Any "Latest & Greatest" about Delta?
02-14-2014 | 07:45 PM
The Brown Dot +1
Joined: Jun 2009
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From: 777B
Icing had nothing to do with the accident. They simply stalled the aircraft.
The airplane performance study and simulations showed that the airplane experienced minimal performance degradation because of ice accretion.184 Specifically, the AOA at the time of the wing stall was about 1° above the expected AOA for a clean wing (no ice accretion) stall warning. Thus, the airplane could have been operated in normal flight, at the non-icing Vref, and with a substantial margin remaining above the actual point of stall. As a result, the NTSB concludes that the minimal aircraft performance degradation resulting from ice accumulation did not affect the flight crew’s ability to fly and control the airplane. The flight crew’s actions during the accident sequence are further discussed in sections 2.2.2 through 2.2.4.
They were at 2300 feet on autopilot approaching the marker in level flight. The CA commanded gear down and flaps to 15. Props were set to fine pitch and power to idle. It was left there until the aircraft stalled. The PFD gave them 18 seconds of warning in red they were slowing below the commanded AS prior to stick shaker.
The airplane performance study and simulations showed that the airplane experienced minimal performance degradation because of ice accretion.184 Specifically, the AOA at the time of the wing stall was about 1° above the expected AOA for a clean wing (no ice accretion) stall warning. Thus, the airplane could have been operated in normal flight, at the non-icing Vref, and with a substantial margin remaining above the actual point of stall. As a result, the NTSB concludes that the minimal aircraft performance degradation resulting from ice accumulation did not affect the flight crew’s ability to fly and control the airplane. The flight crew’s actions during the accident sequence are further discussed in sections 2.2.2 through 2.2.4.
They were at 2300 feet on autopilot approaching the marker in level flight. The CA commanded gear down and flaps to 15. Props were set to fine pitch and power to idle. It was left there until the aircraft stalled. The PFD gave them 18 seconds of warning in red they were slowing below the commanded AS prior to stick shaker.
02-14-2014 | 07:49 PM
Da Hudge
Joined: Oct 2006
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From: Poodle Whisperer
02-14-2014 | 07:55 PM
Gets Weekends Off
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From: B737 CA
Hold up there, you're putting a few words in my mouth based on one throwaway comment. I'm not saying "RJ pilots got screwed". Every one of us knew exactly what we were getting into when we took the job. Mind you, we made that decision because it had become a defacto requirement for a civilian pilot who wanted to fly for the majors, but that's no excuse. I take responsibility for my actions and don't claim to be a victim whatsoever. Neither do I consider 10 years at the regionals "winning the lottery," though it certainly beats what you had to go through.
It seems like you've made the connection between outsourcing of narrowbody flying and your furlough and subsequent stagnation; don't you want that flying to be recaptured? That's what I want (and have for 10 years), and with the pilot shortage getting underway there may very well be a good chance to do exactly that in the near future. I don't want you to recapture it because RJ guys got screwed...we didn't, we got exactly what we were looking for (a chance at the majors) and no more. I want you to recapture it because junior guys like yourself got screwed, royally. I want you to recapture it because there is presently an enormous schism across this profession, and the lack of unity is going to hurt us going forward.
I've been trying to avoid "mainline guys are to blame for giving up scope!" arguments lately because *everyone* has a share of the blame, it's hypocritical to blame someone for a choice that I subsequently took advantage of, and because blaming people makes enemies out of needed allies. My throwaway comment about profit checks partially financed by RJ flying probably sounded accusatory, when I was mostly saying "Look, everything in this industry is connected. You can't biatch about Pt 117 that much when your wages, profit sharing etc were partially financed by contract decisions that eventually led to the conditions that brought about Pt 117." It's an argument for taking back scope: outsourcing 50% of your narrowbody flying will inevitably affect the 50% you keep.
It seems like you've made the connection between outsourcing of narrowbody flying and your furlough and subsequent stagnation; don't you want that flying to be recaptured? That's what I want (and have for 10 years), and with the pilot shortage getting underway there may very well be a good chance to do exactly that in the near future. I don't want you to recapture it because RJ guys got screwed...we didn't, we got exactly what we were looking for (a chance at the majors) and no more. I want you to recapture it because junior guys like yourself got screwed, royally. I want you to recapture it because there is presently an enormous schism across this profession, and the lack of unity is going to hurt us going forward.
