Sully has spoken
#32
Feeling blessed.
Joined APC: Feb 2005
Position: Was I finally in the right place at the right time?
Posts: 537
Y’all are all so smart. Everyone in aviation should come to APC for a consult before they do anything. Nothing has changed here in the 20 years I’ve been apart.
On another note. Al Haynes and crew. Sully is a sissy compared to them.
On another note. Al Haynes and crew. Sully is a sissy compared to them.
#33
Boeing should have stopped with the 700. Everything after has the performance of a long range MD-80.
#34
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jun 2015
Posts: 4,116
The 800 is a pretty versatile and good performing airframe. Can fly short haul or winter westbound transcon.
The 900 is when things start to unravel a bit. Tail strike questions got boeing to fess up they were fudging Vref #s to keep them lower.
Result is 900 crews now use the aoa to cross check calculated Vrefs.
In close one never relaxes with a 900.
The 900 is when things start to unravel a bit. Tail strike questions got boeing to fess up they were fudging Vref #s to keep them lower.
Result is 900 crews now use the aoa to cross check calculated Vrefs.
In close one never relaxes with a 900.
#35
Banned
Joined APC: May 2017
Posts: 733
This comment just broadcasts your lack of experience. A professional pilots spends years learning to ignore the fight or flight instinct when something goes wrong in a plane. Very few emergencies require immediate action. In fact, many accidents could have been prevented if the crew simply took 30 more seconds to properly identify the problem.
A dual engine failure after takeoff is not something we prepare for. We don't know the exact distance we are from the airport. Making an immediate turn back based on feel would have been a gamble and as the NTSB showed, a risky gamble. Rather than react based on gut instinct, he took more logical actions that had a greater chance of saving the day. He had Skiles attempt an engine start while he asked ATC for landing options. Those actions allowed him to maintain aircraft control rather than run out of energy over a densely populated city.
Do you know the glide ratio of an Airbus? Do you know exactly how far you are from the runway? How much altitude would you lose in a 180 degree turn? That's a lot of information you need to gather (or more likely guess). Maybe in his years of experience, he saw plenty of pilots try to turn back to the airport only to run out of energy and lose control of the plane.
The only reason you "know" he could have turned back was because lots of crews got to practice this in the sim. They had 2 big advantages. 1: They knew both engines were going to fail and 2: They weren't going to kill anyone while they practiced. While you think he is a bad pilot for not instantly making the turn back, the truth is, he was right at the very edge of the window for a possibly return. What you are proposing is the same as a crew guessing where they think V1 is. That is what he had to do. He had to make a judgment call and just like V1, the statistics show that unless you KNOW you are below V1, you are better off continuing.
So unless you know the minimum altitude and speed you need to be to turn back and land for EVERY one of your takeoffs, I wouldn't comment on 1549.
A dual engine failure after takeoff is not something we prepare for. We don't know the exact distance we are from the airport. Making an immediate turn back based on feel would have been a gamble and as the NTSB showed, a risky gamble. Rather than react based on gut instinct, he took more logical actions that had a greater chance of saving the day. He had Skiles attempt an engine start while he asked ATC for landing options. Those actions allowed him to maintain aircraft control rather than run out of energy over a densely populated city.
Do you know the glide ratio of an Airbus? Do you know exactly how far you are from the runway? How much altitude would you lose in a 180 degree turn? That's a lot of information you need to gather (or more likely guess). Maybe in his years of experience, he saw plenty of pilots try to turn back to the airport only to run out of energy and lose control of the plane.
The only reason you "know" he could have turned back was because lots of crews got to practice this in the sim. They had 2 big advantages. 1: They knew both engines were going to fail and 2: They weren't going to kill anyone while they practiced. While you think he is a bad pilot for not instantly making the turn back, the truth is, he was right at the very edge of the window for a possibly return. What you are proposing is the same as a crew guessing where they think V1 is. That is what he had to do. He had to make a judgment call and just like V1, the statistics show that unless you KNOW you are below V1, you are better off continuing.
So unless you know the minimum altitude and speed you need to be to turn back and land for EVERY one of your takeoffs, I wouldn't comment on 1549.
#36
#37
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jun 2017
Posts: 659
It seems that you're the one making assumptions. I'm a 40 year pilot with decades of 135 and 121 time and thousands of hours in the A320 family. Let's hear your creds beyond internet bigmouth. I'm confident in my judgment knowledge of the airbus and skill. I'm questioning yours. I'll stand by my original statement that Sully had a very lucky day where superior airmanship overcame inferior decision making. Take your grandstanding somewhere else junior.
#39
Here is a quote from the NTSB report:
"The simulations demonstrated that, to accomplish a successful flight to either airport, the airplane would have to have been turned toward the airport immediately after the bird strike. The immediate turn did not reflect or account for real-world considerations, such as the time delay required to recognize the extent of the engine thrust loss and decide on a course of action."
"The simulations demonstrated that, to accomplish a successful flight to either airport, the airplane would have to have been turned toward the airport immediately after the bird strike. The immediate turn did not reflect or account for real-world considerations, such as the time delay required to recognize the extent of the engine thrust loss and decide on a course of action."
#40
He actually does have better aviation safety credentials than 99.9% of us line pukes. The Hudson thing was just a moment of opportunity that met years of preparation. I don't begrudge the man that.
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