It's not a buffet. We can't just eat our fill and then go back through the line and fill our plate up with some more good stuff we like.




Notice that it's signed by both MEC's








November 30, 2012

Dear Fellow Pilots,

There has been much discussion about the consequence of voting “No” on the Tentative Agreement. Debate on this and other subjects is healthy and expected. But that debate should be based on facts, experience and informed opinion -- and not on conjecture or misstatements.

That’s why a Council communication that went out last Tuesday caught our eye. It suggested that US Airways flight attendants -- who have now rejected their second Tentative Agreement -- have bettered themselves with these “no” votes. Unfortunately, and as discussed below, the NMB has recessed this mediation and isn’t scheduling more meetings; management will not meet with them outside mediation; and they’re now still working under a bankruptcy contract.

The Council communication also asserted that, if ratification failed, the NMB would “immediately” restart the mediation process. All MEC members had several opportunities to hear directly from the NMB and ask the Board members questions. There was never any information presented that allows that conclusion. ALPA’s Representation Department and outside experts we’ve consulted have set out a more realistic understanding of the process followed by the NMB in the event of contract rejection.

In the event of a failed TA the Board generally recesses the mediation case in order to get more information about the reasons for its failure. Normally ALPA would survey the pilot group and leadership to determine the areas that need improvement in the failed TA. Then the JNC would receive direction from the MECs. Next, the NMB would be contacted and a status conference scheduled with the NMB. The JNC would meet with the NMB, review the case, and request the immediate resumption of mediation. Based on previous steps, this meeting would typically occur about 2-3 months from rejection of the TA. The Board would then contact UAL management to obtain its views. Afterwards, the Board and the mediators assigned to the case would determine when to schedule the resumption of mediation, and thereafter, future dates for mediation, if appropriate. It is typical for a revised TA to take more than six months to achieve.


Additional Information Provided by ALPA’s Representation Department
At our request, ALPA’s Representation Department provided other observations about its experience following contract rejection along with historical support for those observations.

► The return to negotiations/mediation following a failed TA is not immediate and talks do not typically ramp up to intensive levels, if at all, until a few months later.

► The return to negotiations/mediation following a failed TA is not immediate and is often influenced by the economic environment and the Company’s financial performance in the period after the failed TA. The Company is now also able to revisit any areas they wish to negotiate.

► The return to negotiations/mediation following a failed TA is not immediate and more favorable than they actually are. It’s usually impossible to assess the net/net impact, or true Company cost, when costing information isn’t available and delays are factored in. Typically, savings from delayed pay increases, benefit improvements and work rule enhancements are used to offset the cost of the revised deal when it includes better terms and conditions.

► The return to negotiations/mediation following a failed TA is not immediate and They know that deals will rarely, if ever, be approved in the future and employees will always believe there is a better deal if they vote “no” the first time. As a result, it’s much more common for money to be moved around in the revised package than it is for money to be added to the package.

Here’s some more detail that may help explain the above observations:

Resumption of Negotiations/Mediation is Not Immediate
It’s very hard for the NMB to re-commence mediation until it has a clear understanding of the issues that caused a TA to be voted down. The Board knows that a Company isn’t going to simply make improvements in every important contract area. The Association surveys or polls to understand member views objectively in order to brief the NMB intelligently about the problem areas. That process takes some period of time. Once data is in hand, the two MECs will have to discuss and direct the JNC. These discussions and decisions sometimes take time as well. With MEC direction, the JNC meets with the NMB, which then seeks the Company’s views and willingness to meet. Internally the NMB decides on the best way to handle the case and decisions about meeting location and schedules are made. It’s customary for serious meetings to get underway months -- not weeks -- later based on the above-mentioned intermediate steps. It is typical for a revised TA to take 6 months or longer to achieve.

Results Following a Failed TA Are Often Problematic
It’s very difficult to make broad generalizations about the results of contracts negotiated after a failed TA -- both because situations are different and because, without detailed costing and valuation information, it’s impossible to accurately assess the changes. Here are a few recent examples:

(a)AirTran (Section 6) -- ATN pilots, under their independent National Pilots Association (NPA), began bargaining for a new CBA in the 2004 time frame. After approximately 3 years of virtually no progress, they entered into services agreement with ALPA for E&FA help and professional negotiator assistance. In the 2008 time frame, and with assistance from ALPA and the NMB, they reached a TA that was not ratified by members. The NMB recessed the case for the better part of a year before resuming mediation in early 2009. The NPA merged with ALPA in May 2009. In the fall of 2010 we reached a new TA that was ratified by members.

(b)Southwest (Section 6) -- After almost 3 years of negotiations, SWAPA completed a new collective bargaining agreement in the Spring of 2009 that was rejected by members because of inadequate international code-share language and unfavorable scheduling rules. A revised TA was reached and ratified in the Fall of 2009. The revised TA modestly improved international code-share and scheduling rules but pay components were reduced.