I've been trying to avoid "mainline guys are to blame for giving up scope!" arguments lately because *everyone* has a share of the blame, it's hypocritical to blame someone for a choice that I subsequently took advantage of, and because blaming people makes enemies out of needed allies. My throwaway comment about profit checks partially financed by RJ flying probably sounded accusatory, when I was mostly saying "Look, everything in this industry is connected. You can't biatch about Pt 117 that much when your wages, profit sharing etc were partially financed by contract decisions that eventually led to the conditions that brought about Pt 117." It's an argument for taking back scope: outsourcing 50% of your narrowbody flying will inevitably affect the 50% you keep.
Junglebus..I'm getting the vibe that you're a champion of the "RJ pilots got screwed" and that mainline pilots are enjoying their profit sharing checks "on the backs of poor RJ pilots". As one of the former 1310 DAL furloughees, let me offer a different perspective;
RJ Captains didn't have any problems upgrading in a few years and logging a decades worth of TPIC on the backs of mainline furloughees.
RJ Captains at Comair didn't have any problems cashing Strike Assesment checks as mainline pilots honored their struck work out of CVG and tried to reduce the pay gap by making Comair pilots the highest paid RJ Captains in the industry.
RJ Captains didn't have any problem refusing to allow furloughed mainline pilots to get hired in the RIGHT seat at Comair in exchange of preferred interviews at DAL unless the lists were merged and all scope provisions were eliminated.
RJ Captains didn't have a problem supporting the RJDC to sue mainline ALPA.
RJ Captains didn't have a problem flying to the 121 max for the lowest bidder as long as they got to fly new, bigger turbine aircraft on routes that used to be flown by mainline 737, 727, M88, DC9 pilots.
Rj Captains didn't have any problem flying legacy passengers hub to hub, laying over in FCA, MSO, JAC and then non-revving with their families in first class to Paris while they made an average of $100k a year.
RJ Captains didn't have a problem using their thousands of hours of PIC to shop around for a SWA/JBLU/Frontier/Spirit/Allegiant/Suncountry/ect. job but then enjoy a flow-thru agreement to DAL and get a class date just weeks after our final furloughees get back to the line after a decade without their ID badge.
Sorry Junglebus. You just got hired at Delta, right? You better save the "on the backs of RJ pilots" for APC..'cause it ain't gonna fly when you're talking smack around 15 yr FO's who are still waiting for a chance to move to the left seat.
Here's what I've been doing while you've been an RJ Captain;
DFW 727C, SLC 727B, SLC 73NB..9/11..DFW M90B, CVG M88B, Furlough...Recall, ATL 737B, SLC 737B, SLC M90B, merger..SLC 320B.
Sorry you had it so rough. The pilot shortage and 1500 hr rule are gonna be huge windfalls for any RJ Captain hired on the front of the wave. You won the lottery, but you still want to ***** about having to buy a ticket.
RJ Captains didn't have any problems upgrading in a few years and logging a decades worth of TPIC on the backs of mainline furloughees.
RJ Captains at Comair didn't have any problems cashing Strike Assesment checks as mainline pilots honored their struck work out of CVG and tried to reduce the pay gap by making Comair pilots the highest paid RJ Captains in the industry.
RJ Captains didn't have any problem refusing to allow furloughed mainline pilots to get hired in the RIGHT seat at Comair in exchange of preferred interviews at DAL unless the lists were merged and all scope provisions were eliminated.
RJ Captains didn't have a problem supporting the RJDC to sue mainline ALPA.
RJ Captains didn't have a problem flying to the 121 max for the lowest bidder as long as they got to fly new, bigger turbine aircraft on routes that used to be flown by mainline 737, 727, M88, DC9 pilots.
Rj Captains didn't have any problem flying legacy passengers hub to hub, laying over in FCA, MSO, JAC and then non-revving with their families in first class to Paris while they made an average of $100k a year.
RJ Captains didn't have a problem using their thousands of hours of PIC to shop around for a SWA/JBLU/Frontier/Spirit/Allegiant/Suncountry/ect. job but then enjoy a flow-thru agreement to DAL and get a class date just weeks after our final furloughees get back to the line after a decade without their ID badge.
Sorry Junglebus. You just got hired at Delta, right? You better save the "on the backs of RJ pilots" for APC..'cause it ain't gonna fly when you're talking smack around 15 yr FO's who are still waiting for a chance to move to the left seat.
Here's what I've been doing while you've been an RJ Captain;
DFW 727C, SLC 727B, SLC 73NB..9/11..DFW M90B, CVG M88B, Furlough...Recall, ATL 737B, SLC 737B, SLC M90B, merger..SLC 320B.
Sorry you had it so rough. The pilot shortage and 1500 hr rule are gonna be huge windfalls for any RJ Captain hired on the front of the wave. You won the lottery, but you still want to ***** about having to buy a ticket.
