This comment just broadcasts your lack of experience. A professional pilots spends years learning to ignore the fight or flight instinct when something goes wrong in a plane. Very few emergencies require immediate action. In fact, many accidents could have been prevented if the crew simply took 30 more seconds to properly identify the problem.

A dual engine failure after takeoff is not something we prepare for. We don't know the exact distance we are from the airport. Making an immediate turn back based on feel would have been a gamble and as the NTSB showed, a risky gamble. Rather than react based on gut instinct, he took more logical actions that had a greater chance of saving the day. He had Skiles attempt an engine start while he asked ATC for landing options. Those actions allowed him to maintain aircraft control rather than run out of energy over a densely populated city.

Do you know the glide ratio of an Airbus? Do you know exactly how far you are from the runway? How much altitude would you lose in a 180 degree turn? That's a lot of information you need to gather (or more likely guess). Maybe in his years of experience, he saw plenty of pilots try to turn back to the airport only to run out of energy and lose control of the plane.

The only reason you "know" he could have turned back was because lots of crews got to practice this in the sim. They had 2 big advantages. 1: They knew both engines were going to fail and 2: They weren't going to kill anyone while they practiced. While you think he is a bad pilot for not instantly making the turn back, the truth is, he was right at the very edge of the window for a possibly return. What you are proposing is the same as a crew guessing where they think V1 is. That is what he had to do. He had to make a judgment call and just like V1, the statistics show that unless you KNOW you are below V1, you are better off continuing.

So unless you know the minimum altitude and speed you need to be to turn back and land for EVERY one of your takeoffs, I wouldn't comment on 1549.

 

Although “system” is part of the acronym, MCAS is not really a system. It’s a computer program that adjusts the flight control logic of the existing system. It’s already been “fixed” from what I understand. Now it just needs to be approved and implemented (tested, etc.). I can’t tell a lot of difference flying the MAX vs a 737-800NG honestly except for the displays. It’s just a little nicer. Running the Stab Runaway checklist should have solved the problem. Leaving the thrust levers at full thrust does not help, however.

At SWA, we were told about MCAS and how to deal with it after the Indonesia crash, btw (before Ethiopian). Was the crew of the second crash really dealing with a “ghost system”, or were they improperly trained?

I guess any additional sim training that comes from this will give us plenty of practice in running the Stab Runaway, watching our speed and turning the trim wheel....


I do agree with you though that they have pushed the 73 about as far as they can/should.

 

Yeah, I get that.



But, the runaway stab procedure is being used for a failed MCAS system. There should be an MCAS fail, AOA fail, or something that tells the crew whats really going on.

I wonder was Boeing being pressured to build this plane for a customer? it didn't need to get built.

We have reached the end of the capability of the B-737. No other versions of the 737 have a need for an MCAS system.

The FAA wanted MCAS on the jet. Heard Boeing didn't even want it. But, they built it. The FAA certified it.

Boeing needs to build the jets for everyone, not just western trained pilots. I feel confident that most US/Canadian/British pilots could handle it. But, what about on a bad day, on a severe wx day? What about in bad turbulence, etc. Still don't like the MCAS system unless it can be disabled and only then with 2 AOA inputs that the brain is smart enough to use one channel if one goes a foul. Or, one, or both can be de-selected by the pilots.

Not loving the design philosophy.

Why was it kept secret? That's an even bigger mystery.

 

It was still a ghost system. Some operators got more inside intel than others. likely because the other accident hasn't gone final on the report.

I forsee lots and lots of training. It is what it is. Boeing may not like it, because they will end up paying for it all, and not the airlines.

But, I also hope that there are some serious changes to MCAS. A single AoA channel into the system that can fail and that can provide bad data is poor indeed. 2 channels, 2 AoA inputs should be SOP, not the exception.

This 737 did not need to be built. No real reason to. The 757 could have been upgraded and the line could have been opened. Boeing engineers need to go to work and start competing with Airbus. The 757 is the answer to a bigger and more capable air-frame in the 170 to 200 seat capacity range. power, legs, lift. great HDA capability, and shorter runway ability. Good capability in the 757 and great stopping ability.

 

You don't seem to know what you are talking about. The 757 cannot be upgraded because there are not enough of them to satisfy the demand for a 150-200 passenger jet. The 757 line cannot be "opened" because they no longer have the jigs or other manufacturing hardware. To re-create all of that would cost nearly as much as developing a brand new airframe.

The 757 is only popular today because they are cheaper than when they were new. Every airline wants a 150-200 passenger jet, but no one wants to pay for a new one. The truth is, a 757 is often more capable than what operators need (or more accurately, want to pay for).