(c) AirTran/Southwest -- This was a package of 2011 agreements that included SLI issues and provisions related to transition to SWA rates and benefits. As to pay, a deal was first negotiated that brought all ATN pilots to SWA rates very quickly and provided certain protections for ATN flying. The MEC did not approve the deal based on their SLI-related concerns and refused to send it out to pilots. The second deal made very modest improvements to the SLI, but ATN pilots also move much more slowly to SWA rates and benefits over a period that extends until 2015. After the MEC rejected the first TA, the Company spent more time evaluating its earlier offer and concluded it had offered and agreed to a package that was too expensive.

(d) Pinnacle -- Prior to the Mesaba/Colgan transaction, Pinnacle pilots negotiated for more than 4 years before reaching their stand alone TA. The agreement provided substantial pay, work rule, scope and benefit improvements but was turned down by members. The NMB recessed the case for many months before calling the parties in for a status conference. There were informal meetings between Company and pilot representatives for a few more months seeking to narrow the open issues. Once open issues were narrowed, the NMB reconvened talks. But that new agreement was reached more than a year later during JCBA negotiations with Mesaba and Colgan.

US Airways Flight Attendants
Unfortunately, and contrary to the Council communication referred to above, the US Airways flight attendant contract rejection does not stand for the proposition that “good things come to those who wait.”

The NMB has now helped the parties achieve two TAs -- both of which failed to ratify -- over the course of the last 18 months. Each looked a little better on its face than the previous deal. Essentially, economic features were shuffled to move money into areas that were more important to AFA leadership. The Company used the delays to add some money to the contract but, it’s reported, without changing the net cost to the Company when they got the benefit of the delay.

The NMB has now recessed the case and is not scheduling meetings.

The AFA US Airways website, has the following:
“The airline’s flight attendants haven’t had a unified contract since US Airways and America West merged in 2005. The two groups still fly separately, under separate contracts, with different work rules and pay rates. US Airways’ pilots are in the same situation.”

November 1, 2012 AFA Update:
We have been advised by the Company that they do not intend to develop a proposal for a revised tentative agreement. The Company has indicated they are only willing to meet if directed by the NMB and are not willing to engage in negotiations outside of that process. Additionally, Doug Parker indicated at Crew News that the Company has no plans to put more money into the Flight Attendant Agreement.

United pilots are urged to come to Town Hall meetings where you can ask your questions about these subjects and hear directly from JNC members, pilot subject matter experts and professional negotiators and advisors.

In Unity,



Captain Jay Heppner
Chairman, United MEC

Captain Jay Pierce
Chairman, Continental MEC

 

I was pleased to see this was signed by both Jays, and I'm STILL trying to figure out why the SEA rep chose this particular argument to make his point. It's a CASE STUDY in why the premise that you should "never take the first offer" is fatally flawed. In my opinion, he shot any credibility he had by using this example as a reason to vote "No"

 

Well, that and this is far from the first offer.

The first offer was years ago. If I remember correctly, it was along the lines of Delta +$1 (their OLD pay rates), CAL work rules, and UAL's pathetic scope. We are many, many iterations later. This is just the first one where we get a direct voice.

 

I like this letter better, from sUA pilot Jerry Leber.
How did we get here? How to proceed?

Our contracts’ amendable dates were 12/31/08 for LCAL pilots and 12/31/09 for LUAL pilots. By our account the company’s delay tactics were largely to blame, but by all accounts the combination of two extremely different contracts was both painstaking and time consuming.

It is clear that the call for release to the NMB created a sense of urgency for all the parties and helped bring this negotiation to an AIP, but what is also clear is that our negotiators were in no position to close the deal in the all-important end-game. We all remember the more than three months it took for the parties to actually agree on exactly what they agreed to in the form of a TA. Anyone who has negotiated to buy a house or even a car knows that this is no way to secure the best deal possible.

The bad news is that it took 3-4 years past our respective amendable dates to achieve what almost everyone agrees is a disappointing TA, but the good news is if we turn it down that time-consuming effort of meshing two disparate pilot contracts doesn’t need to be repeated. All that remains is to fix some glaring and important flaws in this TA and we have far more leverage with the company than we did just a few months ago.

The most unacceptable item from a unionist perspective in this TA is LOA 25 in which a relatively small group of our brothers and sisters who were furloughed would be treated as second class citizens even though the financial impact of making them whole is very small on the company, but enormous upon these pilots' lives. These twice-furloughed LUAL pilots will have their longevity credit for the time they were furloughed limited unlike other pilots from LUAL, LCAL, DAL, NWA and other airlines because a very few want to preserve our furloughees' disadvantage for others imaginary SLI benefit and in doing so deny these furloughees and their families thousands of dollars of much needed and well-earned compensation that is meaningless to the company. There is an inspiring ground swell of support from the LCAL pilots to right this wrong because they recognize it as simply unjust. If there is one thing we should have learned over the years it is to never eat our young. Even if we discount the potential economic impact on such cannibalistic behavior to the Association, the cost in terms of fomenting never ending disunity alone should give us reason to pause. Have we not learned our lessons?