02-14-2014 | 08:14 PM
Runs with scissors
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From: Going to hell in a bucket, but enjoying the ride .
02-14-2014 | 08:17 PM
Runs with scissors
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From: Going to hell in a bucket, but enjoying the ride .
02-14-2014 | 08:21 PM
Da Hudge
Joined: Oct 2006
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From: Poodle Whisperer
02-14-2014 | 08:25 PM
Runs with scissors
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From: Going to hell in a bucket, but enjoying the ride .
02-14-2014 | 08:45 PM
Da Hudge
Joined: Oct 2006
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From: Poodle Whisperer
02-14-2014 | 10:06 PM
Gets Weekends Off
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Yeah, icing was only a peripheral factor. I have 2300 hours in the Q400, much of it across the Cascades, Sierras, Rockies, & Canadian Rockies in winter. It does just fine in ice, largely because it has an ungodly amount of power. Horizon did a good job of maintaining the boots, which helps a lot.
I studied the accident pretty closely at the time due to my experience in the airplane and wrote a series of in-depth blog posts about it (here are Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 if you're interested). But here's the cliff notes version: the crew was engaged in non-pertinent conversation for most of the flight, continuing well below 10,000, and neglected to do the descent checklist - including entering v-speeds - until a few minutes before landing. They had the Refs Speed switch set to "Increase" as per SOPs in icing conditions; on the Q400 this activates the stick shaker at 8° AoA instead of the normal 12°. They however, forgot to use icing speeds, which at most weights is a 10-15 kt increase. Colgan's training in this area was deficient; the NTSB interviewed about 30 Colgan pilots (including check airmen) after the accident and only a few could give the correct answer to when you use Ref Speeds Incr and when you using ice speeds.
Basically, the CA just decelerated from 170 kts very quickly when he was slowing to approach speed and forgot to call for landing flaps until they were fairly slow. They were still above the (incorrect non-icing) approach speed, but because of the refs speed switch being set to Incr & the landing flaps not being set yet, the plane hit 8° AOA, the stick shaker went off, the autopilot disconnect, and the CA hauled back on the yoke with about 20-30 lbs of force while bringing the throttles up to 80% torque and not touching them again (130% is available in an emergency).
The plane wasn't even close to stalled when the shaker went off. The speed deteriorated to 105 kts while pitching up to 30°, with the CA using aileron/spoilers to counteract the considerable torque/p-factor instead of rudder; therefore when it stalled, it immediately snapped right, to 105° bank. At this point the stick pusher was on but he overrode it with 60-120 lbs (!) of force the whole way down with one momentary interruption when they had somewhat recovered from the upset, but still had a huge AoA. It's true that the FO put the flaps up without being commanded during the initial stickshaker event, but given that the CA's handling resulted in nearly continuous AoAs over 25°, it's doubtful that leaving the flaps alone would have made a difference. After the upset, they basically had one chance to save it, but the CA continued to haul back on the yoke.
As to why the CA hauled back on the stick, many have suggested he was thinking tailplane stall, and I guess it's possible as he had previously flown the Saab, but honestly everything he did looks more like panicked reaction than any conscious decision. The way that Colgan (and pretty much everyone) taught stalls at the time resulted in having motor memory of 20-30 lbs of back force on the yoke during stall recovery, because you normally stopped trimming at a high airspeed, and were expected to maintain altitude during recovery. Well, if you use the exact same motor response when the autopilot trims all the way down to stick shaker, combined with 80% torque, you get a very quick 30° pitch up.
Colgan's training was infamously bad. The Q400 was a quirky airplane and IOE at Colgan was half of what Horizon gave pilots new to the airplane. Both CA and FO were tired from punishing commutes. FO had commuted across the country because she couldn't afford to live on the east coast and had moved back in with her parents. She also had a head cold and talked on the CVR about not daring to call in sick. CA of course had many checkride busts, a few of which he hadn't disclosed on his app. Was a former Gulfstream PFT kiddie. Yeah, the crew screwed the pooch pretty royally, but this was also a system accident if we ever saw one. Part of that system was CO pilots allowing their company to outsource their flying to a dirtbag operator. Part 117 and the ATP rule mean that dirtbags now can't be quite so dirtbaggy, but the system that put an airplane like the Q400 at an operator at Colgan is still in place and still being defended by certain parties within ALPA.