Boeing DID have to create the 737 MAX. The NEO was gaining so many orders that Boeing would have had to give up all narrowbody market share for the next 30 years if they didn't respond fast. Southwest, nor any other airline, told Boeing that it HAD to be a 737. What forced their hand was the market was only willing to pay $120 million per plane. The only way Boeing could do that was to use an already existing production line.

None of that is an excuse for cutting corners and making a poorly designed system to keep the handling characteristics the same in order to avoid simulator training. THAT is where they went wrong.

 

Nope. The FAA did not care. MCAS was not made to keep the 737 MAX stable. It was designed so that it handled the same as any other 737. Without the MCAS, the FAA would have certified it but would have required crews to get difference training. Boeing was trying to avoid that since the NEO didn't need difference training.

No conspiracy theory here. It was not kept a secret. When operators ordered the plane, there was an option to attach MCAS to a second AOA. If MCAS was a secret, why would they have that as an option? The fact that they offered that as an option is odd and I hope we get to learn their reasoning. Also, I'm pretty sure that in the maintenance manuals they have several error codes associated with MCAS. If they were trying to hide MCAS, then that means they would have to hide it from the mechanics too.

There are lots of systems that pilots aren't told about or are overly simplified. That electrical schematic in your manual looks nothing like the actual electrical system. Pilots get the cliff-notes version. If I want to know where the static port for cabin pressure controller 1 is on my plane, my manuals won't help. Does that mean it is a secret? This looks more like an administrative/organization error. Whoever was in charge of updating the pilot manuals either didn't know about MCAS or didn't think it was important. Boeing did make a mistake by not including it, but there is little evidence (and evidence to the contrary) that Boeing was trying to keep it a secret.

 

Negative. I know exactly what I am talking about. Boeing is too lazy to do it right, so they put a bandaid on their lack of vision and call it good. Customers apparently want a longer range jet (than the traditional variants of the 737). Boeing says sure, here comes the max.

Some customers (SWA) only flies the 737, so they really need it. I don't think SWA would buy an upgraded/newer model of the 757 even if it was dirt cheap.

There is information out there that suggests they can reacquire the tooling and jigs necessary to re-open the line.

It doesn't have to be a "cost" issue. Those costs can be passed down to the consumer as they are already.

It should be a quality issue. Boeing hasn't had many difficulties at all with the 757. It's a high quality machine, well designed, and well suited for a variety of missions and it does them economically.

At issue here is the fact that the B-737 maximus is akin to putting the round peg into the square hole.

All those ref speeds are insane....That should be a clue as to the fact that they have stretched, weighted it down, etc to the max.

Now what's holding it up? aerodynamic forces/loads in high speed decent....I guess the trim wheel will be very hard to use in certain scenarios. Is the FAA going to test everyone's upper body strength to insure they can manipulate it?

 

[QUOTE=2StgTurbine;2841553

No conspiracy theory here. It was not kept a secret. When operators ordered the plane, there was an option to attach MCAS to a second AOA. If MCAS was a secret, why would they have that as an option? The fact that they offered that as an option is odd and I hope we get to learn their reasoning. Also, I'm pretty sure that in the maintenance manuals they have several error codes associated with MCAS. If they were trying to hide MCAS, then that means they would have to hide it from the mechanics too.

.[/QUOTE]

What airbus is doing with the NEO shouldn't be of concern to Boeing operators, check airman, or line pilots. Differences training is now a moot point. You're gonna get some training alright.... Lots of it.

The line pilots did not know anything about the options nor AOA criticality to MCAS. Nor MCAS failure modes. Maybe some higher-ups knew about it, but the guys and gals flying the planes didn't get the memo.

There is some reporting, not sure if accurate that suggests that Boeing test pilots were not informed of MCAS.

Is avoiding differences training really that important to Boeing? If they had built the 737 higher off the ground to begin with, back in the junk jet days they would have been able to accommodate a bigger engine and would have had no need to move the motors, and no need for MCAS.

The 757 seems a logical answer for Boeing if they didn't want to do a straight re-design. I don't know if Boeing can recover from a reputation stand-point. Their manufacturing is a mess, their quality control is a mess. That may be indicative of what's going on in the crystal palace. I hope Boeing gets it together.

 

The 757 performed so well, so economically, airlines stopped ordering it until Boeing had to stop making it. It’s not some conspiracy. They build what airlines will buy, and if the 757 was as economical as you say, they’d still be rolling off the line.

 

lots of airframes are parked right now because Boeing wanted to max out the guppy.

Boeing made a business decision. Obvious evidence suggests there were more than one flaw in Boeings approach.

Heck, the lawsuits haven't even come yet. There's no telling what will be brought out in discovery. It may get uglier yet.

The 757 could have gotten even lighter with using composites where appropriate. No one will ever know how economical the 75 could get. There could have been many efficiencies added.