For those of you wishing to abort every single T/O for a minor abnormality (not associated with a loss of control/power) and ' stretching ' that career by making rash decisions at the cost of your crew/pax...please post your schedules here as to allow us to avoid ever flying on your plane. Thank you !

it better be prior to 80 kts, because that is unacceptable to both the rest of the crew and pax for you to try a high speed abort over a EFIS COMP MON. Who do you fly for so I can avoid your airline?

Hmmmmmmmmmmmmm...........CRJ-200= Not much automation???? EFIS, FMC, Autopilot etc. etc. etc. Wow, how far we have come..............amazing! lol

Well I have been reading this thread since it started, but I hadn't really felt the need to comment till now. Three things I would like add to this.

First, while it is difficult to clearly present intent in a post on a forum, the post you quoted to make this comment was very obviously sarcasm. Please learn to take a joke and laugh once in a while with the rest us.

Second, a few people have questioned aborting a take off for anti-skid. I would like to honestly ask why a person would feel safe continuing a T/O roll with that system now malfunctioned. Braking distance for the abort would be based on the anti-skid working. Now take this scenario. You start your T/O roll on a short runway while right at your runway limited weight. At 90 knots, anti-skid goes out but you decide to continue because that isn't a "loss of control/power". At 90 knots, the RJ can sometimes have 50 knots to go before rotation. Now lets say you are still rolling down the runway and something happens at 130 knots that you do need to abort for. Not likely, but could happen. Do you really think you could stop from that close to V1 with the anti-skid not working???

Now I want to say before someone points it out, that this caution may be inhibited. I would have to dig up my systems book to verify that, but the question still stands for those of you who have said that anti-skid failure wouldn't necessitate a rejected T/O. Just trying to understand the reasoning.


Last, before I ever came to an airline, I was doing training on the Do-Jet for a charter company. My sim partner was an old RJ driver from Independence and he couldn't help but laugh at the differences between the two airplanes. I think he summed it up pretty perfectly when he said the following:

"The CRJ is the most automated airplane ever built that does nothing for you."

Neither EMAS nor any other available Runway Safety Area is factored into any calculations. The aircraft is supposed to be able to perform within the "accelerate-stop distance available," which includes regular pavement and any declared stopway. Of course, that doesn't always happen - hence the need for Runway Safety Area and/or EMAS.

There is no specific equivalency between regular pavement and EMAS. EMAS performs differently for different aircraft, and is designed specifically for the particular runway considering the "critical" aircraft and the fleet mix that use that runway.

Also, regular pavement provides different benefits depending on whether the aircraft brakes are operational. EMAS performs independent of brakes.

That's like saying "I chose to abort at Vr with an engine failure on a short runway because there may have been a flock of birds at 100 feet over the runway which may have caused the other engine to fail if we continued the takeoff and hit them. Not likely but it could happen"

Washington bureaucrats, if you can believe it...

Good analogy. I find it risky to try to bring an airplane to an abrupt halt, when the airplane is trying to tell you that it might have trouble stopping.

I'm glad it all turned out okay. Without second-guessing the crew, it's a chance for all of us to think about what we would do in a similar situation.

During upgrade training, we did a series of possible RTOs. Some serious, some minor, and it was fascinating what some pilots deemed worthy of an high-speed abort. (a lav fire, for example - perhaps an unintended result of abbreviating the takeoff briefing to "fire/failure/loss of directional control")

A high-speed abort (80+ KIAS) is a very, very risky maneuver. Boeing studied RTOs over the past 30 years and found:

• More than half the RTO accidents and incidents reported in the past 30 years were initiated from a speed in excess of V1.
• About one-third were reported as occurring on runways that were wet or contaminated with snow or ice.
• Only slightly more than one-fourth of the accidents and incidents actually involved any loss of engine thrust.
• Nearly one-fourth of the accidents and incidents were the result of wheel or tire failures.
• Approximately 80 percent of the overrun events were potentially avoidable by following appropriate operational practices.

(bold/italics added by me)

I can think of two RTOs I've had: a bird sucked into an engine at 80 knots and a generator failing at 70 knots. With the bird, we were on guard and had discussed the threat prior to takeoff. The gen failure was a surprise, and quite frankly, it took us a few seconds to respond. Good thing it was a long runway and a nice day.

Are you kidding? That's a horrible analogy. Vr is above V1 and I can think of no company anywhere that would say it is ok to abort above V1. Read what CaptainV quoted about aborts above V1.

If you continued a T/O with the anti-skid inop and something happened that led to an abort after that, I guarantee you that the NTSB accident or, if you're lucky, incident report would read something like this:

This accident resulted in large part do to the flight crews decision to continue the T/O roll even after the ability to stop the aircraft was known to be degraded.