I studied the accident pretty closely at the time due to my experience in the airplane and wrote a series of in-depth blog posts about it (here are Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 if you're interested). But here's the cliff notes version: the crew was engaged in non-pertinent conversation for most of the flight, continuing well below 10,000, and neglected to do the descent checklist - including entering v-speeds - until a few minutes before landing. They had the Refs Speed switch set to "Increase" as per SOPs in icing conditions; on the Q400 this activates the stick shaker at 8° AoA instead of the normal 12°. They however, forgot to use icing speeds, which at most weights is a 10-15 kt increase. Colgan's training in this area was deficient; the NTSB interviewed about 30 Colgan pilots (including check airmen) after the accident and only a few could give the correct answer to when you use Ref Speeds Incr and when you using ice speeds.
Basically, the CA just decelerated from 170 kts very quickly when he was slowing to approach speed and forgot to call for landing flaps until they were fairly slow. They were still above the (incorrect non-icing) approach speed, but because of the refs speed switch being set to Incr & the landing flaps not being set yet, the plane hit 8° AOA, the stick shaker went off, the autopilot disconnect, and the CA hauled back on the yoke with about 20-30 lbs of force while bringing the throttles up to 80% torque and not touching them again (130% is available in an emergency).
The plane wasn't even close to stalled when the shaker went off. The speed deteriorated to 105 kts while pitching up to 30°, with the CA using aileron/spoilers to counteract the considerable torque/p-factor instead of rudder; therefore when it stalled, it immediately snapped right, to 105° bank. At this point the stick pusher was on but he overrode it with 60-120 lbs (!) of force the whole way down with one momentary interruption when they had somewhat recovered from the upset, but still had a huge AoA. It's true that the FO put the flaps up without being commanded during the initial stickshaker event, but given that the CA's handling resulted in nearly continuous AoAs over 25°, it's doubtful that leaving the flaps alone would have made a difference. After the upset, they basically had one chance to save it, but the CA continued to haul back on the yoke.
As to why the CA hauled back on the stick, many have suggested he was thinking tailplane stall, and I guess it's possible as he had previously flown the Saab, but honestly everything he did looks more like panicked reaction than any conscious decision. The way that Colgan (and pretty much everyone) taught stalls at the time resulted in having motor memory of 20-30 lbs of back force on the yoke during stall recovery, because you normally stopped trimming at a high airspeed, and were expected to maintain altitude during recovery. Well, if you use the exact same motor response when the autopilot trims all the way down to stick shaker, combined with 80% torque, you get a very quick 30° pitch up.
Colgan's training was infamously bad. The Q400 was a quirky airplane and IOE at Colgan was half of what Horizon gave pilots new to the airplane. Both CA and FO were tired from punishing commutes. FO had commuted across the country because she couldn't afford to live on the east coast and had moved back in with her parents. She also had a head cold and talked on the CVR about not daring to call in sick. CA of course had many checkride busts, a few of which he hadn't disclosed on his app. Was a former Gulfstream PFT kiddie. Yeah, the crew screwed the pooch pretty royally, but this was also a system accident if we ever saw one. Part of that system was CO pilots allowing their company to outsource their flying to a dirtbag operator. Part 117 and the ATP rule mean that dirtbags now can't be quite so dirtbaggy, but the system that put an airplane like the Q400 at an operator at Colgan is still in place and still being defended by certain parties within ALPA.
I have to take offense with that statement there as someone who went through Colgan's infamously bad training. I never realized how famously good other regional carriers were by contrast. I'll agree with you completely that the Q400 growth was too much, too quickly and tested the capability limits of Colgan's training department.
The problem with Colgan was an inability to grow effectively. Prior to Pinnacle's acquisition of Colgan staffing was becoming an issue. Most RJ operators were draining the pilot applicant pool and Colgan was not competitive or desirable enough to most pilots. When Pinnacle bought Colgan that only exacerbated the staffing issues as Q400's were being integrated into the CAL codeshare through EWR. Basically Colgan was pushed to grow through Pinnacle's backing at a faster rate than they could accommodate. Pinnacle was attempting to play the whipsaw game with the Colgan group, as the Pinnacle guys were 7+ years from there prior contract's amendable date.
I don't care what company you work for, every groups has that 10% of pilots who slipped through the cracks and should not be flying. We have developed outlets to try and flag these dangerous types of attitudes/sub par abilities, but even then sometimes these types don't get flagged. The majority of pilots at Colgan were, and still are, extremely competent, capable, and all around good sticks. I'm sure that may be difficult too believe, but as a new DAL guy, you may want to try disparaging entire labor groups. We've had enough of that in this industry and if we move forward it will need to be together and not upon the backs of each other.
