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MD88 FLC OVERSHOOT ASSIGNED ALT ON DEP WHEN BOTH PLTS ATTEMPT TO TROUBLESHOOT COMPASS SYS SPLIT.

Narrative: BOTH COMPASS SYS SPLIT ON INITIAL TURN TO HDG OF 190 DEGS. DIVERGENCE INCREASED RADICALLY ON TURN TO 220 DEGS AT 2.3 MI DME. ATTN DIVERTED TO STANDBY COMPASS TO CONFIRM ACTUAL HDG. EXCEEDED ASSIGNED ALT OF 2500 FT BY APPROX 600 FT. RETURNED TO 2500 FT EXPEDITIOUSLY AND CONTINUED TO WORK COMPASS PROB. IN RETROSPECT, I INAPPROPRIATELY DEVOTED TOO MUCH ATTN TO THE ABNORMAL CONDITION RATHER THAN MAINTAINING MORE COMPREHENSIVE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. ADDITIONALLY, THE STANDBY COMPASS ON THE DC9/MD80 IS ABYSMAL. IT IS AN AWKWARD ARRANGEMENT, AT BEST. THE COMPASS MUST BE VIEWED THROUGH A SYS OF MIRRORS WHICH EASILY GET OUT OF ALIGNMENT. THE MONITORING PLT WAS REMOVED FROM HIS 'MONITORING ROLE' BY THE IMMEDIATE NEED TO REALIGN THE MIRRORS OF THE STANDBY COMPASS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 510481: WE HAD A COMPASS DISCREPANCY. I ATTEMPTED TO CONFIRM OUR HDG BY USING THE MAGNETIC COMPASS AND XCHKING WITH BOTH COMPASS SYS. THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED ON THE MD88 WITH A SERIES OF MIRRORS AND LIGHTS. THE CAPT WAS FLYING THE ACFT. A FEW SECONDS LATER, I HEARD THE ALT RPTR NOTIFY US OF A DEV. I FEEL I COULD HAVE MONITORED THE ACFT BETTER, HAD I NOT BEEN TRYING TO FIND THE COMPASS IN THE BACK OF THE COCKPIT THROUGH THE SERIES OF MIRRORS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text.

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Narrative: ON BOTH DAYS WE WERE SLOWED DOWN TO MINIMUM FORWARD AIRSPD TO FOLLOW BEHIND ONE DC9 OR ONE MD88. THIS SLOWDOWN COST US 24 MINS AND 4000 LBS OF FUEL AND 15 MINS AND 3000 LBS OF FUEL RESPECTIVELY. HOWEVER AT THE DISTANCES INVOLVED WE COULD HAVE EASILY OVERTAKEN THE ACFT ... .

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The right auxiliary pump and the xfer unit were switched off at cruise; FL360. At top of descent; the auxiliary and xfer unit pumps were switched back on. Hydraulic pressure and quantity were normal. Between FL240 and FL220 and approximately 60 NM north of ZZZ2; the master caution light illuminated and indicated left/right hydraulic pressure low. System display panel showed hydraulic pressures zero and quantities L19/R9. The first officer began working the non normal checklist for hydraulic pressure low in the QRH. This particular checklist ensures all pumps are on and then in an attempt to remove air from the system the checklist requires the engine hydraulic pump and auxiliary/xfer pump be switched off and then back on. The first officer accomplished this 4 times with no permanent rise in hydraulic pressure ....

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