout training but ultimately washed out because they lacked the ability to perform to standards in the cockpit

The real weeding process starts with the company oral, progresses with simulator training, and checking, line training, and then the ultimate line check which is the final check.

If HR wants desires to waste company’s money by hiring those who fail their ATP written, nor have an aptitude to fly an airplane, then so be it.

What lacks in a number of carriers is a strong check airmen group. That is the last line of defence to weed out those who do not make the grade from the fare paying customers.

No... that's part and parcel of the whole thing. My point is that the training and ultimately the checking process at Colgan concerning the crew of the ill fated flight has failed the general public.

Whats with all you clowns who think there was 1 cause and 1 solution?

Really?

Reading through this thread I cant believe the number of you saying things like "no that wasn't the cause, this was" or "no you dont need to do that to fix it, you need to do this."

Airplane accidents are always the result of a chain of events, and the solution to preventing similar accidents in the future is always multi-faceted.

I agree with what you have posted, but then that would mean that Colgan's interview process was basically a formality, no? I would be upset as a check airman if I was sent a guy who was low-time, failed his intial interview written, and then didnt know how to enter a hold. So what was the point of the interview process? I would think that the liability would be pretty scary for a check airman to even begin trying to train this individual. I guess the chain of events begins when they ignore they interview standards to even go to the check airman.

The interview process is merely a snap shot of an individual at a given point in time. It’s the time where one has the opportunity to audition for a part in the play so to say. Also it give the interviewers to see if the applicant will get along with the other kids in the sand box. So what, a written is failed. So what someone brain fart$ during an interview. Big deal, a question is answered incorrectly. it happens. If previously employed, records from previous carriers or schools will help HR and the hiring board make their decision.

As for the responsibility of the check airman, yes it is a major one. It's up to the check airman to identify not only a deficient airman, but also deficiency in the training that lead to the recommendation for the check ride by the instructor(s) involved.

Interesting. Do you think if the guys at LIT and in Colombia wouldn't have wrecked planes if they had single pilot 135 IFR time? Maybe they did, don't know.

Do you think UAL wouldn't have come close to plowing a 744 into a mountain in SFO if they had that experience?

As blunt as it was, Juice pretty much nailed most of it.

Poor SA, poor decision making, lack of adherence to sops, poor airmanship all sem to be the common theme. A pilot with (insert experience here) is just as capable of killing people as a pilot without (insert experience here).

For the onboard armchair aircraft accident investigator experts:
Discuss the aerodynamics of a split flap upset, look at the PF reactions in the tape, match the timeline with response. Mix that into the stew of speculation, because from training and experience, the crew reacted to the scenario as if believing there was a split flap.

Even at place with unions, you still have punitive sick call policies. Even if the company never intends to punish anyone of calling in sick per their policy, its an intimidation factor and a deterrent.

There is one very important point that is not being discussed or debated that I think is important to consider in this accident. I believe that many of the part 121 stall training procedures are flawed. For example, a common stall recovery procecure is as follows:

1) Slow aircraft to impending stall.
2) At stick shaker, add full power and accelerate in level flight to recover.

This procedure is simple and absolutely correct. BUT, in the 121 training environment, this is performed as a proficiency maneuver. It must be performed with a +/-100 ft. tolerance to 'PASS' the maneuver. Move the control wheel too quickly, and the pusher activates. The pusher will quickly 'BUST' the manuever (more than 100 ft), so the reaction to prevent BUSTING is to pull against the pusher.

This becomes negative training. I have seen it over and over again in the sim. Accidental pusher activation causes immediate JERK/PULL on the control wheel by the pilot. This triggers another pusher activation. And usually another JERK/PULL by the pilot.

This becomes a conditioned response (albeit the incorrect response). It is the fear of a BUST that incorrectly conditions the response to pull on the yolk if the pusher activates.

Now, put this individual in the real world with a real impending stall. And guess what, it is the CONDITIONED RESPONSE that prevails.

I have been through a 121 training program that didn't even demonstate the pusher (only the shaker and the recovery procedure).

In reality, if the pusher activates, the CORRECT response is to allow the control yolk to move FORWARD. Add power, and accept some altitude loss. Smoooooth light control pressure will minimize altitude loss to a couple hundred feet. In our real world operating environment, we almost always have a few hundred (if not a few thousand) feet of margin.

I believe airlines should be training a realistic proper response to pusher activation (not just the shaker). And the proper response to a pusher event is to allow the yolk to move FORWARD.

Yeah no kidding.......I'm saying that there may be a better way to indicate an approaching stall than the stick shaker. In the case of this accident the stall was misidentified or not known at all by both pilots. What are the odds that the only two pilots in all of 121 carriers that don't know how to identify a stall or impending stall flew together that night? I'm betting that there is a shockingly high number of pilots who would react the same way as renslow in that situation.