Regardless, welcome aboard and congratulations. I'm assuming you've spent a good amount of your career at a regional based on your handle, so you'll always appreciate the difference in working at mainline as opposed to a regional.
DH
02-14-2014 | 11:25 PM
Moderator
Joined: Dec 2007
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From: DAL 330
Junglebus..I'm getting the vibe that you're a champion of the "RJ pilots got screwed" and that mainline pilots are enjoying their profit sharing checks "on the backs of poor RJ pilots". As one of the former 1310 DAL furloughees, let me offer a different perspective;
RJ Captains didn't have any problems upgrading in a few years and logging a decades worth of TPIC on the backs of mainline furloughees.
RJ Captains at Comair didn't have any problems cashing Strike Assesment checks as mainline pilots honored their struck work out of CVG and tried to reduce the pay gap by making Comair pilots the highest paid RJ Captains in the industry.
RJ Captains didn't have any problem refusing to allow furloughed mainline pilots to get hired in the RIGHT seat at Comair in exchange of preferred interviews at DAL unless the lists were merged and all scope provisions were eliminated.
RJ Captains didn't have a problem supporting the RJDC to sue mainline ALPA.
RJ Captains didn't have a problem flying to the 121 max for the lowest bidder as long as they got to fly new, bigger turbine aircraft on routes that used to be flown by mainline 737, 727, M88, DC9 pilots.
Rj Captains didn't have any problem flying legacy passengers hub to hub, laying over in FCA, MSO, JAC and then non-revving with their families in first class to Paris while they made an average of $100k a year.
RJ Captains didn't have a problem using their thousands of hours of PIC to shop around for a SWA/JBLU/Frontier/Spirit/Allegiant/Suncountry/ect. job but then enjoy a flow-thru agreement to DAL and get a class date just weeks after our final furloughees get back to the line after a decade without their ID badge.
Sorry Junglebus. You just got hired at Delta, right? You better save the "on the backs of RJ pilots" for APC..'cause it ain't gonna fly when you're talking smack around 15 yr FO's who are still waiting for a chance to move to the left seat.
Here's what I've been doing while you've been an RJ Captain;
DFW 727C, SLC 727B, SLC 73NB..9/11..DFW M90B, CVG M88B, Furlough...Recall, ATL 737B, SLC 737B, SLC M90B, merger..SLC 320B.
Sorry you had it so rough. The pilot shortage and 1500 hr rule are gonna be huge windfalls for any RJ Captain hired on the front of the wave. You won the lottery, but you still want to ***** about having to buy a ticket.
RJ Captains didn't have any problems upgrading in a few years and logging a decades worth of TPIC on the backs of mainline furloughees.
RJ Captains at Comair didn't have any problems cashing Strike Assesment checks as mainline pilots honored their struck work out of CVG and tried to reduce the pay gap by making Comair pilots the highest paid RJ Captains in the industry.
RJ Captains didn't have any problem refusing to allow furloughed mainline pilots to get hired in the RIGHT seat at Comair in exchange of preferred interviews at DAL unless the lists were merged and all scope provisions were eliminated.
RJ Captains didn't have a problem supporting the RJDC to sue mainline ALPA.
RJ Captains didn't have a problem flying to the 121 max for the lowest bidder as long as they got to fly new, bigger turbine aircraft on routes that used to be flown by mainline 737, 727, M88, DC9 pilots.
Rj Captains didn't have any problem flying legacy passengers hub to hub, laying over in FCA, MSO, JAC and then non-revving with their families in first class to Paris while they made an average of $100k a year.
RJ Captains didn't have a problem using their thousands of hours of PIC to shop around for a SWA/JBLU/Frontier/Spirit/Allegiant/Suncountry/ect. job but then enjoy a flow-thru agreement to DAL and get a class date just weeks after our final furloughees get back to the line after a decade without their ID badge.
Sorry Junglebus. You just got hired at Delta, right? You better save the "on the backs of RJ pilots" for APC..'cause it ain't gonna fly when you're talking smack around 15 yr FO's who are still waiting for a chance to move to the left seat.
Here's what I've been doing while you've been an RJ Captain;
DFW 727C, SLC 727B, SLC 73NB..9/11..DFW M90B, CVG M88B, Furlough...Recall, ATL 737B, SLC 737B, SLC M90B, merger..SLC 320B.
Sorry you had it so rough. The pilot shortage and 1500 hr rule are gonna be huge windfalls for any RJ Captain hired on the front of the wave. You won the lottery, but you still want to ***** about having to buy a ticket.
CG,
Great Post - you also saved me from having to type all of that.
Plus 1310!
Scoop
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