Another overarching problem with this TA was the failure to extract from the company their end of the grand bargain. Towards the end of the negotiation the MECs agreed to allow the JNC to submit a UAX 76 seat RJ proposal but only in return for Delta + compensation. The TA RJ proposal gives the company all the benefits of the DAL RJ proposal, but the shrinkage in UAX block hours and mainline growth that DAL pilots are receiving as a result of 88 717s entering their mainline fleets is just a hope in our contract. Our TA allows UAX to add 67 76-seat RJs without parking one 70-seat UAX RJ. All they would have to do is park enough 50-seaters to keep the overall UAX block hours steady. There are 75 older and very high-maintenance CRJ-200s that are the obvious choice. The rest of the 50-seat UAX fleet are relatively new and more standardized EMB-145s largely flow by favored partner ExpressJet. Only if at some future date UAL decides to order mainline E190/5s or Bombardier CS100s will United pilots enjoy the mainline job growth and UAX block hour shrinkage that our DAL counterparts now experiencing.

Did we get DAL + compensation in return for our UAX 76-seat RJ scope proposal? NO!

• We got DAL - 8.5% in 2013, -3% in 2014 and -3% in 2015, the year in which the DAL contract becomes amendable.
• While our B/C plan will be 1-2% higher our new long-term disability (LTD) plan will cost us $150-$221 a month out of pocket while DAL’s LTD is better and paid by the company.
• Delta pilots got two on-time contracts which are the equivalent of 100% retro pay while we are getting about 50% and still don’t have the exact accounting that our union promised prior to voting to avoid another bond debacle of mis-preconceptions of what is actually due. Vague charts are inadequate.
• Delta pilots got 5% of the equity in DAL while we are getting zero. Today this is worth about $30,000/pilot.

The rationale the company used and that we bought to rationalize this year delay in the DAL pay rates was their inability to add 76-seat RJs to the UAX fleet within a year. It is safe to say that United pilots are sick and tired of paying for management incompetence.

The solutions to these problems are very simple.

• Adjust the limit on UAX block hours to drop immediately and proportionally from the first UAX 76-seat RJ that is added, not the 154th.
• DAL pay from day one.
• United pilots receive 10% of UAL stock that is immediately sellable. The extra 5% would be to compensate for the substandard retro.

Finally, work rules. We need to be assured that the adoption of the CAL PBS system and many of their work rules are not going to destroy pilots’ quality of life. The average 5 hours/day definitely helps, but we also need the 3.5 to 1 trip rig that Delta pilots have enjoyed for years much sooner than a year after our seniority lists are merged. And finally, if forced junior-manning is as rare and unlikely as the sales pitch would have us believe then it begs a simple question. Then why is the company so adamant about having it? Removing it from our agreement would be a sign of good faith on their part that they truly want to build a better culture with their pilots. It would show that they are willing to use incentives such as ADD pay instead of continuing to depend on sticks.

That’s all great, but what leverage to we have?

The biggest lever we have is the company finally needs this agreement. Wall Street and the institutional investors who control UAL stock are clearly growing frustrated with the poor return on their investment and the prospects going forward especially when the financial and service comparisons with DAL are so clearly deficient. UAL’s superior network is still compelling, but the analysts have seen the exodus of premium customers away from United. It is clear to them that this TA and the integration of the pilot groups necessary for any UAL turnaround to begin. A strong NO vote would certainly shock airline analysts and could not be helpful to the UAL stock price.

At WHQ a myriad of IT projects including the migration from Unimatic to CAL’s Crew Management System (CMS) are on hold awaiting the pilot contract. The company needs to complete this migration by the end of 2013 ahead of the new FAR 117 Flight Time/Duty Time deadline. With the opening of new pilot bases and separate pilot groups the complexity and inefficiencies of the operation continue to grow and the company falls further behind in their pilot training backlog that can only be solved by getting pilots to fly more hours per month. The only plausible way to do that is for this manpower negative TA to pass.

The public call for release by the NMB got us this far, and that strike/release threat is far more credible now that the election is behind us. Labor was critical in the key state of Ohio and ALPA is a member of the AFL-CIO whose leader was in the Oval Office meeting with the President a week after his reelection. NMB Board member, Linda Puchala, personally told our MECs that she needs to know immediately if the TA fails what the pilots’ reasons for turning it down are. This clearly indicates that our contract is a high priority for the NMB and this Administration.

Finally, while the fears of UAL management wanting to shrink LUAL are warranted their ability to do so is limited by non-terminable protections in the TPA and the LUAL contract. The “replacement aircraft” provision in the TPA doesn’t expire like some provisions arguably may on March 31, 2013. This provision mandates that aircraft ordered after the legal merger, like UAL’s July 2012 737 order, will be flown by the pilots from the legacy airline whose planes are parked regardless of whether that plane is currently in that fleet. So if there is no TA by August 2013 when those 50 737-900ERs start arriving to replace the retiring LUAL 757-200s then LUAL pilots will fly those 737s and will be trained by LUAL instructors.

We are also protected by sections 1-F-1/2, the minimum block hour guarantee, of our contract and 1-C-1-d of our contract that limits UAX block hours to no more than UAL mainline block hours. We currently have grievances filed against the company for exceeding that contractual limit. If the company reduced LUAL mainline block hours they would have to reduce UAX block hours proportionally.

On September 11, 2001, the world changed for the airline industry and the pilots of United Airlines in particular. More than any other pilot group we sacrificed to save our company, we gave up over fourteen-billion dollars in concessions as well as the loss of our pensions for the promise of shared sacrifice, shared reward. We paid that price to retain some semblance of our work rules. Anyone who has seen the objective list of concessionary gives to the company in terms of both work rules and other areas realizes that life is going to be very different for the United pilots in the coming years if this TA is ratified. The reasons to vote yes are simply not compelling in terms of threat when one looks objectively at the very real and practical protections we have in place in our current CBA, T&PA, realities in the industry, and pressures on senior management. The reasons to vote yes are also often stated in a political context, i.e., “We need to move on.” Isn’t that exactly how the company and others have positioned us to get their way? The price of moving on at this moment will be staggering, the pain will be felt for the next six to eight years. The value received in the demonstration of a little more patience will be rewarded.

We have come a long way in this fight for what we are due. Our predecessors faced much more daunting prospect and far longer odds. We work for the world’s largest airline with and the best network. UAL has $7B in the bank and is profitable despite gross mismanagement. If we fail to take the slightest risk even when the circumstances are so favorable then we should not expect management to deal fairly with us in the future. This is a critical and defining moment that will determine what type of airline for which we will work for the rest of our careers.

Jerry Leber

 

While I agree with Captain Leber's sentiment I can not agree with his conclusions. I would offer as direct rebuttal my post located here.

The fight that most of us want to have is not a fight that can be won in Section 6 negotiations. It is a fight to change the framework from within which we negotiate all future contracts and how those contracts are protected from legal maneuvering by unethical managers. It will take a legislative solution to parts of the RLA and BK code amongst others. That is a fight I'm very willing to fight, just as soon as I get their boot off my throat. We must not only have the willingness to fight, but the capacity.

 

History is written by the victors, I can't wait to see what Flying the Line 3 has to say about us!

 

I think as a pilot group we have acted as true "bullies". We thump our chest in the good times, but are the very first to cave in the bad, when the chips are down.

As another previously posted, vote yes to a pay raise, and no for a payout.

If we would have followed his advice 10 years ago, we would never ended up where we are today.

Look what APA did in BK. They voted no for a voluntary pay cut. They may end up with little or no pay cut, and maybe a pay raise. IN BANKRUPTCY!!!!!!!

 

Thank YOU!

We're not going to get more because Jeff is a "nice" guy.

We're going to get more by demanding more.

Gordon always said we left money on the table on the last contract, when asked why he didn't give it to us - he said, "You didn't MAKE me!"

Jeff has more money.

Jeff is under immense pressure from Wall Street (especially from Chase Manhattan) and the board to get this deal done.

You think we don't have leverage, you haven't been listening to the investors on the conference calls - "when are you getting this done so that you can start making money!"

The leverage we have is to say this fish stinks, bring us back another one!

Everyone who doesn't see that hasn't been paying attention.

There is always MORE - you just have to demand it.

Vote NO!

 

In order for you to vote yes, how much more money per year are you going to require? I'm guessing you want full retro, so add $1 Billion. Then you want DAL pay right away, and absolutely NO gives according to what I've read in other posts. Let's say that's another, what $500 million? Do you think the banks want Jeff to sign on for another $1.5 Billion just to get a deal? Sorry, but your opinion of how much leverage we have with the banks and how badly Jeff needs this deal isn't backed up by what I'm hearing and seeing. You are entitled to your opinion, but your assertion that "Everyone who doesn't see this isn't paying attention" carries absolutely zero credibility. It's your opinion. Nothing more, nothing less.

You don't get more by demanding more. You get more by having the leverage to back it up. Thank Wendy and Jay P. for giving that away right from the beginning.

 

My NO vote is not based on dollars.